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Preface
 
The importance of the Korean development experience inter­
nationally lies in the hope that this remarkable economic performance
 
gives, most importantly, to other nations in their quest for better
 
national economic performance and in bettering the lives of their
 
citizenry, and, secondarily, to donors or lenders in how to improve
 
the development process or ensure that funds are repaid.
 
This hope is not spurious, and Korea is not unique, but there are
 
dangers in lightly abstracting from the Korean experience without
 
careful attention to distinguishing those elements that are uniquely
 
Korean, and those general lessons that might be learned from that
 
effort. This paper h.opes to clarify some of the issues. Inevitably
 
some will remain clouded.
 
0 Korean economic development in its various attributes has perhaps
 
been more studied than any similar national economic changes in the
 
contemporary world. Ten volumes have been published by the Harvard
 
University Press alone for the Harvard Institute for international
 
Development, and the Korea Development Institute, a collaborator in
 
those studies, has its own impressive publication list. There are
 
more Ph.D. dissertations in the United States on Korean economics
 
than in any other Korean field. There is, of course, a whole
 
literature in the Korean language, and Korean economics is the
 
subject for both the Japanese academic and popular presses.
 
This apparent interest in Korean development has reflected
 
economic growth and bred proliferation of academic publications. The
 
literature is now so extensive that it is difficult, except for the
 
specialist with command of at least three languages, to marshal the
 
available facts and their various interpretations. Even with these
 
skills, the analysis of Korean economic development is in large part
 
a matter of intuitive insight and interdisciplinary sensitivity. It
 
is both an art and a science, and the balance between the two is a
 
matter for either dispute or conjecture.
 
As one who has been involved in evaluation of development
 
activities for a number of years, I have felt that there has always
 
been an intellectual gap in an analysis of what a project or a
 
program between what happened in a country, area, or sector, either
 
for its benificl.aries or in the aggregate, and the causal connection
 
between the planned activity and the changes. So many relevant
 
factors impinge on project results in the non-laboratory setting in
 
which they must existand which are extraneous to the project, that
 
it becomes difficult if not impossible to attribute the results to
 
the project 
government or 
itself, 
donor 
a program 
policies, 
in related fields, or 
and sometimes aspects 
changed 
of the 
international economic scene, or a complex combination. of all of 
these factors. 
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Demonstrating that growth --with more difficulty, increased
 
equity-- took place over a prolonged period is relatively easy, but
 
it is infinitely more complex to separate the causal connections, and
 
virtually impossible to quantify in any meaningful way the uses of
 
donor funds in isolation from other, possible, causal factors.
 
Intellectually, thus, the task set is difficult, but that is not
 
to deny that progress has taken place, and that there has been a
 
generally positive donor record in Korea. Observers of the Korean
 
scene perhaps can be satisfied with that conclusion, that the "hard
 
numbers" that economists desire are available only in the aggregate,
 
and that they should not be too disheartened. Causality between-donor
 
activity can reasonably inferred, if not proven.
 
For these reasons, this essay is highly personal, not only in its
 
interpretation of Korean growth and distribution, but also for the
 
implications that it draws from Korea that might be applicable to
 
other societies.
 
I would like to thank both present and past members of the Korean
 
government, including the staffs of the Ministry of Finance, the
 
Economic Planning Board, the Bank of Korea, and the Korea Development

Institute for their kil.dnesses and assistance. I have refrained from
 
naming individuals here, for the conclusions are solely those of the
 
author, and errors of fact or interpretation should not be attributed
 
to others or their institutions.
 
I would also like to thank members of AID's Center for
 
Development Information and Evaluation for reading the early drafts
 
of this paper, and to John Bennett of the Korea Development Institute
 
of America and Paul Kuznets of Indiana University for t!heir extensive
 
comments on the drafts. They all have immeasureably improved it, but
 
are of course not responsible for any errors or sins of commission or
 
omissions.
 
To AID and the World Bank, I offer thanks for allowing me to
 
increase my understanding of Korean development. The views expressed

herein do not reflect, and have not been cleared with, any agency of
 
any government or any donor, multilateral or bilateral.
 
Bethesda, Maryland
 
September 1984
 
Summary
 
By any standard of performance, The Republic of Korea
 
overall is justly considered an economic success. The forces

that produced sustained growth are complex; some are rooted in
 
Korea's unique historical and cultural milieu, but some lessons
 
may be abstracted from the Korean experience.
 
Korea emerged from the partition after World War II and
 
the destruction of 
the Korean War economically devastated,
 
bereft of heavy industries and natural resources--a military

and economic ward of its principal donor, the United States.
 
In the long run, however, fts economic disadvantages were
 
offset by non-economic factors--an ethnically 
 homogenous

population, linguistic unity, a high value placed 
on mobility

through education, and 
'-he principle of a meritocratic state.
 
Although mired, in abject poverty, its people shared a
 
remarkably equal distribution of the assets that 
remained
 
because of the land reform inaugurated by the U.S. military

government, the material destruction of the war, and the spread
 
of primary education.
 
Korea followed a policy of 
 import oubstitution until
 
1961. Almost completely dependent on donor support 
for food
 
and consumption goods, 
as well. as raw materials and military

assistance, Korean policy stressed 
the ma- imization of foreign

assistance, including maintenance 
of an unrealistic set of
 
foreign exchange rates that effectively discouraged exports.

Charges that donor support 
was concentrated on consumption

goods and that the PL 480 food 
import program retarded real­istic agricultural pricing policies were generally accurate, as
 
the policy goals of donor and recipient were different.
 
Following the military coup of 
1961, President Park inter­
nally consolidated and centralized economic and 
 political
 
power, and externally, perhaps because he 
 was unsure of
 
continuing U.S. support, 
 because import substitution had
 
obviously failed Park owed
and nothing to the interests
 
supporting that program, and in part to distance his government

from the United States, shifted economic policy to an export

promotion program. Donor was with
support diversified, 

normalization of relations with Japan a critical element in 
the
introduction of capital and technology. 
Foreign investment was
 
encouraged, the first IBRD loan signcl, 
and export targets

rigorously set and meticulously enforced. President 
Park's
 
concentration on the economy, which 
he was able to control
 
through administrative, political, and social means, as 
well as
through taxes and a government allocation of institutional
 
credit, became exceedingly effective as he seemed to regard 
it
 
as his avenue to political legitimacy. Growth of Korean GNP,

exports, overseas construction earnings, and manufacturing
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capacity has attracted the admiration of foreign observers,

especially in the light of Korea's deft handling of the crises
 
associated with the two oil price increases, a worldwide
 
recession, and a large defense burden.
 
Although relatively favorable, income distribution
 
worsened as the government virtually ignored the rural sector
 
until the early 1970s. Figures on income distribution in Korea
 
are badly flawed, as they are in many countries. They show,

however, that, first, the creation of urban employment in
 
manufacturing and, later, subsidies and development in
 
agriculture, lowered the percentage of the population in
 
poverty from 40 to 10 percent. Income disparities are likely

to grow with the elimination of pricing subsidies.
 
Equity in Korean society was greatly enhanced by the crea­
tion of employment opportunities, a process in which donor
 
support was an important but unquantifiable factor. There
 
exist, however, important rural and urban income disparities,
 
as well as regional income differentials. Equality of access
 
to the marketplace is lacking as the government has control of
 
institutional credit and allocates it in larger part the
to 

successful major industrial and trading conglomerates, because
 
they are easier to work with in achieving government targets,

such as those in heavy industry. Women are denied equal pay

and status in the development process. Labor is supressed.
 
The importance and effectiveness of the donor role have
 
shifted over time. For the first decade and a half after
 
liberation, donor, essentially U.S., support was essential to

the survival of the state and the modest growth that took
 
place. It was eminently successful in land reform, although it
 
never reached its full potential, as payments to landlords were
 
not used productively to their capacity. Acrimonious disputes

between donor and recipient marked economic policy negotiations

in the earlier period.
 
The increasing success of the Korean export drive under
 
President Park encouraged commercial lending and foreign

investment, so that concessional assistance became extremely

modest. The role of multinational lending to Korea is
 
considered by the government to be an important attraction for
 
commercial lenders.
 
There is general agreement that since the early 1960s
 
Korea has been an effective user of concessional assistance, by
 
any definition of the term. Foreign assistance has been of
 
varying importance and impact in differing fields.
 
Overall, policy advice was followed if it was seen as
 
serving Korean interests and supported the distribution of
 
power and the national directions already determined by
 
v 
government. It was particularly effective when it was viewed
 
as having been internally generated, and was used by one part

of the Korean government to strengthen its views in relation to

other governmental entities.
 
Technical assistance personnel, in spite of problems of
 
language and knowledge of the bureaucratic culture, could be

effective if they provided the technical means by which to
 implement effectively the pre-determined policy directions of

the government. Training and human resource development were

universally regarded as effective and one of the most important

elements of concessional aid.
 
Donor support has generally followed Korean government

policies and priorities. Emphases have changed as governmental

priorities have shifted, but (with few exceptions) donors have
followed the government's lead. Aid levels in the Korean
 
context have had little correlation with the effectiveness of
 
foreign assistance.
 
Korea is not a simple model that can be emulated by other

nations, but it has been in a very real sense a model user of
 
foreign assistance. There are, however, lessons from the

Korean experience. Although multilateral aid agencies have an

edge in both prestige and flexibility over major bilateral
donors, there is need for reform in both camps. The search for
 
universal solutions to problems that may specific in nature

continue to plague both types of donors.
 
I. Introduction
 
Korea has been widely recognized both publicly and
 
professionally for its economic accomplishments. Some more
 
popular observers have likened the rapid, indeed spectacular,

growth of the Korean economy in the past two decades to the
 
rebirth of the phoenix from the ashes and destructIon of the
 
Korean War, or alluded to the "miracle on the Han." Others,
 
more academic, stress the continuity of the Korean tradition,

noting that various policies and peronalities helped unleash a
 
potential that was always latent. Certainly, development

economists and specialists regard Korea's national economic
 
performance as one of the world's outstanding successes. There
 
is no dispute over its sustained and high growth for over two
decades in the face of overwhelming odds: a paucity of natural
 
resources, rising energy costs, internal political turmoil,

heavy defense burdens in the light of international insecurity,

the world's third highest population-to-land ratio, and the
 
highest per capita to 
farm lane ratio in the world, excluding

the city states like Singapore.
 
A. Background
 
The Korean development experience poses not so much the
 
issue of what happIned in broad perspective, on which there is
 
general agreement , but rather: (a) why and how it happened;

(b) whether the sweeping generalizations of remarkable macro­
economic developmental success reflect or mask important dif­
ferences beneath the national level; (c) what role did foreign

aid agencies, multilateral and bilateral, play in this process;

and (d) most important, since development is about people, what
 
specifically happened to people Korea in this
the of rush to
 
succeed. There may 
also be important lessons, extrapolating

from the available Korean evidence, applicable to other nations
 
aspiring to similar goals. Analysis of the operating prin­
ciples and methods of the various donors might also lead to
 
recommendations on how to enhance their efficacy.
 
This essay, then, must be concerned with all of the issues
 
herein raised, but it is particularly focused on the question

of the role that foreign concessional assistance, multilateral
 
and bilateral, played in this process.
 
It will analyze the growth of the Korean economy,

especially in the 
context of a remarkable shift in development
 
strategy beginning in 1961, one that has been characterized as
 
"perhaps the most dramatic and vivid [policy] change that ha
 
come about in any developing country since World War 11."9
 
Within this context, it will explore the issue of distribution
 
equity in Korean society, a question on which existing data are
 
far less reliable than those of growth. To understand the
 
critical developmental 
policy shifts that have occurred in
 
Korea, their historical context must first be examined.
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Within this broad ken, an analysis of the role and bene­
fits accruing to women; the place of the private sector in
 
Korean development; the role of trade; how policies 
were
 
formulated and the influence, if any, of foreign assistance
 
agencies on them; and the efficacy of technical cooperation or
 
assistance within the Korean context will also be essayed. The
 
growth of Korea has been mirrored in the growth of literature
 
on Korean development, but this essay will not attempt to
 
reproduce or summarize this vast corpus of material. Rather,

it will focus on the effectiveness of foreign assistance in
 
meeting the broad growth and equity targets that are generally

the concerns of the four major donors to Korea: the World
 
Bank, 6the Asian Development Bank, the United States, and
 
Japan. The economic influence of each of these donors has
 
differed over time, with te United States no longer providing
 
major assistance to Korea.
 
The complexity of the Korean development process as docu­
mented in-the burgeoning literature on the subject precludes

the narrow interpretation that the forces leading to such rapid

growth were solely the result of text-book like economic
 
factors. The diverse pressures shaping Korean economic
 
expansion require a politico-economic analysis, with additional
 
consideration of its socio-cultural background, although

development agencies prefer to deal with quantifiable economic
 
indicators.
 
As one author noted:
 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, given the complexity

of relationships and the obvious influence of institu­
tional and cultural factors that economists treat 'govern­
ment' as exogenous and that neither economists nor
 
political scientists have a paradigm that can satisfac­
torily explain how Vhe regime or government influences
 
economic development.
 
Although donors may wish to eschew political factors in
 
providing assistance, and this is especially important for
 
multilateral agencies, understanding the political and social
 
forces that shape economic policy and development is quite
 
separate from providing assistance because of such factors. It
 
is the former that is of concern here, for if lessons are to be
 
learned from the Korean development process, they will only be
 
applicable if they relate to the non-economic forces in other
 
societies.
 
B. On Folklore and Definitions
 
A wide range of quasi-informed development folklore has
 
evolved and been articulated about Korean growth. These views,

often expressed at high academic or government levels, tend to
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obscure those elements of accuracy included in such sweeping

generalizations to the effect that the causes of Korean growth
 
are solely or essentially to be found in the efficacy of the
 
private sector, a Confucian or "post-Confucian" society,[9]
 
strong authoritarian leadership, pricing or exchange rate
 
policies, or indeed are only attributable to the success of
 
foreign assistance, a desideratum devoutly to be wished by some
 
staff of donor organizations.
 
One authority on Korea, in an exhuberance of enthusiasm,
 
could write, "The almost irresistible conclusion from Korean
 
development experience is that with proper economic policies

and a continuation of reasonable international aid levels most
 
developing countries can achieve at least a 6 percent annual
 
growth rate, and manw0 countries could sustain growth rates as
 
high as 10 percent." Worldwide experience since that time
 
would challenge this lesson as neglecting other, important
 
factors in the Korean experience.
 
The task of analysis is further complicated by the absence
 
of clear and distinct definitions, including those as fundamen­
tal to this study as economic assistance and concessionality,

and indeed effectiveness, the last of which will be defined
 
subsequently. Aid (as distinct from commercial credits) from
 
all sources to Korea since liberation from Japanese coloni
 
rule in 1945 to 1983 has probably totaled over $26 billion,

much of it in grant or concessional form. About one-third of
 
this amount was military assistance. From 1962 until 1981,

Korea received $41.7 billion in foreign lending and grants, of
 
which oni-third came from public and two-thirds from commercial
 
sources. Even this figure 
Korea's external debt in 1981, 
seems 
and 
low, 
beca
as 
use 
it 
most 
approximated 
assistance 
before 1962 was in grant form. 
In considering the role of foreign aid, how does 
one
 
calculate or account for any influence of military assistance
 
in economic development? Although some forms of military

support can be excluded from any economic analysis, there are
 
other forms that are more ambiguous. The training of thousands
 
of military officers in the United States may have had a
 
significant impact on these individuals when they left the
 
services and assumed important roles in the civilian government

and economy. The early supply of skilled labor, such as
 
electricians and mechanics, came from the military. Social
 
mobility in Korea in the past two decades has been possible

through the military. Surplus U.S. military equipment in large

quantities had economic impacts. The role of the Korean
 
military and foreign military aid was pervasive, and affected
 
the economy in manners not usually adequately defined. How
 
important the military experience of working within a strong

hierarchical command structure was for effective implementation

of developmental projects, a hallmark of the successful Korean
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experience, is worthy of consideration. So too the effects of
 
military mobilization are important in analysis of labor supply

and employment issues. 
 An analysis of military assistance is
 
not included in this paper: its importance awaits careful
 
study.
 
How also does one account for the important effects of the

Vietnam War on the Korean economy and its foreign exchange

holdings at that time, as well as in the training of 
an over­
seas construction industry that was later to play such a vital
 
role in the Middle East and elsewhere (about $13 billion in
 
1981 and 1982)? Can Japanese "reparations" be considered as
 
concessional assistance? How do we calculate or evaluate the
 
contributions of the relief and developmental operations of
 
literally hundreds of voluntary organizations and foundations

that assisted Korea? These issues are 
not resolved here,

although their importance should not be overlooked 
 or
 
underestimated.
 
Although it likely the real
is that (as opposed to
 
nominal) value of foreign c-oncessional assistance, espqqially

in the earlier period, may well have been overestimatedr4 from
 
the United States alone Korea received more assistance per

capita than any other country in the world except Israel and
 
Vietnam. This assistance was even more important in the 1950s
because of-the absence of other donors, commercial credits, and
foreign investment, let alone the inflation since that period.
 
The definition of the concessionality of foreign aid 
seems
 
on the surface to offer less controversy since it ostensibly is
 
determined by how much resources must be repaid. clearly
It 

involves interest rates below the international market, but may

also include long repayment schedules and grace periods. It is

also evident that "concessionality" may be defined by field or
 
sector: commercial lending may not be available for certain
 
types of projects (e.g., health). The economic returns may not
 
be readily apparent, and thus concessional assistance may be
 
appropriate. Concessional assistance thus 
may transcend the

normal IDA context, and may also be influenced by internal
 
factors. International market-rate lending to Korea, although

at times not concessional solely in interest rate terms,

ususally turns to so when re-lent
out be internally, at least
 
in comparison with the curb or informal market. Since the
 
demand for credit exceeds the officially controlled supply and
 
as the government has had virtual direction over the
 institutional credit mechanisms within Korea, including those
 
originating from abroad, credit in 
this monopoly situation has
 
tended to be highly concessional compared to the informal
 
market and is used to shape and direct 
economic investment.
 
Even institutional rates may differ. For example, foreign

funds to the Korea Development Bank in 1980 were re-lent at 

percent interest, but in the same year government equipment
 
9.1 
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loan interest rates were 21.0 percent. In that year, the
 
Medium Industry Bank re-lent foreign funds at 8.5 percent,

Korean governmepn funds at 19.5 percent, and their own funds at
 
24.8 percent. The complexity of interest rates within the
 
same organization but reflecting different origins of the funds
 
is also ey1 dent in the National Agricultural Cooperative

Federation. The government uses subsidized interest rates to
 
encourage specific exports. Korea continued to borrow from IDA
 
as late as 1974, but the bulk of lending to Korea under IBRD
 
auspices was at the prevailing interest rates for middle-income
 
countries, although it was somewhat below commercial rates.
 
The definition used in this paper will include such lending to
 
Korea, but will obviously exclude loans from private commercial
 
banks and commercial investment.
 
This paper is divided into consideration of the two main
 
analytical elements of the study: growth and equity or distri­
bution. This division allows the paper to be more focused than
 
a straight historical analysis. Aid effectiveness issues that
 
cut across these two aspects of the report will be treated
 
toward the close of the paper in a separate section.
 
1. Growth
 
Growth is defined for purposes of this paper as the expan­
sion of the Gross National Product in real terms in the
 
aggregate and on a per capita basis. Although growth does not
 
necessarily imply self- sustaining expansion of the economy,
 
and thus development, this issue is one that must he addressed
 
here. Growth also subsumes the increases in the productivity
 
of land, labor, and capital, as well as the mobilization of
 
savings for investment. It includes as well the allocation of
 
these resources and the capacity of the society to invest and
 
manage such allocations and production. Entrepreneurship is
 
thus one element of the growth process. Growth is also
 
concerned with the increases in the rates and types of tech­
nological change, and must also include discussion of the
 
capacity of the state to generate foreign exchange, and the
 
volume and changes in the composition and direction of trade.
 
The reliability of the figures on aggregate growth in the
 
Korean society is relatively good in comparison with other
 
nations. Although there are some gaps, inadequacies, and
 
inconsistencies, and entrepreneurial and managerial functions
 
can hardly be quantified, a clear overall picture of Korea's
 
overall accomplishments is possible.
 
2. Equity
 
As growth deals with aggregate figures, equity disaggre­
gates those figures in various ways. Equity is distribution,

but distribution that transcends funds and includes other
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factors as well. Equity in development terms may be defined as
 
participation in and the shared access to the resources, bene­
fits, decisions, and costs associated with the development
 
process in economic, social, and cultural spheres, and the
 
potential mobility to partake of social and economic change.

Equity developmentally is not necessarily equality, but is more
 
akin to an admittedly ill-defined concept of "fairness."
 
Equity is thus not simply limited to aspects of income distri­bution, although in many societies income is its most obvious 
manifestation and in development agencies the normal focus of 
inquiry, when it is considered at all. Income is, after all,

only one aspect of that which is distributed.
 
Perhaps more important than the rather static data that
 
analysis of the income of various deciles of the population or
 
Gini coefficients provide at any single point are such issues
 
as (a) under what conditions can income be enhanced (and who
 
has control over those conditions if they exist), (b) what
 
types of social and economic mobility exist in that society and
 
are they increasing, and 
(c) how much and what kind of access
 
do individuals have to the social services generally subsumed
 
under the rubric of basic human needs?
 
These issues are positively phrased. The converse must
 
also be explored: who benefited less, or sacrificed more for
 
growth in the society as well? Any analysis must also deter­
mine not only who gets how much out of growth, but what the

obstacles are are
to shared access, and whether such deterrents 

increasing or diminishing. For this paper the issue of the
 
donors' roles, if any, are particularly important.
 
Social issues are salient as well: to what degree has
 
there been equal access to critical services, such as education
 
or health or amenities such as electricity, and what role has
 
the government played (or, conversely, not played) in making
 
sure that these services were equally available in some appro­
priate manner? Did, for example, agricultural extension
 
workers provide broad regional and farm coverage? Was
 
fertilizer available to all?
 
An issue not normally discussed in economic papers is that
 
of social mobility: can rise both income and
one by class
 (status or prestige) within the society, and through what
 
means? EquiLy in sum is related both to economic and social
 
reality and to hope as well; it 
is both fact and perception.
 
equity: income distribution as disaggregated by 

All of these questions are reevant to Korea and will be 
treated, if only briefly, below. 
We will consider in this paper several aspects of 
income decile
 (the most traditional method for viewing equity), by urban and
 
rural differentiation, and by geographic region. Differences,
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if any, between income distribution within the urban sector,
 
such as in various types of manufacturing, and between manufac­
turing and the service sector and by sex within each category,
 
might also be informative.
 
If there are no important ethnic distinctions in Korea,
 
there are vital regional differences, the origins of which go

back over fifteen hundred years and the saliency of which
 
remain evident today in both economic and political terms. The
 
general availability of employment (as well as its possibility

by region, sex, and training) is one other aspect of equity, as
 
is access to such jobs and the means to acquire the skills
 
necessary to qualify for such activities. Equity should also
 
be viewed in terms of access to the market; that is, is the
 
market reasonably accessible to all, and if credit or other
 
incentives are provided, especially by the state, is there
 
discrimination in its allocation? 
 Further, if the government
 
sets prices for producers or consumers, who secures the bene­
fits ot shoulders the burdens? If there are 
 subsidies
 
involved, how is this accounted for and who immediately or
 
eventually pays the bill? The final economic issue relates to
 
the equitable sharing of the costs of running the state--how is
 
the tax burden allocated?
 
C. Factors in Korean Growth and Equity
 
Korea as a nation had several important advantages that,
 
in retrospect, were to be critical in both the growth of the
 
economy and tha distributive patterns related to such economic
 
changes. Although they are not necessary and sufficient pre­
conditions of rapid development, and few were prescient enough
 
to anticipate their relevance, the Korean experience indicates
 
that they may have accelerated the process.
 
1. Ethnicity and Culture
 
Korea's singular advantage over many other societies, one
 
that has important implications for both growth and equity, is
 
that Korea is the only country in Asia, and one of the few
 
developing countris in the world, that is essentially ethni­
cally homogenous. Over the centuries, Korea has evolved into
 
a society in which there are no significan17 minority groups

that have traditionally been disadvantaged, no groups that
 
have been cast outside the mainstream of the society. Con­
versely, there were 
no different peoples who developed a
 
commanding or exploitative economic or social role in the
 
state. There were, thus, no ethnic impediments to econamic
 
development or the distribution of its fruits, and no ethnic
 
scores that had, in nationalistic terms, to be settled. Korea
 
fortuitously avoided dilemma having deal the
the of to with 

equivalent of the Indians in Burma, the Chinese 
in Indonesia,
 
or the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The colonial Japanese were
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repatriated by an occupying military power, the United States,

and quickly vanished from the internal economic scene.
 
This single ethnicity has meant that education could be
 
focused anu the pcpulation mobilized with relative ease. There
 
were no insuperable problems of linguistic diversity that
 
retarded advancement through education in a national language

that--because it had been supressed by the colonial power-­
acquired added piquancy, or indeed the universal and rapid

expansion of education throughout the state, with important

implications for the future mobilization of labor for
industrial development. Regional accents in Korea are more a
 
cause for humor than they are for rancor.
 
An obverse developmental hypothesis based on Korea may

thus be formulated: countries that have ethnically diverse
 
populations will probably find economic growth with equity more
 difficult to achieve, manage, and sustain. In such circum­
stances, donors will have to be sensitive (with resultant
 
staffing implications) to the nuances of working with a central
 
government to affect positively, or disadvantage as little as

possible, ethnic groups on the periphery. The balance between
 
ethnicity and distributional economics is indeed often
 
delicate.
 
Korea!s comparative developmental advantage extends to a
 
number of other, related areas. There have been no vitupera­
tive religious splits in Korea that have proven divisive
 
economically or socially, and there has been none of the reli­
gious conservatism that has militated against change, economic
 
or social, in other societies. Christianity (both

Protestantism and Catholicism) have been an important

indicator, but not determining element, of change. Its growth

has mirrored Korea's economic expansion, although a causal
 
relationship between the two is not demonstratable.
 
Ethnic cohesion toward the external world, in spite of
 
extreme factionalism internally, has been characteristic of
 
Korea for a thousand years. In the face of external cultural
 
threats from its neighbors, Koreans have shared a strong sense
 
of "Korean-ness," which has given them relative cultural
 
cohesion. This has important developmental and mobilization
 
implications when externally threatened.
 
The ardent desire for reunification between North and
 
South Korea is one obvious manifestation of this basic cultural
 
unity. Yet the perceived military threat from North Korea has
 
given substantial impetus toward attainment of both the growth

and equity goals of the Republic. In some sense, the large

military expenditures, one-third of the budget and up to 6.5
 
percent of GNP ±L, and the continued mobilization of the fifth
 
largest standing army in the world are in part offset by the
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drive to achieve the political goal of succeeding economically,

and to do so equitably.
 
Three 
 other general factors have been critical in
promoting longer term economic 
growth with a relatively high
These are: land reform throughout the Republic; equal social,

physical, and gender access to primary education; and a merito­
cratic government service (as well as similar employment 
in
 
many quasi-governmental institutions, 
such as banks), the
primary access 
to which was through an impartial examination
 
system. The first two items were assisted by foreign donors,

and the last is a contribution to world culture through the
Confucian-oriented state, reinforced by contemporary western
 
values.
 
2. Land Reform
 
Foreign assistance began in 1945 with the liberation of
Korea from its colonial master, Japan. The American military.
government prior to the formation of the First Korean Republic
in 1948 set in motion two processes, both of which were based
 
on policy decisions inspired from abroad. 
 They were, in fact,
fundamentally different from the relief assistance provided or
fertilizer imported, for example, for the former was transitory

and the latter simply the logical extension of the

modernization process begun under the Japanese. 
They were also

well received internally and were to have profourid effects on

Korea that continue to the present.
 
Fundamental was 
land reform, a two-stage operation, the
first step of which was to distribute to the Korean farmers
land that had been 
under Japanese control or ownership. This
has been called "without doubt, the most sig 4ficant 
accom­plishment of the U.S. Military Government." The second

stage, 
which was completed after the armistice following the
Korean War, broke up the larger Korean yangban (gentry) estates
leaving Korea with a relatively equitable rural income distri­bution pattern. A limit of three hectares was set for

ownership of agricultural land. Full owriexship was only 13.8
 percent in 1945, but 73.6 percent in 1960.
 
Although land ownership had strong emotional underpinnings
in Korean society, the value of agricultural land was very low
because government prices for rice were essentially below the
 
costs of production, a situation alIwed to continue because of
 a massive U.S. food import program. Thus investment in rural

real estate was not economically sound until the 1970s, and
land reform met with little major opposition. Although an

erosion of owner-operated farms and a perceptible rise in
tenancy have occurred since the reform, as well as pressures to

raise or eliminate the ceiling on land ownership to make

mechanization more 
feasible and thus increase the productivity
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of labor, Korea's relatively egalitarian rural income figures
(however flawed they may be) today still reflect the positive

nature of this policy shift.
 
In economic terms, the land reforms probably lowered
 
production for a short period as the state could not efficient­
ly replace the support provided by the landlords in supplying

seed, fertilizer, and credit. In the longer term, however, it
prompted aspiring mobile people to move to urban areas, induced
 
investment into urban endeavors, politically placated the rural
 
population, and may have raised farm productivity when pricing

and other factors were in place.
 
The landlords were paid in government bonds that rapidly
deteriorated in value. This was then, in effect, income
 
redistribution, not only land reform, and thus was important

for the relative equality of income distribution in the high

agrarian society that was Korea following liberation."
 
Landlords retained their social, if not economic, standing, and
 
many of them invested their resources in the modern equivalent

of the imperial examination system of the Yi Dynasty--modern,

westernized education for their children--and urban real
 
estate.
 
This reform was inspired from abroad. The examples of the
 
American-instituted reforms in Japan and Taiwan were the
 
models, but the saliency of the reform was also in part

prompted by a previous North Korean land reform that politi­
cally could not be ignored in the South, as well as (in its
 
second phase) by the reform effectively crippling Syngman

Rhee's yangban political opposition.
 
3. Education
 
The second critical aspect of foreign developmental

assistance was the expansion of the primary educational system,

which the American military government thought would help

"democratize" Korea. Exploited by the Japanese, and denied
 
access to education in Korean, the Koreans had a latent but
 
pent-up demand for education that exploded as soon as it was

politically feasible. In the closing days of the colonial
 
period, even the right to maintain their Korean language and
 
their names was denied in a Japanese effort to integrate them
 
into the mainstream of the Japanese Empire--a process that 
can
 
accurately be called attempted cultural genocide.
 
This educational demand, which had its origins in a value
 
system heavily dominated by the Confucian concept of the
 importance of learning, was in part met through the rapid

construction with foreign aid of a primary school system that

eventually resulted in raising literacy rates to one of the
 
highest levels in the newly industrialized nations. Adult
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literacy was only 2ifpercent in preliberation Korea. Today it
 
is over 93 percent. Korea may have the only major army in
 
the world composed completely of high school graduates or those
 
with higher education. By 1969, the average years of schooling

of those between 25 and 34 years of age was higher in Korea
 
than in France or Italy.24
 
The basic American foreign assistance effort had three
 
policy goals: the democratization of education, its decentral­
ization, and the creation of coeducational classes to improve

the status of women. Although the basic objectives of the
 
donor were never met ane Korean education remains hierarchical,
 
"democratization" was never achieved, control of the education
 
system is even more highly centralized than before, and coedu­
cational classes were never was accepted beyond the primary

level, the educated labor force that was created prior to
 
demand emanating from the manu gcturing sector was an important

element both in Korea's growth and in the rapidity with which
 
it was accomplished.
 
Korean growth and development did not create the demand
 
for education. Rather, popular demand (somewhat unrealistic in
 
the earlier period--Korean education was not known as an ivory

tower, but a "cow bone tower," a structure built on the sale of
 
cattle by farmers to finance their childrens' education) for
 
mobility through schooling-substantially led any real growth in
 
the economic system. As the economy expanded, however, an
 
educated labor pool of both men and women was available who
 
were able to provide Korea a competitive edge over many nations
 
with 4 less literate and educated populace. The Korean govern­
ment early attempted to spread the primary school system

throughout the country. Indeed there were few places by the
 
1960s that did not have a primary school within walking

distance of most villages, and by i9f15, 99.5 percent of primary

school-age students were enrolled.40 Although female parti­
cipation in education started out quite low, it has now
 
equalled that of males, at least at the primary and middle
 
school levels, and virtually in high schools. Female
 
enrollment ratios in colleges, however, are relatively low
 (26.5 percent in 1975), probably because of the high costs
 
associated with education at that level.
 
Although the government advocated the establishment of
 
schools throughout the country, the level of government

expenditure on education was kept quite low in comparison to
 
other countries; since 1960 it has run about l5,percent of the
 
government budget and under 3 percent of GNP.-- In fact, it
 
can be said that the bulk of education in Korea was privately

financed. The strong desire for education is evident from the
 
enormous amount of private funds going into education--in 1961,

for example, expenditures on education weii estimated to equal

one-fifth of the currency in circulation. Throughout much of
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the decade beginning in 1966, the costs of middle school were
 
about 10 percent of disposable hoggehold income, high school 15
 
percent, and college one-third.'7 In 1977, more than two­
thirds of total in-school expenditures were borne by parents of
 
middle, high schooJ. and college students, and this limited
 
educational access. Thus, significant sacrifices were made
 
by the population to educate their children.
 
Severe equity problems did and still do exist, however, in
 
educational access and at higher levels. Poverty thus retarded
 
educational advancement, but also through the 1960s roads and
 
transportation in rural areas were so limited that a consider­
able number of potential students could not go on to middle and
 
high schools, which were only located in the market towns
 (eups). There were no boarding facilities there, and it was

only the exceptional farm family with means or relatives in the
 
towns that could enable a child, usually a male, to go to
 
middle and high school.
 
An important byproluct of the expansion of government

assistance in rural areas beginning in 1971 was the massive
 
construction, improvement, paving, and expansion of the rural
 
road network. This had important equity as well as economic
 
implications, for (with buses subsidized by the government

along some more remote routes) students were able to get to

school more easily. The IBRD has provided well over $350
 
million and the ADB over $1A0 million for road and highway

construction and improvement." Along with the expansion of the
 
rural road system came the increase in farm income because of
 
the change in policy related to the higher pricing of rice and
barley, and thus funds became available for further education
 
of children beyond primary school. This meant that in the
 
1970s farm children could be seen attending schools on bicycles

that previously had only been the major mode of transporting

produce to market. Of course, the expansion of the population

in middle, high schools, and colleges had important

implications for restraining the growth of the labor force.
 
Because the educational and social system pointed consis­
tently upwards toward a bureaucratic position (today business
 
may be even more entizing), there was a persistent demand to
 
get into a good primary school, leading to a good middle and
 
high school, and then to one of the better universities. This
 
practice mirrored the Japanese experience. The system was so
 
accurately predictable--good primary schools being the critical
 
first factor in social and economic success--that families of
 
civil servants or businessmen would often not join their
 
husbands in the provinces so they might have access to the
 better schools of Seoul. In that sense, most of the rest of
 
Korea was disadvantaged. In 1975, Seoul, with about 20 percent

of the population, had 16.3 percent of the nation's primary, 20
 
percent of the middle, 34.2 percent of high school, and 42.5
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percent of college graduates, and education was a 2important
(but not primary) motivation for migration to Seoul.
 
In a series of recent reforms, the government has
 
attempted to break up these patterns by assigning schools by

lottery, eliminating a private tutorial system that favored the
 
children of the wealthy elite by allowing them to excel mo
 
effectively on all types of competitive examinations,

expanding higher education (and technical schools as well) and
 
in general breaking down the continuation of an elite, gentry
(yangban) tradition in which, parenthetically, most of the army

did not participate. Education is expensive in Korea, many of
 
the private costs hidden, and one surrogate indicator of
 
increasing rurrl incomes is that many farm families who once
 
could only serd their children through primary school can now
 
send them through middle and high school (whereupon they

usually abandon the farm for urban employment). The issue of
 
continuation in school is more important in Korea than in some
 
other nations, because Korea uses a mix of both the Korean
 
alphabet (hangul) and Chinese characters (hanja--the latter
 
have been eliminated in North Korea). One may be literate in
 
hangul after primary school, but one cannot read Korean news­
papers, printed in a combination of the two, since Chinese
 
characters are not introduced until late in primary educatlon.
 
Thus to function effectively in Korean society a minimum of a
 
middle school education is-required.
 
4. The Meritocratic State
 
For the generation now in power, the social contacts
 
established through the "right" education were an integral part

of success if one could pass through the stiff entrance
 
requirements of the meritocracy.
 
The Confucian state originated the concept of a bureaucra­
tic meritocracy through instituting an examination system for
 
government positions. It is not surprising that Korea, a state
 
even today with strong Confucian overtones, should have adapted

the concept to its own use.
 
Initial entry into the bureaucratic system through

examination tends to perpetuate or ratify the existing social
 
order. Although, theoretically, anyone can pass, in fact those
 
who graduate from the better universities, and those who enter
 
those universities from the better high schools, are chosen on
 
merit, and are in fact basically a self-perpetuating intellec­
tual elite who can be said to be "the best and the brightest,"

often the scions of well-known families who have managed to
 
maintain their social (and economic) standing through ensuring

that their children remain at the apex of society.
 
- 14 -

This is not to say that Korea, as many other societies,
 
does not also operate of the "entourage" system associated with
 
patrimonial societies, 4 but the merit system as a means of
 
initial entry is pronounced and respected. The depth of
 
bureaucratic competence extending down through the Ministry of
 
Home Affairs, and in the various sectoral ministries, to the
 
county (gun) is evident in the effective degree of project

implementation to which every donor attests. It has been an
 
integral feature of both growth and equity.
 
These three elements of land reform, educational
 
expansion, and a meritocracy, some of which are shared with
 
other states, in the longer term more than made up for the
 
natural resources, the heavy industry and mineral wealth, and
 
the hydroelectric power plants that in 1945 had been North
 
Korea's portion on partition. They are not sufficient
 
explanations for Korea's economic progress, but they were
 
integral to it. They were, in part, assisted by foreign aid.
 
II. 	 Korean Growth
 
Korean growth was neither continuous nor sectorally

balanced since the Korean War. So that perspective on the
 
changes that took place at different periods will become
 
evident, it is important first to provide an overview of the
 
development of the economy.
 
A. 	 Economic Accomplishments of the Republic of Korea,
 
1953-1983
 
In 1953, Korea was in ruins. The destruction caused by

the Korean War devastated the society and the economy, only

physically sparing a small segment of the southeast, which was
 
swollen with refugees. No one was emotionally spared. There
 
were over a million civilian casualties in South Korea alone,
 
and an addihional 420,000, mostly South Korean, dead among the
 
UN forces. The destruction caused by the war in South Korea
 
alone was estimated at $2 billion, and included two-thirds of
 
all industrial plants and 40 percent of all buildings. The
 
physical losses weredestimated at just under the equivalent of
 
the total 1953 GNP.a Agricultural production had dropped 27
 
percent. Twenty-five percent of the total population were
 
refugees.
 
The Republic of Korea could not have survived on its own
 
at that time. It could neither feed its people nor provide

them with basic necessities--let alone amenities; it could not
 
run the government without outside assistance, nor could it
 
protect the state. The standard of living had dropped below
 
World War II levels, and was not to equal them again until
 
1957. Urban degradation and the "spring hunger" of the
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become, both militarily and economically, a ward of its
 
principal donor--the United States.
 
Per capita annual income of the population of 21 million 
at this time was about $67 in current dollars. Less than 23 
percent of the population was urban. Infant mortality was 112 
per thousand live births, and life expectancy was about 53 
years. About 74 percent of the labor force was in agriculture,
and only 7 percent in industry. Exports in 1955 were only

about $18 million, mostly consisting of sales to UN forces in
 
Korea, and 
only about 8.3 percent was composed of manufactured
 
goods. Rice production was 3.7 million metric tons.
 
There was, perhaps more importantly, a widespread malaise
 
in this fractured society reflected in an essentially defeatist
 
attitude. Korea by itself, it was 
said, could not be economic­
ally self-supporting. This pessimism was to last for another
 
decade and was to influence both the donors and recipients for
 
a considerable time. Even the most optimistic of reports, that
 
done by Robert R. Nathan Associates in 1953 under UN auspices,

called for concentration on agriculture and mining (not

manufacturing) to achieve self-sufficiency in five years. It
proved to be unworkable within the period set, 3and later Korea
 
was to follow a different route to development.
 
Table I
 
Category 1953 1961 
 1.970 1982
 
Population (million) 
 21.016 25.710 32.241 38.876(81)

Percent urban 23.1 28.6 
 40.7 55.9(81)

Crude live birth rate 45.3(58) 41.3 30.3 24.0(80)

Infant mortality

(per 000) 
 112.7 75.3 50.0 33.1(81)

Life expectancy 53.2(58) 55.0 60.3 
 66.1(81)

Agricultural labor
 
force-(%) 74.1 64.1 50.0 
 34.0(80)

Industrial labor
 
force-(%) 7.0 18.0
9.6 29.0(80)

Vocational school
 
enrollment (000) N/A 272.7
119.3 805.3(79)

Agricultural production

index 100 99.0
70.0 159.0(81)

Production--wheat (M/T) 101 172 219 66
 
Production--rice (M/T) 3,744 4,717 5,471 7,083

Production--barley (M/T) 794 1,197 1,591 745
 
Imports ($ million) 345.4 316.1 1,984.0 26,344.6(81)

Exports ($ million) 39.6 40.9 835.2 21,188.9(81)

GNP per capita ($) 
 67.0 82.0 248.0 1,800.0
 
90 
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Domestic Savings as 
 8.0 15.6 29.3
% of GNP (62-66) (67-71) (77-78)
Manufacturing as % 8.3 13.9 77.1 

of exports 
 (69)
 
Source: Derived from IBRD data.
 
On the coup of General Park Chung Hee in 1961, Korea had
 
not greatly changed 
from 1953. It was true that per capita
income had increased and infant mortality had started a
precipitous decline, 
but the nation was still dependent on
foreign assistance for its imports and for a large, but
falling, percentage of support to the government's budget.
Exports had marginally improved to $40.9 million, but 
still

manufactured products only comprised 13.9 percent of that
 
total.
 
The significance of 
the shift in politics was, however,
 
soon evident as Korea came tosbe ruled by "military, bureaucra­tic-authoritarian regimes." With this change came vital
decisions about the 
nature of the international economic rela­
tions that Korea 
was to pursue, and the type of economy that

Korea was to have. These changes were palpable, consistent,

generally pragmatic, ably implemented, and came at a time when

the world economy was receptive to an export drive.
 
The support of donors, on which Korea had been so heavily
dependent, continued to be vital for 
a period, as will be
demonstrated 
 below, but the nature of the relationships

changed, and the growing economic independence of Korea,
desired both by the Koreans and by the U.S. but for different
 
reasons, became readily apparent.
 
Today, the visitor, who had been absent for 
two decades,
traveling in almost any portion of the nation would have diffi­
culty recognizing Korea, either urban or rural. 
 The towering
Seoulscape, changing markedly every few years, is only the most

obvious aspect of change that is also mirrored in the country­
side, where forests have been replanted, houses rebuilt, roads
paved, and where there are few areas of Korea that 
indeed can
 
any longer be called isolated.
 
Life now is no doubt generally better. Infant mortality
is less than one-third of 1953, life expectancy is up 13 years.
Korea has become a largely urban and integrated society.
Exports totaled over $21 billion by 1981. From a society that

relied on foreign grant assistance to provide at various
 
periods a third of the government budget, almost total support
for its military, and up to 85 percent of all imports, Korea

attracted both donors and commercial lenders and investors.
 
Whereas in 1953 there was concern that the state could not
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support itself, and its credit was nil, today a debt burden of
 $40 billion is not regarded as unduly constraining to a nation
 
with the export record and potential of Korea.
 
The macroeoconomic performance of South Korea by any stan­
dard 	has been spectacular. GNP has risen an average of 8.3
 
percent from 1962 to 1981. Impressive has been the growth

since 1981: 5.6 in 1982 and 9.3 percent in 1983.

Manufacturing since 1961 has been the strongest sector, and
 
exports have been expanding at about 30 percent per year, so
 
that Korea today almost entirely exports manufactured
 
products. Almost as important has been the breadth of the
 
exports. Even by 1969, Korea exported most in value among

middle-income countries of that period, and its diversification
 
of exports--some 101 commodities of which 71 were manufactured
 
and 	 valued at 77.1 percent of total exports--were more
 
diversified than any other country in this group except

Mexico. In the early 1960s Korea exported to only 19 coun­
tries; in 1976, Korean exports reached 175 nations and areas.40
 
One of the most important changes that has occurred in

Korea has been the development of confidence by the government

in both planning and execution of development activities. This
has been in marked contrast to the attitudes of dispair that
 
were 	prevalent in the first decade following the Korean War.
 
This despair was shared by most, if not all, foreign

observers and technical assistance specialists, and seemed
 justified by the generally poor performance that prompted it.
 
If there has been a consistent pattern among foreign profes­
sional observers of the Korean economy, it has been a major

underestimation since 1963 of the Korean capacity to achieve
 
goals that seemed wildly optimistic to those who were not fully
 
aware of the strength of the Korean bureaucratic culture, its
 
capacity for responding to directives, and the resiliency and
 
hard work of its talented people.
 
The simplistic notion that this remarkable performance was
 
one that was consistently measured and balanced over the three
 
decades since the Korean War is not only false but dangerously

misleading, masking problems in growth, changes in policy, and
 
uneven distribution of such growth by region and sector over
 
this period. To review Korea's economic achievements is thus
 
to review these changes, many of which were intimately linked
 
to the political process in Korea, the personalities of the
 
leaders, and the changing relationships with the donor commu­
nity.
 
B. 	 Import Substitution and Foreign Aid Maximization,
 
1953-1960
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The literature on Korean economic development and foreign

assistance produced during and following the first decade after
 
the outbreak of the Korean War 
seems a dirge at an economic
 
wake. It reflected extreme disillusionment by both Koreans and
 
Americans over their own and each other's performances.

Ameriqqns referred to Korea as having a "mendicant mental­
ity," -L as the 
latter wanted aid but seemed less interested in
 
official U.S. report stating that "accomplishments have 

development, and as a "bottomless pit" into which aid flowed 
without result. 
The restrained donor scepticism may be summed up by an 
been
 
less than they otherwise would have been or have cost more than
 
was necessary in what_ we believe is a significant but
 
indeterminate measure." These documents stress inefficiency,

lack of proper use of assistance, political interference in
 
economic issues, and corruption. On the other hand, later
 
official reports from the 1960s, after exports began to 
rise
 
and the economy markedly improved, put far less emphasis on
 inefficiency, but, when critical, dealt with 
 a lack of
 
reporting on assistance and manipulation (use for different
 
purposes than intended, but not waste) of funds, but put far
 
less emphasis on inefficiency.
 
Congressional findings indicated that Korea lacked techni­
cally trained manpower, -deplored the extent to which the
 
economy was dominated by government enterprises that were
 
inefficient, noted the extreme concentration of authority for
 
economic decisions in the hands of Syngman Rhee, indicated
 
concern that projects were chosen for prestige not economic
 
reasons, and noted that ineffective measures were taken to
discourage specu itive trading, collect taxes, and promote

domestic savings.
 
The personality and emotional predelictions oi President
 
Syngman Rhee had a pervasive influence over the economy of
 
South Korea during his tenure. He refused to accept the divi­
sion of Korea as permanent and was always determined to unify

the two regimes. He thus was reluctant to establish those
 
industries, including power generation and fertilizer plants,

that would duplicate those in the North under a unified
 
government that he assumed he would control. Economic planning

by Koreans (as opposr.d to that of foreign advisors) was not
 
formalized until late in his administration for this same
 
reason. 
 The first Three-Year Economic ivelopment Plan was
 
approved by the cabinet in January 1960, just three months
 
before the student revolution that forced Rhee into exile. It
 
was only implemented in revised form as a five-year plan

following the coup of General Park Chung Hee in 1961. It may
be said that the modest economic growth that took place in the
 
Rhee era was the result of large-scale foreign assistance
 
rather than implementation of any positive economic plan or
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mobilization of domestic savings-- governmental, business, or
 
personal. The propensity to save is strongly influenced by

confidence in both the economy and the society. There was
 
little of either during this period.
 
The economic regime of the First Republic has been charac­
terized as one of import substitution, as the Park and Chun
 
governments ones of export promotion. Import substitution and
 
export promotion are not, however, opposed in some sort of
 
economic Manichean dualism. Rather, they may be thought of as
 
a spectrum along which it is possible to array countries,
 
periods or sectors in terms of emphasis. Thus, although it is
 
substantially correct to say that the Rhee period was
 
essentially tilted toward the import substitution end of the
 
spectrum, a variety of export incentives were promulgated but
 
had little effect due essentially to unrealistic exchange rate
 
policies.'- During the export-oriented Park period the stress
 
on self-sufficiency in rice and the development of the heavy

and defense-related industries could be considered as import

substitution within a driving export emphasis.
 
Although a joint economic planning commission was estab­
lished during the Korean War to coordinate donor-recipient

policies and to ensure effective use of the multiple resources
 
pouring into Korea from various types of American assistance
 
(which also generated local currency that was to be programmed
 
jointly), the donor-recipient relationship has been character­
ized4 in this period as one of tension and virtual hostil­
ity. There were policy discussions, even confrontations, but
 
they could hardly be considered "dialogue." The development of
 
a complex series of multiple exchange rates that were in large
 
part overvalued and retarded export development but also
 
allowed vast profits to be amassed through their manipula­
tion. It was, thus, quicker and easier to profit from
 
speculation and influence than through increased production.

Rhee's policy seems to have been one of maximizing the flows of
 
foreign assistance rather than the development of an autonomous
 
economic system.
 
During this period, aside from some modest assistance that
 
was brought in through the UN and a large number of private

assistance organizations, the donor flows were over 90 percent

from the United States and were in the form of grants. In
 
various years during this period, the United States provided a
 
third of the total budget for the government (58.4 percent in
 
1956) and up to 85 percent of all imports and 75 percent of
 
total fixed c-ipital formation. During 1952-1958, foreign aid
 
and relief assistance provided 75 percent of Korea's imports

and 8 percent of GNP. This latter figure could have been twice
 
as large however, according to one source, had, the exchange
 
rate used in the calculations been realistic.47 Yet policy

reforms were instituted slowly, and rarely, and with great

recrimination.
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In spite of the massive assistance from the United States,
 
there seemed little agreement between the governments on
 
anything beyond the survival of the Korean state. Thus argu­
ments about the level and role of foreign assistance were
 
endemic, with the Koreans attempting to expand government

activity without indigenous resource mobilization, while the
 
United States was tryg to limit both their and Korean
 
government expenditures.
 
Syngman Rhee maintained personal control over the economy.

He demanded that any issues involving changes in the exchange
 
rate, relations with Japan, or foreign assistance had to be
 
approved personally by him. The dichotomy over the objectives

of foreign aid are apparent. Rhee wanted to restore destroyed

industry, but the United States was afraid that the funds might

be used for political purposes, and in addition such support

would take a long gestation period to have any effect and would
 
require additional local currency, thus implying more aid­
funded commodity imports, the sale of which generated such
 
funds. On the other hand, Rhee did not want foreign aid
 
concentrated in agriculture because such funds could be
 
controlled by local politicians. The foreign donor, the United
 
States, had one prime objective in mind: the majgtenance of an
 
effective military command at the lowest cost." Thus there
 
was a difference in goals that led to conflict over economic
 
policies and performance.
 
For the first three-years (until 1956), the Koreans
 
dominated, but after that the Americans had a stronger

influence on the stabilization program through the threat of
 
substantial drops in aid. Yet "To take the period as a whole,
 
however, it was Rhee who called the tune in economic policy.

As so often happens, a weak regime confronting a strong power
 
was able to use the very weakness to attain most of its ends.
 
Rhee successfully purso8 d what might be called a policy of
 
'coercive deficiency. '
 
The major lesson from this period about what is now called
 
"policy dialogue" is that there was relatively little success­
ful policy intervention by the donor, despite the magnitude of
 
the support. .In similar situations when a major bilateral
 
donor is providing funds sufficient in theory to influence the
 
policy decisions taking place in a host government, the diverse
 
reasons for such massive support (e.g., political, security,

military, etc.) are likely to be highly complex from the
 
donor's policy perspective. Thus economic policy issues are
 
caught in a complex web of sometimes contradictory policy and
 
bureaucratic interests that fjevent focused pressures for
 
individual economic reforms, since it is likely that
 
military, security, diplomatic, and indeed internal donor
 
political imperatives will take precedence.
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The tensions between Korea and the United States were sum­
marized as follows:
 
The Korean government of Syngman Rhee wanted
 to build a modern economy similar to, but
 independent of, the Japanese economy. 
 Their
desire was for new factories and heavy indus­try financed through foreign aid having little
 
regard for the inflationary impact of the
heavy investment 
programs or the longer-run
issues of comparative advantage. The United

States, on the other hand, was concerned about

moving the South Korean economy towards self­
sufficiency as rapidly as possible while hold­ing down the aid requirements and minimizing
instability and inflation 
 in the process.

Thus, there was clear disagreement over the
issue of resource mobilization, with the

Korean government wishing to rely mainly 
on

external resources, or if necessary on infla­
tion as a means of mobilizing domestic re­
sources, and the American government urging
greater 
Korean efforts at domestic resource

mobilization rough increased taxes and pri­
vate savings.
 
Severe criticism of the early American aid effort was
warrented and began to surface in print in Korea following the
overthrow of the Rhee government. American aid, it was

charged, imported consumption-type goods and not the basic
capital materials needed to build up a self-sufficient economy.
Investment goods were less than 14 percent of all imports from
1953 to 1960 and less than 10 percent in 1953, 1957, and
1958. There was concern that the PL 480 program was counter­productive in that it allowed the government to suppress
producer prices for rice. This the
 criticism was later widely

echoed. 
 It was also said later that "This use of program loans
(in the 1960s) for 
rice purchases of AID funds in conjunction

with increased PL 480 imports appears to serve 
 as a
disincentive 
 for the Korean government to g ek an early
solution to problems in its agriculture sector."
 
In spite of the 
fact that the rural areas were disadvan­taged and that both 
the public sector, which che Americans

criticized as too large (partially but not 
completely because
the state took over many of the Japanese assets), and the
private sector were charged with being inefficient, the economy

was 
by no means stagnant. The agricultural sector grew by 4.1
percent during this period, even though rice production, the
mainstay ,2f the agricultural 
 sector, remained relatively

constant. Even some
in industry, observers noted that the
charge that foreign assistance was not productive in the 1950s
 
- 22 ­
is not accurate because many of the earlier projects permitted

the high growth rates of the 1960s, even though the assistance
 
allowed thp5 perpetuation of poor policies for longer than 
was
 
necessary. Yet the aid programs were "maintenance-type"

activities, largely conservative rather than more isky
 
programs "aimed at remodeling and rebuilding the society."
 
During the post-Korean War period of the Rhee government,

the magnitude of assistance was so great and pervasive, and
 
Korea was exporting so little, that almost all of the savings

generated from foreign sources may be attributed to foreign

aid. From 1953 to 1961, this ranged from a low of 5.2 percent
 
to a high of 10.8 percent of GNP (average, 8 percent of GNP).

During the same period, government savings were negative,

rangig from a low of -1.7 percent to a high of -3.0 percent of
 
GNP. Foreign assistance amounted to "more than half the
 
total resources available for capital accumulation in every
 
year from 1955 to 1962." The critical role of foreign

assistance at that time is thus apparent.
 
One may sum up the pre-Park era on overall aid effective­
ness as one in which foreign assistance was essential to the
 
survival of the state, but poorly used and unimaginatively

planned and administered. Some preconditions for growth were
 
created: excess industrial capacity, an educated population,

and foreign, modern specialized training in skills needed for
 development. The results, however, did not seem to equal the
 
effort.
 
It is now somewhat disingenuous to claim that, because a
 
later regime under substantially different economic motivation
 
and incentives, effectively used and built upon some of the
 
assistance of the earlier period, this previous assistance was
 
therefore successful. In fact, the assistance might have been
 
better supplied to other sectors (or countries) in greater or
 
lesser amounts, and it should be remembered that it was the
 
Koreans who made the later effective use of the capacity and
 (some) institutions created, not foreign technicians or policy

specialists. "A [productive] base had been laid but the
 
effective exploitation of this base depended on a different
 
political regime, a different set of economic policies %and a
 
different relationship between government and business. " 8
 
C. Export Promotion and Rapid Growth, 1961-1983
 
The period of rapid growth of the Korean economy came
 
about during the regime of Park Chung Hee, apparently motivated
 
by political factors as much as by economic considerations.
 
The success of the program was, however, contrary to the
 
expectations of most Koreans and foreigners at that time.
 
1. Export Promotion and Political Will
 
- 23 -

General Park Chung Hee and 
a group of officers from the

Eighth Class of the Korean Military Academy seized power on May
16, 1961 in a successful coup, the first such event since 1392,

the founding of the Yi Dynasty. 
 The coup leaders, in spite of
their success, were at a distinct disadvantage. They had over­
thrown the popularly elected administration of Chang Myon
(Syngman Rhee had been deposed a year earlier), one that came
 
to power in one of the few fair elections Korea had seen, but
 during its brief tenure seemed disorganized and ineffective,

perhaps a natural consequence following the years of political

repression under Rhee. Park himself was suspect.
 
Rhee, for all 
his failings, had a degree of political
legitimacy, at least at the beginning of his administration,

for he had inviolable nationalist credentials 
as a result of
 his anti-Japanese struggle in exile. He also had the 
backing

of the United States, at that time considered a political

asset. 
 Park, on the other hand, had no such legitimacy. He
had been an officer in the Japanese army and had no national­istic history. Coming from the army and. from rural
a poor
(Kyungsang) lower class background, he 
had neither credibility

with the intellectuals and gentry. nor with the students or
 
labor unions, whose activities the coup suppressed. Park was

also at first suspected of being a leftist, as he had been
 
arrested in connection 
-with the communist-inspired Yosu­
Sunch'on insurrection of 1948.
 
The United States had been against the coup, both because
 
it was committed to the democratically elected government of
Chang Myon and because the leaders had moved troops without
 
authorization from the UN command, controlled by the United
 
States. Relations with the coup leaders remained very 
cool

afrer the coup became an accomplished fact. The United States
 
virtually 
forced Korea into holding the 1963 elections, over

Park's opposition, and used economic aid 
as one element in its
 
pressure.
 
The economic consequence of these political and social
 
forces was that Park needed to acquire domestic legitimacy,

which he could only obtain through the economic development of

the country. Bitterly disappointed in relations with the
 
United States for the first two years after the coup, he

resolved to increase the potential for Korean economic indepen­dence through a major policy shift that was a product of his
political and economic needs; thus 
 the export drive was
 
launched. If it were to succeed, 
it would give him respecta­bility at home and greater autonomy from the United States, 
on

which, however, he had to continue to rely foi 
 military

security. Park was also independent of the economic,
industrial, and bureaucratic elements that had fostered 
the
 
import substitution policy, 
 and may have intentionally
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attempted to reduce or eliminate their influence. The tension
 
between security needs and economic forces in relation to
 
Korean reliance on the United States has been a continuing
 
theme from the Rhee period to the present, although contempo­
rary disputes are about trade not aid.
 
There is considerable evidence for this conclusion, drawn
 
both from Park's own statements on the need for greater
 
autonomy, and from economic actions taken without the close
 
economic consultations that had previously been a pattern (even

if with acrimonious overtones) of the Rhee period, and were to
 
be important later. Closely following the coup, a currency
 
reform was initiated without consultation with the United
 
States. The First Five-Year Plan (excavated from the Rhee
 
period and revised) was promulgated without foreign advisory
 
assistance, in marked contrast with the Second Five-Year Plan
 
(1967-1971), in which foreign advice was actively sought.
 
Since it was a plan that had its genesis in the Rhee period, it
 
is not surprising that it was not oriented toward manufacturing
 
exports. "The plan envisaged mainly import sub3titution and
 
export of primary product 9 (not labor-intensive manufactures)
 
to replace foreign aid." The joint U.S.-Korean Economic
 
Coordination Commission did not meet from 1961 to 1963.
 
The first efforts by the Park government following the
 
coup were to consolidate -power and authority throughout the
 
state. Local government became appointive, not elective. The
 
Economic Planning Board was formed controlling and centralizing
 
both planning and budgeting. The commercial banks were all
 
nationalized. The Ministry of Finance gained legal as well as
 
de facto control over the central bank, monetary policy, and
 
access to credit (an especially potent source of power since
 
debt as a percentage of Korean business liabilities wg 82.5
 
percent, compared to 35 percent in the United States). The
 
Office of Rural Development was created, wedding agricultural
 
research and extension, and the National Agricultural

Cooperative Federation was formed combining an 6earlier
 
cooperative movement with the Agricultural Bank. In
 
addition, the government consolidated labor unions, teacher
 
associations, and cultural groups into umbrella confederations,

allowing the state to control all potential sources of power

and authority. Significantly, it prohibited the formation of a
 
national student federation, which the army considered would be
 
a threat to the regime. Thus, while the state sought external
 
autonomy from the United States, it took extensive steps to
 
prevent any internal sources of autonomy or dissent from
 
developing,
 
It was already apparent that Korea needed to mobilize both
 
internal and external capital if it were to accomplish its
 
objectives. The knowledge that U.S. aid would diminish over
 
time, as well as the experience with the United States after
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the coup and the political need to move ahead raoidly in
 
economic terms and reduce the overwhelming dependence on the
United fates, prompted a change in the donor reliance
 
pattern,01 and indeed on the type of assistance from the major

donor, the U.S.. Korea moved from grant supporting assistance
 
to development loans, perhaps in part because loans, even 
on
 
the most concessional terms seeped a sign of greater indepen­
dence and more self-reliance.'" Although relations with the
 
United States improved markedly following the visit of Park to
 
the United States in 1965, the Korean drive for economic auton­
omy and greater international political credibility led it to
 
diversify its foreign donors and funding sources.
 
2. Diversification of Donor Support
 
In retrospect, the pattern of Korean movement from virtual
 
exclusive reliance on the United States to a highly diversified
 
and sophisticated array of mechanisms--including trade, aid,

investment, and overseas industrial expansion--is obvious. It
 
was not, however, a single event, but a process that still con­
tinues.
 
The first IBRD loan to Korea dates from 1962, as does the
 
real start of Korea's efforts to encourage foreign investment
by promulgation of a revised investment act. Korea encouraged

the IBRD to form a consultative group to coordinate donor
 
support; it first met in 1966. Following the first oil crisis,

Korea moved to expand its activities to the Middle East, with
 
continuing and pronounced success. Korea has been sensitive to
 
the need for persistent review of its trade and aid program.

By far the most important new relationship that was
 
established, with implications for aid, trade, investment, and
 
technology, was the reestablishment of relations with Japan.
 
In spite of the obvious economic sense of such a move,

Rhee's adamant stand against reestablishing relations with the
 
Japanese had considerable popular support. The United States

strongly backed the move for normalization, as it was called.
 
Park's high-handed method for normalization (involving highly

questionable parliamentary tactics for its ratification in
 
1965) brought forth a series of continuing student demonstra­
tions. Park, however, persisted, imposing martial law.
 
Normalization brought in some $800 million (over 10-year
a 

period), of which $300 million was to be in grants, $200
 
million in concessional loans, and an additional $300 in
 
commercial credits. In fact, from 1965 through 1982, Japan had
 
grown to become the third largest donor as well as the largest

investor and trading partner of Korea. Japan has provided
$4.417 billion in overall assistance, including $1.898 billion
 in grant!;, loans, and technical assistance. After a Korean
 
request focr an additional $10 billion in support from Japan,

agreement was reached in 1983 for $4.0 billion, of which $1.85
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billion will come from the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(concessional assistance), and $2.15 
billion from the Japanese
Export-Import Bank together with 
other Japanese commercial
banks, at interest rates and/or projects to be ermined.
d 

Interest rates will, however, be more than 4 percent.
 
It has been estimated that Japanese capital inflows
 
contributed 10 percent of 
gross domestic capital formation in
the first few years after normalization. 65 Equally important,

however, have been the technological innovations introduced
into Korea from Japan. Through 1973, half of the technical
 
assistance and royalty payments paid by Korean firms were to
Japan, but by 1982 this figure had dropped to about one-third
(total $668 million), with paymerits to the United States

slightly surpassing those to Japan." The network of foreign
trade contacts provided by the large Japanese trading companies

have handled a considerable percentage of Korean trade,

especially in Eastern Europe. The Japanese traders have egn

captured 82 percent of the sales of Araerican grain to Korea.
 
The sensitivity of the Japanese role 
in Korea to Koreans,

many of whom still view Japan's interests on the peninsula with
 
considerable concern, is quite understandable. It is neverthe­less evident that it is a Japanese model was followed in
industrial policy and in agricultural pricing policy as well.

Many of the administrative forms and statutes 
in Korea derive
from the Japanese, whom the Koreans often regard with a mixture
 
of admiration and disdain.
 
The Japanese have 
been the major investors in Kor.a.
 
Through 1979, Japanese firms had invested some 
$587 million, 9
 
56 percent of all foreign investment in Korea since 1962,

when such investments began to be encouraged. Through 
1983,

approvals of Japanese investment cumulatively totaled !L843.4,
in 663 projectsor 
 49.5 percent of all investment.6' In
 
contrast, the United States 
(excluding foreign subsidiaries of
 
U.S. multinational firms), the largest
second investor, had
$409.7 million invested in Korea, or 29.1 percent of the

total. There is no distinction in the statistics between
Japanese investment and the investment of Koreans resident in
 
Japan. For 
example, the single largest commercial investment
has been by the Lotte company, which is owned by a Korean
 
resident there.
 
If Japanese aid and investment have been pervasive, the
lending of the World Bank has been even
of greater magnitude.

Since 1962, the Bank has provided $5.259 billion in assistance
 
to Korea through April 6, 1984. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) has provided $1.377 billion since 1968, when its program
began. Korea 
is the second largest borrower from the ADB.

Both banks have made major investments in infrastructure,

especially transportation, 
and both have provided substantial
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funds to Korean banks and institutions for relending to
 
industry.
 
In Korea, many believed that just as the Japanese had
 
expanded their economy as 
a result of the Korean War, so the

Koreans could progress during the Vietnam War. In fact this
 
was the case. In addition to the combat training for about
half of the standing Korean army (in rotation), Korea was able
 
to reap considerable economic rewards from that involvement.
 
Through a series of construction and other service contracts,

remittances, commercial exports to Vietnam, and military goods

sales (not to mention access to the American PX and commissary

facilities, which were well Lised), earnings to the Korean
 
economy from Vietnam were large and significant.
 
Although there are some discrepancies in the published

figures, earnings from Vietnam were 10.6 percent of foreign ex­
change eunings in 1966, 19.4 percent in 1967, and 17.3 percent
in 1968. They have also been calculated at 1.5 percent of
 
GNP in 1965, 2.2 percent in 1966-- 3.7 percent between 1967­1969, and 4.4 percent in 1970. Overall, its Vietnam
 
involvement may have contributed $660 million 
to the Korean
 
economy between 1968 and 1971. Other figgies place the total
between 1965 and 1973 at $926.3 million. ..Korea's share of
 
exports to Vietnam as a percentage of Korea's iotal exports was
 
considerably lower than that of Japan's to Korea during the
 
Korean War. Korea also 
reaped psychic rewards from Vietnam;

for the first time Korea was a provider of assistance, not just
 
a recipient.
 
The overall effect of both the Japanese normalization and
 
the involvement in Vietnam, coming as they did at about the
 
same time, is estimated to have contributed one-thiq to one­
half of Korea's GNP growth adjusted for inflation.' At the
 
time that this took place, with a significant drop in U.S. eco­
nomic assistance during this period, these events were
 
especially important to the growth of the Korean economy.
 
D. From Aid to Trade and Investment
 
The ramifications of Korea's change from a major foreign

aid recipient to an important tradeing and industrializing

nation, with considerable attractions for foreign investors,

but even more importantly for foreign lenders, extend beyond

the foreign exchange earned. A variety of other purposes were
 
and continue to be served. These give added impetus to the They
include the diplomatic (more than economic) competition with
 
North Korea in the third, world, the economic reinforcement of
 
the mutual security treaty with the United States, the ties

with Japan, access to Middle Eastern oil, and the acquisition

of technology necessary to remain competitive in a world
 
economy. How has foreign assistance affected this process, if
 
at all?
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Export expansion also has important internal implications

affecting employment, wages, imports, the nature of the
 
concentration of private economic power in Korea, and the role
 
of the government in managing an increasingly complex
 
economy. It has thus both growth and equity consequences.
 
The state of the Korean econcniy in 1983 was healthy

overall. GNP in real terms grew at 9.3 percent, reaching $75
 
billion. Per capita GNP rose to $1,880, and is predicted to be
 
$1,974 in 1984. Foreign debt reached $40.1 billion in 1983
 
(the fourth highest debt in the developing world after
 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), but the debt service ratio
 
remained manageable at 15.4 percent, or at 20 percent including

short-term debt. Exports reached $24.4 billion, while imports
 
were $26.2 billion. At the close of the present fifth Five-

Year Plan in 1986, the Korean economy is expected to ,;ow to
 $97 billion, and per capita income to attain $2,325." The
 
prospects in general for Korea are positive, although there are
 
indications of stress in some sectors of the economy.
 
The competitiveness of Korea's export trade is a product

of a continuing realistic exchange rate, competitive prices,

educated domestic labor and its increased productivity with
 
relatively low, controlled (but rising) wages, more sophis­
ticated technology, export incentives, and political

determination to succeed.
 
Although it may be argued that the remarkable rural
 
progress that has transpired throughout Korea was in some major
 
measure attributable, to a network of subsidies that are now
 
beginning to unwind,'5 this cannot be said of export growth, at
 
least to the same degree. Although there was in 1968 an 18­
cent subsidy on every dollar exported7covering an average loss
 
of 16 percent of the export price, a later more detailed
 
study indicated:
 
Other emperical analysis indicated that the
 
remarkable export growth, 33 percent in real
 
terms per annum for 1965-79, was achieved not
 
by overgenerous export subsidies but by an
 
incentive system which approaches on average

the effective protection and effective subsidy
 
rate that can be expected from a free trade
 
regime. Also, the long-run trend of real
 
effective exchange rate which more or less
 
remained roughly constant despite short-term
 
fluctuations indicates that the export
 
incentives in terms of te effective exchange
 
rate remained constant.
 
Continued export expansion has been dependent on, and is
 
likely to remain tied to, both the concentration of economic
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power in Korea 
(and thus the issue of equity in access to the

market place) and higher technology.
 
The Korean economic scene is dominated by the emergence of
the Jea-Bul (Chaebol--or zaibatsu in Japanese, conglomerates in
English), multipurpose and Aroduct firms that contrcl in large
part the Korean economy. These conglomerates are both

similar to and 
different from similar organizations in other

nations. They are uniquely Korean in that they are 
generally

characterized by single-family ownership, usually led by one
individual, which is quite different from 
 those in other

countries. They are similar, however, in that they are
diversified in products different
but in that they do not

control financial institutions, which are either directly

operated or regulated by government. The have recently,
however, bought into five commercial banks that have been
denationalized--Samsung, for example, has 14 percent of
Commercial Bank and 26 percent of First City Bank shares. Thus
the government has a much greater degree 
of control than in

other nations, and has used the conglomerates to pursue new

economic directions such as the development of the defense
industry, often at considerable economic risk.
 
The conglomerates have been growing at 
an even more rapid

rate than the economy as a whole. The largest 46 firms in 1973
produced 9.8 percent of the GDP, but 17.1 percent by 1978, 
or
23 percent of nonagricultural GDP (in fact, the tor. 5 firms
produced about half of that amount). Of the Fortunc 500 firms,
ten are Korean and Korea has four out of the top five 
of
private LDC entities.
 
Since the individual subsidiaries of the conglomerates can
qualify for loans from the Small and Medium Industry Bank, this
increasing concentration of economic power, 
under stringent
government control of credit, has meant less access the
formal credit market for smaller firms, indeed 
to 

an emphasis on
larger firms in many fields. The IBRD and the Asian Develop­
ment Bank projects have thus expanded this economic concentra­tion, and may further exacerbate inequitable access to

credit. This concentration is effective, however, 
 in

stimulation of the economies 
of scale. If there are problems

with equity in credit 
(for there is no "neutral" institutional
 
source of credit in Korea, although there is planned
liberalization), it is also evident that the larger firms'

salaries are considerably better than the smaller firms',
probably providing increased 
equity in that regard. Since

employment in small industrial firms dropped from 64.7 percent
in 1960 to 24.7 percent in 1976, the growth of the

conglomerates has generally and substantially contributed 
to
higher wages, but with emphasis on higher technology, the gap
between large firms 
(which can use such technology more easily)

and smaller firms may increase. In addition, there may be
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growing disparaties among incomes within the larger firms
 
themselves.
 
The issue of technology is intimately associated with
 
trade expansion, because Korean labor is already working long

hours (about 55 per week, up from 45 hours a decade earlier),
 
and improved productivity (thus international competitiveness

and high wages) is integrally associated with technology. The
 
growth of technological competence has been of concern to each
 
of the donors, including the training of key staff and the
 
strengthening and creation of such institutions as the Korea
 
Institute of Science and Technology. This donor concern with
 
training and with scientific institutions no doubt contributed
 
in some unquantifiable degree to Korea's technological capacity
 
at all levels, and as far as can be ascertained, the funds
 
generally were and are still being well used.
 
Although Korea by 1978 invested 0.7 percent of GNP in
 
research and development (more than Argentina, Brazil, and.
 
India, for example) and had comparatively more scientists and
 
engineers thn those other countries (22,000 per million 
of
 
population) Korea has used trade 
to develop its technology
 
more than any other means. Three-quarters of foreign buyers

designate specifications for goods, for the general experience

is that Korea has had a strong record in the development of
 
process technology, but is weak on product design. Technology

has been formally acquired (i.e., purchased or transferred)
 
about one-third of the time, but informal means, such as
 
employees' previous experience and buyers' information, have
 
proven more valuable.
 
In order to continte growth and further raise living

standards, increasing levels of technology and its wide
 
dispersion will be necessary. Donors have recognized this need
 
and have moved to provide various levels of training to enable
 
Koreans to move up the economic ladder, and to ensure that
 
there are institutional and financial means by which technology
 
can be introduced into Korea. The response of donors to this
 
need has been appropriate, but given the magnitude, and the
 human infrastructure already developed, it must be admitted
 
that the donor contribution has been useful but marginal in the
 
aggregate.
 
Foreign investment in Korea is still less important than
 
the size of the Korean economy might indicate. Through the end
 
of 1983, there have been cumulative investments of $1.4 billion
 
since 1962. Of this amount, the largest shares are in chemi­
cals (19.3 percent), electric and electronic products (14.7

percent), hotels and tourism (11.5 percent), and textiles (9.7

percent).1O Japan is the leading investor, with over half of
 
the value (50.5 percent), followed by the United States (29.1

percent, excluding foreign subsidies of U.S. multinational
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firms). Investment has been small relative to the size and
 
potential of the economy due to the fear of conflict on the
 
peninsula, the uncertainty about the future political leader­
ship and the political process, and past tight government

controls on investment that, however, have recently been
 
relaxed.
 
The expansion of trade, exports, and investment has meant
 
an increase in employment, important drops in unemployment and
 
under-employment and large-scale rural-to-urban migration for
 
the jobs created. This has had highly favorable results in
 increasing per capita income and to the extent that donors have
 
facilitated the process, it has been an important contribution,
 
even though the magnitude of commercial flows has dwarfed
 
concessional assistance.
 
Is there, then, a conflict between trade and aid, or can
 
trade substitute for aid, as some suggest? The Korean evidence
 
is not conclusive, but it suggests that aid was important
an 

precondition to developing strong trading capacity and 
links,

and that training and exposure to external economic conditions
 
together with the enhancing of broad skills (and not
 
necessarily only those that are technological, although they
 
are critical) are important elements of foreign assistance.
 
Even in broadly successful trade regimes, such as Korea,

it may continue to be useful to provide a variety of innovative
 
and longer term investments in fields, such as research, with
 
concessional assistance. It is also evident that donor confi­
dence in Korea, as evidenced by concessional lending, has been
 
an important factor in Korea's securing commercial credits.
 
The supposed dichotomy between trade and aid is not an accurate
 
portrayal of the Korean scene, and on 
the basis of the Korean
 
experience should be subjected to careful scrutiny in other
 
countries.
 
E. The Contribution of Donors to Korean Growth
 
It is apparent that there was some potential created for
 
growth during the pre-Park period, especially in excess
 
capacity and the training of individuals in technical fields.
 
Thus the support of the United States, as the critical donor,
 
was important. The basic donor contribution, however, was in

the maintenance of some semblance of a government in South
 
Korea and the relief and rehabilitation operation that led to
 
raising the standard o.f living once again to prewar levels.
 
One study concluded:
 
The massive inflow of foreign assistance before and during

the Korean War was essential to the survival of South
 
Korea as an independent country. Continuation of a high
level of economic assistance for the decade after the war
 
probably made the difference between the small 1.5 percent
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per annum growth rate and no growth at all in per capita

income. Without this growth, the living standard of the

population would have remained desperate, political

cohesion would have deteriorated, and the foundations for
 
subsequent high growth would not have been forged. 
 Thus,

aid played a critical role for the two decades from the
 
mid-1940s to the mid- 1960s. Since 
then it has added
 
perhaps one percent to the already high growth and
rate 

therefore can 81 be characterized as relatively

inconsequential.
 
Growth did occur after 1953, and at levels that would
 
please many developing societies today, but the rate of growth

was not commensurate with the resources provided from outside,
 
nor the relatively advanced institutional base on which Korea
began its growth, even allowing for the massive destruction of
 
the Korean War.
 
In the 1960s, under Park, foreign assistance was also
 
essential, not for maintenance of the regime but for the expan­
sion of the economy. The use of funds was generally prudent

and the diversification of donor support was wise, as reliance
by any nation on any single democratic donor puts the recipient

at the mercy of the whims of the donor's electorate. Equally

important was the effort by the Korean government to generate

internal investment and revenues. These were accomplished by

the upward adjustments made in interest rates on longer term
 
savings, the advice of foreign technical assistance in 1965,

and by rigorous enforcement of tax and other regulations on
 
both industry and individual incomes.
 
In the 1970s, foreign assistance probably was not
 
absolutely necessary, as foreign exchange earnings were begin­
ning to be impressive in aggregate terms, and Korea was able to
 
attract commercial capital and credit outside of foreign

assistance. Koreans had already been trained, highly qualified

Korean scholars and technicians had been attracted to return to
 
Korea from their residences abroad, and the bureaucratic
 
mechanisms were in place, together with the political will, to
 
use them for the economic and other purposes of the state.
 
Foreign assistance during this period was effectively and
 
efficiently used, but its contribution was of a different order
 
of magnitude from that in the previous periods. Foreign aid
 
probably speeded the adoption of various reforms and the
development of certain industries and institutions. More
 
important, it probably also encouraged the Korean government to
 
make certain investments (such as in various types of technical
 
education) more comprehensively and quickly than they otherwise
 
might have done, and it further strengthened the role of thcse
 in the Korean government anxious to liberalize the economy.
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The external and internal encouragement of Korea to
 
continue to borrow has created a "massive" debt burden for the
 
nation. Korea in 1983 had a debt of some 
$40.1 billion, and a
debt service ratio over 
 20 percent, including short-term
 
debt. Korea has the largest debt of any nation in Asia, and
 
although the magnitude of Korea's obligations are dwarfed by a
 
number of Latin American nations, there 
are many in Korea who
 
are concerned. This concern is not shared by many professional

observers outside of Korea, since interest on 
the debt is less
 
than three months of exports.
 
Korea has shown remarkable resiliency in meeting the

economic shocks to which the world recently has seemed heir.
 
In some sense, however, Korea's ability to meet its interna­
tional economic obligations will not only depend on the state

of the world economy, but on the internal political scene and
 
the capacity of the state to adapt to a peaceful transfer of
 
power.
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III. Growth with Equity? The Korean Experience
 
That Korea has become one of the fastest growing nations
 
in the world is beyond question. Whether that growth has been
 
accompanied by improved or worsened income distribution, how
 
income distribution has shifted over time, and the likely

future direction of such changes are more complex issues. They
 
ar also ones on which data are more limited, and often in
 
d, .pute. The fragility of that evidence is readily apparent

and has been noted in the literature, some of which will be
 
cited below.
 
The issue of equity, beginning with its definition and
 
however defined, excites considerable interest and often
 
controversy. Obliquely incorporated into the United States
 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, it has relevance for that
 
nation, but for others as well.
 
The equity question in developing societies is more stark
 
than in the west as resources there are more limited, when
 
growth occurs a relatively small and usually concentrated group

normally prospers in an obvious manner, and this prosperity may
 
seem more grating as income disparities are very pronounced as
 
the deprived start from a lower base." Where such problems were
 
often politically tolerated in the west for long periods, a
 
more concentrated population and mass communications, sometimes
 
even in largely illiterate societies, have meant that the
 
political boiling point has often been lowered.
 
This problem, with its political ramifications, inevitably

raises the issue of the strength of various types of
 
governments in producing a growth environment. Especially

salient is the issue of authoritarian regimes. Can such
 
governments deal with growth more effectively, and is a denial
 
of equity essential f(6 growth? Some studies have evaded
 
answering the question. The issue could be the subject of a
 
separate essay.
 
The Korea case is, however, particularly difficult, and
 
the issue 
cannot be avoided, even if it cannot be resolved.
 
Economic growth has clearly outpaced political development, and
 
participation has languished 
even as exports have increased.
 
Having fought a war to preserve the independence of Korea, and
 
having done so in the name of preserving democratic government,

the United Nations, and especially the United States, has a
 
continuing commitment to the Republic of Korea. Faced with the
 
perceived continuing threat from North Korea, the South Korean
 
government has called upon its.citizenry for sacrifices of both
 
a political and economic nature.
 
No solution to the issue of how much equity is required or
 desirable with economic growth is likely to be resolved, as the
 
problem is one of degree, as are the issues of what groups
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should sacrifice to what extent for the common good, and the
 
nature sacrifices face a perceived
of such in the of North
 
Korean threat. No group will be satisfied by any arbitrary
formula, which would likely be an unrealistic possibility in
 
any given society, and although this author desires the
 greatest possible 
 degree of equity, he recognizes this
difficulty. The normative issue cannot 
be resolved, even In
 
the case of Korea, in this essay.

Equity in income is difficult to achieve in a period of
 
rapid growth. As 
one author concluded, "our experience with a
 
range of policies indicates that it is much eaIer to make the
income distribution worse than to improve it." 1YYet Korea has
 
a generally good overall reputation in equity terms, at least
 
as compared to most economies in Asia. As the Harvard-Korean
 
Development Institute studies indicated:
 
One of the most striking features of Korean
 
economic development since 1945 is that develop­
ment 
 has been achieved without requiring or
 
causing a highly unequal distribution of income.
 
In World Bank publications and other international
 
forums, Korea has been hailed as 
a prime example

of how growth can be achieved with equity.

According to the data presented in these forums,

Korea is among only a handful of less-developed

nations that have achieved a level of quality

comparable 8to that 
 of the advanced world
 
economies.
 
Korea "is generally regarded as being exceptionally

successful in combining rapid growth with advance in equity...

First, the distribution Af income in Korea is among the best in
the developing world."0a Four issues that from
flow that
 
statement and that must be addressed are: 
is this in fact true;
if so, why; what lessons can be drawn from Korea that might be

applicable to other countries; 
 and can donors apply these
 
lessons elsewhere?
 
A. Economic Issues in Equity: Overall Considerations
 
Two general factors have been critical in determining the
positive degree of economic equity in in addition
Korea to

those attributes discussed at the beginning of this essay.
These are the destruction of assets during the Korean War and

the role of the military in creating social and economic
 
mobility.
 
There 
have been, of course, factors that have militated
 
against equity in Korea. Predominant among them is the class
 
structure of Korean society, which has been more highly

stratified and hierarchical than its neighbor, China. Although
the Japanese removed the Korean monarch and the royal family,
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the yangban (gentry) retained their social standing
 
(subordinate, of course, to the Japanese), if not much of their
 
income, at least if it was rurally based. Rapid economic
 
growth is breaking down some of these old distinctions, and the
 
actions of the military to democratize and expand higher
 
education could be interpreted as much as an attempt to wipe
 
out the remnants of a class structure that were alieady being
 
threatened by the growth of the economy as it is a desire to
 
provide more and better trained individuals for an industrial
 
base where higher technology is increasingly important.
 
Residual class structure is reflected in the prestige of
 
government positions (formally the abode of the literati), and
 
the hierarchical nature of the bureaucratic culture that
 
continues to be a critical factor in the excellent implemen­
tation record of development projects by Korean institutions.
 
As land reform equalized poverty in the rural sector, so
 
the Korean War, in its destruction of industrial and urban as­
sets, did much the same for the remainder of the country. Thus
 
with the 'armistice, the bulk of the populace, including the
 
large refugee population that had fled from the north, faced
 
the dire prospects of an uncertain economic future in a state
 
of equalized misery, differentiated largely by remnants of a
 
strong class system and the memory of its former perquisites.
 
The last element promoting equity in Korean society is the
 
military. If a massive change in social structure has begun in
 
Korea, with greater mobility and access in the society through
 
some institutional change, it started first with the military
 
and then has been reflected in part in the business community.
 
Based on a universal male draft system, the military
 
offered the poor but promising man an opportunity for education
 
based on ability (as did the Japanese military in the colonial
 
era), and the military experience at all levels has been an
 
important, but unquantified, element in Korean economic growth.
 
Military training provided the basic skills for a continuously
 
mechanizing civilian society; and military leaders, who inten­
tionally were placed in key civilian jobs to provide mobility
 
for younger officers and to place trusted subordinates in
 
influential positions, both bureaucratic and business, have
 
provided an interesting mix of effectiveness through combining
 
internationally recognized competence in management with an
 
ability to use more traditional associations, based on military
 
academy graduating class affiliations, to accomplish their 
professional goals, 
The 
officers 
effect of 
may never 
foreign training on 
be known (nor is 
thousands of Korean 
it possible here to 
determine the relationship in the Korean case between the
 
military and economic growth), but it is evident that the
 
military command structure, while reinforcing the inherently
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hierarchical nature of the government to give it what must be
 
one of the strongest forces for effective implementation of
foreign aid 
that donors have yet witnessed, ironically at the
 
same time opened significant avenues of social mobility for 
a
large portion of the male population.
 
B. 
 National Income and Income Distribution
 
Starting from a very low base, per capita annual income in
Korea has risen rapidly since 1960. From about $60 that year,
it reached over $1,883 in 1983, wbile per capita GNP rose 
from
$180 in 1960 to $1,480 in 1981. It is estimated that in the

early 1960s, 40 percent of the population was below the ffverty
line, but by 1980 this had 
fallen to about 10 percent.Of The
World Bank however, estimated that by 1979 18 percent of the

urban population and 
11 percent of the rural population were

still below 8 he absolute poverty levels of $370 and $310
 
respectively.
 
There seems no disagreement that the incidence and other
indices of poverty declined significantly between 1965 and
1976, with the first half of that period showing a more rapid

rate of decrease than the second half. 
This difference was due
to a more rapid rate of development in the first period." A
drop in the rate of poverty based on a high growth strategy

with employment 
expansion means that the percentage of the

"hard core." poor will be higher, as those with some economic

mobility will rise above poverty, and that there will likely be
increasing income disparities between elements of the
population even if the majority are better off. This is also
 true for high growth in rural areas 
based on more effective

agricultural inputs. There has been 
a shift of the poor from
the rural to urban areas, as there has been a shift in the

overall population. This is also probably because the majority

of the functionally landless moved to urban 
 areas, and

remittances from the 
cities provide a substantial portion of
the income of those in this category left behind.
 
Poor Population 90
 
(percentage)
 
Year Urban Rural 
 Total
 
1965 54.9 
 35.8 40.9
 
1970 16.2 
 27.9 23.4
1976 18.1 11.7 
 14.8
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If there is general agreement about the Korean accomplish­
ments aggregated at the national level, at
or least in the
magnitude of the change as reflected in these figures, there is
far less agreement about how this income is distributed. Some

earlier laudatory comments have already been cited. 
 The Asian
Development Bank, while agreeing, in 
a later report adds a note

of caution: "Despite the 
fact that income distribution has

worsened in recent years 
Korea hasm aaged to combine rapid

growth with a fair measure of justice."
 
This disagreement is complicated by haphazard collection

of data in the past, the time dimensions to which various com­
ments 
refer, and the types of data that were excluded at vary­ing periods. Kuznets wrote, "There is no regularly published
information on h6Y income is distributed among Korea's various
income groups," 3 and Choo notes the inadequate data on income
distribution. 9 son comments that the data "... are flawed
in the extremes." 9
 
The selective aspects of data collection and inclusion
have caused a numbe of the observers to treat the material
 
with caution. Choo 9noted the exclusion of eup (market town)
residents from urban figures, those with incomes 
over W2

million from all calculations, and very small farmers from

rural calculations. "These deficiencies 
in city and rural
household surveys tend to result in a bias 
toward an over­
representation of those nearer the mean of the size distri­bution of income by eliminating the representation of
households in the two extreme income classes."
 
Rao 96 has also commented on the limitations of the data,

and suggested, "The urban survey is confined to wage and salary

earners rather to all
than income earners and excludes those

who earn more than a specified ceiling; the rural survey

appears to define income as inclusive of changes in the book

value of inventories and thus to overstate rural incomes in
periods of rising inventories and grain prices." Mason also
has commented 
on the inadequacy of the information and the
problem of exclusion, and counsels caution in its use, and

considers that national data are not useful, but Wust be broken
down into urban, rural and business categories. 91
 
Reviewing the data for 1966, Oshima 98 in 
an earlier study

noted that the data eliminated single-person households and
rural households without arable. land (generally the poorer

groups); his analysis produced the following:
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1966 Decile Groups (by percentage)
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Korea 4.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 11.0 12.0 15.0 21.0 
Philip­
pines 1.1 2.9 3.0 4.7 5.8 6.9 9.0 11.6 15.0 40.0 
In comparison with the United States, Japan, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaya, and Ceylon, these figures

suggest that Korea has the most income distributed among the
bottom half of the population and the least income in the top

50 percent. Oshima estimates the Gini coefficient for Korea at
 
about 0.25 at that time, compared to the Philippines with 0.51.
 
Official figures 99 between 1965 and 1980 are as 
follows:
 
Income Bracket 1965 1970 1975 1980
 
Top 20% 41.8 41.6 45.3 46.7
 
Lower 40% 19.3 
 19.6 16.8 15.4
 
Within Sector Income Inequality 1
 
(in Gini coefficients)
 
Rural Income Urban Income Business Income Overall2
 
Year Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
 
1963 n.a. .337 .541 (64)

1967 .357 .315 
 .570 .344 (65)

1970 .296 
 .273 .636 .332
 
1975 n.a. 
 .313 n.a. .381
 
1 From Mason et al., p. 411
 
2 From Suh Sang Mok, p. 40
 
There seems to be no question that overall there has been
 
a continuous rise in incomes in the period 
since 1961. (One

year stands out as an anomoly because 
of the failure of the
 
rice crop in 1980. The oil shocks played a role, but not to
 
the same degree, as 
Korea deftly weathered those difficult
periods.) Although all the evidence is supportive of a rise in
 
incomes in real (as opposed to nominal) terms, there is also

evidence that there are increasing disparities between incomes,
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both between the urban and rural sector and between the richer
 
10 percent of the population and those at the bottom.
 
Although there are those who argue that Korea has
 
maintained reasonable income distribution because of policies

supportive of equity, the contrary seems likely. Before the
 
policy changes of 1971 that affected the rural sector posi­
tively--those of the Third Five-Year Plan--and those of the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan, which were designed to be improve some 
of the social deficiencies in the society, it can be argued
that Korean government policies, at best, took little account 
of the poorest elements of the population. "Government labor 
and agricultural policies have discriminated against peasants
and industrial workers, two major occulhtional groups at the 
bottom of the income-size distribution." .U 
There was little internal pressure after 1961 for govern­
ment to take into account the immediate needs of either the
 
urban workers or the farmers, for there was little partici­
pation by either group in decision-making. Labor unions were
 
closely controlled and strikes were not sanctioned (except

against the U.S military with government connivance), and local
 
government was appointed, not elected. There seems general
 
agreement with conclusion, "Government policies toward labor in
 
Korea prevented real wages from risinglejcept in response to
 
labor shortages in the late 1960s." A study of labor
 
management negotiations from 1977 to 1981 indicated that by

1981 union representation was essentially meaningless in
 
bargaining terms. Final settlements2 averaged on 1.6 percent
 
over managements' initial offer. "U Since that study was
 
made, labor legislation has become even more stringent, and
 
labor unions have lost majir numbers of members, as unions have
 
become illegal in smaller work units. The Korean Federation of
 
Trade Unions estimates that in May 1983, monthly salaries for
 
all workers averaged about half of the $685 monthly income
 
required to maintain minimally a family of five, and the gap is
 
widening.
 
Whether Korea was justified in equity terms in keeping

urban manufacturing wages low at the beginning of the export

drive (and attempting to keep increases as low as possible

today) is a separate issue, but it has allowed Korea to compete

effectively on the international market. There is, of course,

the argument that the most important aspect of improving income
 distribution is to provide employment, and this the government

did. Official figures on unemployment are often suspect, but
 
the migration of the rural population into the cities in large

numbers (Korea is now essentially an urban society and the farm
 
population is rapidly aging) and the growing proportion of
 
urban remittances as a percentage of rural income would seem to
 
validate the estimates of the drop in unemployment rates from
 
8.2 percent to 4.1 percent and underemployment from 24.4 to
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11.4 percent. Government also, however, could be accused of
 
sanctioning underpayment of women who,. for the first time,

found their way into the industrial labor market in large

numbers. They were paid wages in semi-skilled light industry

(such as in textiles, battery manufacturing, etc.), that were
 
clearly a form of supplemental family income, not a living
 
wage, and that were substantially lower than those of the male
 
population. It is significant that Korea in the past has
 
refused to have a minimum wage and did not join the ILO for
 
that reason. Such a wage, however, is likely in the next few
 
years, and Korea plans to join the ILO in 1985.
 
Increasing employment has been critical to equity.
 
Korea was driven by the forces of comparative advantage to
 
expand labor-intensive manufacturing activities. This has
 
generated a rapid growth of employment, which directly

benefited those at the lower end of the income scale. 
 The
 
marked improvement in the employment status of the
 
population is undoubtedly the most .implpftant continuing

influence in favor of equity in Korea.
 
Real urban-worker income did rise significantly, as the
 
table below shows. It doubled between 1965 and 1970, and
 
almost doubled again by 1980.
 
It is virtually impossible, however, to determine the
 
degree to which the donor community contributed to the growth

of employment, and the proportion to which we assign commercial
 
flows, private foreign investment, and the growth of a strong
 
overseas labor market and cfatruction industry (that by 1981
 
employed 168,000 Koreans and was valued at over $13
 
billion).
 
Growth of Urban Worker Household Income
 
1965-1979
 
Daily Wage

All Salary & Wage Annual Earner Annual
 
Year Earner Households Increase Households Increase
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(Constant 1970 Won)
 
1965 16,750 9,946
 
14.1% 15.3%
 
1970 32,401 20,257
 
2.3% 2.2%
 
1975 36,361 22,542
 
12.7% 14.3%
1979 58,607 	 38,443
 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years

adapted from a dissertation by John Slaboda.
 
Donor assistance, however, was calculated to be important
in this 	process. The Asian Development Bank, for example,

estimated that loans to 
the Korea Long Term Credit Bank alone
generated some 56,137.jobs between 1968 and 1983 at an average

cost of $39,700, but that costs per job had fen from $28,000

for the first loan to $86,000 for the third.i This increase
 
was in part due to inflation, but also to the expansion of the
 
capital intensity of investment; the capital output ratio went
from 2.4 	to 6.3 as Korea moved 
into heavy, capital-intensive,

industry.
 
The prospects for improving equity over the 
next eecade
through continuously expanding employment look dim. 
 To keep

competitive on the 
world market, Korea is wisely planning to
 
move 
into export industries with a higher level of technology,

leaving the 
traditional light industries, where labor produc­tivity and wages are lower, to other countries or is (as in

Bangladesh) investing in textile manufacturing there. This

will mean greater capital intensity of employment, and
generally an expansion of employment at a slower rate. This

will come during a period when, because of normal lag time, the
labor 
 force will be expanding faster than the population

growth, even though the latter has dropped from 2.8 in 1960 to
1.6 in 1979. This is li to continue to be the case until
the end of this century. As traditional attitudes erode,
 
more women are 
likely to enter the labor force; thei. partici­pation hasloiready increased from 25.8 percent in 1960 
to 32.6
in 1979. "' If, as seems 
likely because of widening income
disparities 
between rural and urban sectors, rural migration

continues, slower growth in employment in more capital
intensive industries will have important implications for
 
continued equity.
 
Rao has calculated the equity implications under different
 
levels of growth. He concluded that unless there is substan­tial and sustained growth, the Gini coefficient of 0.383 for
1976 might well rise to 0.456 by 1990: "the rate of growth of

Korea's GNP would have to be sustained at over 9 p.a. in order
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to prevent an increase in the number of those below the minimum 
income level and a1%teady deterioration in relative inequali­
ties of income. 1110 Although 1983 reached that level (9.3
percent), it is not planned for the balance of the Fifth Five-
Year Plan and is probably not consistantly attainable. 
Another economic aspect of equity that will be considered
 
here is access to the marketplace. To what degree has the
 
government fostered equal access to the market? In the
 
expanding Korean economy, access to markets, both internal and
 
export, is largely a product of access to credit.
 
The credit mechanisms in Korea are twofold in nature: (1)

the curb or informal market that until recently was unstruc­
tured, volatile, and poorly documented with high interest rates
 
prevailing; and (2) the institutional markets that have been
 
virtually controlled by the government. The government has
 
been able to control the allocation of credit, both foreign and
 
domestically generated, through its domination of the banks in
 
urban areas, and the National Agricultural Cooperative Feder­
ation in the rural sector. Since most business expansion is
 
financed with debt, the state has used the credit level to
 
wield power over the economy by allocating credit to those
 
industries it wished to encourage and to those companies that
 
have performed well. Thus, success in exports has meant the
 
availability of further funds for additional export promotion,
 
trading, importing, or production for internal purposes.
 
Control over credit together with state control over critical
 
corporate personnel and the financial composition of corpor­
ations has allowed the executive branch to dominate the
 
economy.
 
It is significant that curb market debt as a percentage of
 
total liabilities is directly related to firm size. In 1977,
 
firms with 5-9 employees has curb market debts of 14.1 percent,

but firms with over 200 employees had only 2.1 percent.
 
Overall debt (liabilities compared to net worth) was 30.6
 
percent for the 5-9 employee firm but 265.4 percent for the
 
200-299 employee f if and 349.3 percent for firms with 300
 
employees or over. The conglomerates have an average paid­
in capital of 18.1 percent, and their debt-equity ratio in 1983
 
was 455 percent, compared to 360 percent for the whole
 
manufacturing sector. There are some who regard this as
 
indicative of a weak industrial structure.
 
There has not been equity in access to business oppor­
tunity in Korea. It has been the clear policy of the govern­
ment to provide support to the chaebol (conglomerates). In
 
economic terms alone, this has proven to be a very successful
 
policy, anid it is argued by some that Korea's successful
 
management of the 1979 oil crisis and political turmoil follow­
ing Park's assassination was due to the operation of the
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chaebol and their diversified investments. In terms of access
 to the marketplace, this of course has given these companies

the major advantage of being the chosen instrument of Korean

economic (and foreign) policy, with the ability to expand even
 
more widely and at a rapid rate. The U.S. government has noted

that some of its assistance that was intended for small and

medium industries in fact went to large concerns, and that the
intended beneficiaries were not assisted to the degree

anticipated.
 
Although there is a vibrant private sector, 
 with
highlevels of corporate expansion (and failure as well), 
it has

remained under the thumb of government. In this sense, equit­
able access to credit has not been evident in Korean society.

Thedonors have seemed to do little to change this situation,

andthrough support to various development banks have fostered
 
the continuation of this pattern.
 
Environmental degradation has both social and economic
 
costs in equity terms, and in this area the record of the
Korean government 
is mixed. The early quest for industri­
alization and for the spread of foreign investment prompted the
 
state to ignore blatently the environmental quality of life.

At least one report by foreign consultants warning of environ­
mental degradation was suppressed, and its contents never
 
released.
 
The, result was widespread air and water pollution from
industrial plants (and 
in urban areas from automobiles). In
 
some cases irrigation water could not be used because of the
toxic effect on rice plants. There is also the unknown degree

to which the extensive use of herbicides (to cut labor costs),

pesticides, and fertilizer may have affected 
the health of
 
rural populations.
 
Since that early period of export expansion, however,

there has been a concerted effort by government to protect and
improve some environmental conditions. The reforestation pro­
gram in Korea has altered the landscape; it may be the only

successful reforestation program on a national scale in the

world. More stringent pollution control mechanisms may be in
 
place. The author has seen 
no data to indicate that in Korea
projects have been turned down for their potential negative

environmental impact. It is important to note 
that donor
 
support for 
sewage and waste disposal treatment facilities are
 
positive elements on donors' environmental records.
 
The final economic aspect of equity is the sharing of the
 
tax burden. Tax statistics in most countries are subject to
 
severe limitations because of evasion and problems of collec­
tion. Korea is no different, but there seems a general

concensus among observers that Korea has not introduced a
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particularly progressive tax structure. It is certainly not
 
designed to redistribute income, nor, as in some other states,

does it attempt to limit access to the affluent community. It
 
is rather formulated to promote savings and reduce evasions and
 
distortions.
 
Korea relies more than in many states on import and other
 
duties and taxes on luxuries. Although farm income itself is
 
not normally subject to taxation, how does one account for the

"voluntary" donation of funds labor
or for the myriad Saemaul
 
projects that dot village landscapes?
 
A value-added tax (VAT) was introduced in 1977, designed

to replace a more complex series of taxes and exert a favorable
 
influence on exports. "The regressivity issue of the VAT
 
continues to be a topic for hot debate." There 
is no question

that the burden of the VAT has fallen more heavily on those
 
with lowest income, rather than those with the highest income,

and on non-farm families rather 
than farm families. Statistics
 
vary, but estimates range from a burden of 2.42 percent to 3.91
 
percent for those with higher incomes, to 3.62 percent to 9.38
 
percent for those with lowest incomes. The farm/non-farm ratio
 
is 2.90 and 3.82 percent respectively for the higher income
 
groups, to 8 % and 9.38 percent for those with lowest income
 
respectively
 
The tax burden does not appear to have fallen on any one
 
particular group, although as in most societies the wage
 
earners are most likely to be taxed because their income is
 
most obvious. The audit and accountancy functions do not, for
 
example, deal with the conglomerates as a unit, but rather with
 
their individual components, which may allow these firms more
 
flexibility in dealing with their tax obligations. Further,

the government always has at its disposal the explicit threat
 
of tax audits to encourage corporations to follow governmental
 
guidance.
 
Aside from early donor efforts to encourage the government

to improve its tax collection, and some technical assistance in
 
this field, the tax issue, except insofar as subsidies can be
 
considered as a form of negative tax, has essentially been
 
ignored by the donor community. Of course, income redistri­
bution can come about through targeted government expenditures
 
as well as through the tax system, and such rural subsibies are
 
one 
form of attempted, and successful, income redistribution.
 
C. Rural Income and Rural-Urban Differentials
 
Most developing nations that are predominantly agricul­
tural predicate their development strategy on an agriculture­
first policy: this is also the policy of some bilateral donors
 
such as the United States. Korea, however, opted for a
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different path--using the surpluses generated through exports

produced in urban areas to fuel agricultural growth. It is
 
evident that for over two decades the governments of Korea felt
 
that they could afford to slight the rural sector. They were
 
assisted in this approach by the predominant donor over much of
 
that period, the United States.
 
The early conception, perhaps for the decade beginning

with liberation, that South Korea's future lay in agriculture,
 
was based on assumptions that were both natural and inaccu­
rate. It was true that South Korea was more agricultural than
 
North Korea, and the pre-World War II record demonstrated that
 
Kurea could be a food surplus state and could export food
 
grains to Japan. What the latter conclusion obscured was that
 
Korea did this through forced Japanese rice procurement by

drastically curtailing domestic consumption, by substituting

other (inferior) grains, as rice went to fuel Japan's military

expansion. The Nathan Report of 1952 thus recommended that
 
Korea adopt a 11yelopment strategy that would focus on agricul­
tural exports.- It was never implemented.
 
The poor economic investment possibilities in rural areas
 
and the generally conservative nature of the peasant population

after the Korean War (there had been considerable radicaliza­
tion of farmers following liberation and before land reform)

allowed the governments of Syngman Rhee, Chang Myon, and Park
 
Chung Hee for the first decade of his rule, essentially to
 
ignore the rural sector in favor of facing the potentially

mercurial political views of a growing urban people. Thus,
 
consumer prices of staples were held down to keep possible

urban economic unrest under control.
 
The United States through its PL 480 program was able to
 
provide surplus foods to Korea on a grant basis. These grains,

mostly wheat and rice, (cotton was also important for textile
 
mills, and its supply was about half of PL 480 imports) were
 
then sold on the local market, the local currency generated

providing much of the revenue of the Korean government.

Between 1955 and 1971, the value of these importu totalled
 
$777.6 million (an additional $436.1 mffiion was provided by

loan agreements between 1968 and 1973) . This was a short­
term ameliorative mechanism that was in the longer run destruc­
tive of sounder economic planning. The program met U.S. 
national objectives in a quite limited sense: it immediately
disposed of U.S. grain surpluses, it established a commercial 
market for U.S. products (Korea, which was 36 percent self­
sufficient in wheat in 1961, is now 2 percent self-sufficient 
and is supplied essentially from the United States; cotton 
production, which was important, is now virtually nonexistent 
in Korea), and assisted general U.S. foreign policy objec­
tives: the support of the Korean government and people. It 
has been said that PL 480 was the principal means to carry out 
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donor objectives: "Based on the size of the program and the
 
control which the U.S. may exercise over the use of local
 
currency generations, it can be said that the Title I [PL 480]
 
program has become the principal economic tool through which
 
U.S. J~reign policy objectives in Korea are being carried
out."-

Yet this aid program destroyed any Korean government

initiative that might have existed to improve riie and barley

production through pricing policies that provided a fair return
 
on imputed investment. Until the late 1960s, the overall costs
 
of production of rice (including imputed labor costs) were in
 
excess of the government purchase price, which, aMough not 
a
 
monopoly, was sufficient to control the market. Farmers
 
grew rice under such conditions for a variety of reasons: they

needed it for subsistance, it was customary, and because they

did not value their labor as there were few economic
 
alternative uses of their time.
 
There were several factors that caused the Park government

to change its policy toward the rural sector. Park had been
 
under pressure in 1967 from opposition politicians to provide

assistance to the rural population; PL 480 in the late 1960s
 
was changed from a grant program to hard currency (although

concessional) loans; and when in the 1971 election his sources
 
of support were severely eroded in the rural areas, the govern­
ment resolved to take action. The result was increased grain

prices to farmers, more rural infrastructure, and the Saemaul
 (New Community) Movement. This period coincides with the
 
spread of the new high-yielding varieties of rice that markedly

increased yields. Since that experience, however, Korea has
 
learned that the traditional rice varieties respond to the 
same
 
treatment as the newer higq-yielding varieties, often within 10
 
percent of total yields.L ±
 
Since the export drive began after the coup of Park Chung

Hee in 1961, and especially after the infusion of Japanese

reparations and assistance following normalization of relations
 
with Japan in 1965, urban salaried income began to rise as
 
industry expanded and urban labor shortages occurred. Rural
 
incomes, however, remained depressed by the low prices for the
 
basic foodgrains of rice and barley.
 
Although pricing policies were to continue to be low for 
a
 
considerable period, the regime, fo'.lowing foreign technical
 
assistance provided by AID, reformed the agricultural bureau­
cracy by forming of the Office of Rural Develiment, incorpor­
ating research and extension into one system. The govetnment

also consolidated the National Agricultural Cooperative Federa­
tion, providing the basic bureaucratic structure that was to
 
allow expansion of agricultural programs when the political

will was ready.
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The decisions to improve income and performance in the
 
agricultural sector were not only predicated on positive shifts
in grain pricing, but a coordinated effort at rural mobiliza­tion that resulted in an infusion of funds into rural infra­
structure, such as irrigation, roads, and electricity, all of

which were supported in part by foreign economic asgnitance and
 
were essential components of enhanced rural equity.
 
It was fortunate that at the time the Third Five-Year Plan
 
was being formulated, calling for increased attention to rural
development, the new high-yielding varieties of rice were being
introduced and tested 
in Korea. The results were an extension

service in place, widespread irrigfiNon, fertilizer availa­bility (through foreign assistance, and credit mechanisms

working (also partly supported by foreign aid) that enabled the

rural economy to take advantage of the new seed varieties.
 
The confluence of political will, technological innova­tions, and the administrative mechanisms produced an explosion

of production that, by 1976, 
raised Korean rice production to
the highest level per hectare in the world, for a short period
 
even surpassing Japan. The goals achieved were not only

economic, but also political and strategic, but they were short
 
lived. Political expediency to attain the political goal of

rice self-sufficiency pushed too far 
and too fast varieties of

rice that Korean researchers warned would eventually fail.

They did fail in the disastrous crop year of 1980, a failure

officially attributed to cold weather, the literal 
truth of
that assertion obscuring the political and administrative
 
ramifications of the decision to proceed with a single variety
ill-suited to the varying climatic conditions in Korea. 
 It was
ironically a testament to the capacity of Korean
the bureau­
cracy, which ably implemented such a decision, however inappro­
priate it may have been."'
 
The Koreans, with their high-pricing policy resulting in
producer rice prices over two times world
the market price,

were quietly following a successful Japanese model; but where
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan required the

support of the farm bloc to continue in power, the Korean
 
government, from an outside perspective, seemed under no such
 pressure. To placate the urban population, consumer prices of
 
these grains were also held down, so 
that the government found
itself through the Grain Management Fund supporting subsidies
for both the rural and urban populations, a situation that

would eventually prove economically intolerable.
 
The deficit was financed by an expansion of the money

supply, thus fueling inflation in which the whole society would
 
pay the costs of these subsidies. In opposition to the Minis­
try of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Economic Planning Board

staff resolved to cut the deficit. IBRD
The structural
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adjustment loan of October 
1983, as one of the conditions and

supporting widespread concerns previously expressed by Korean
 
planners, called for the elimination of these subsidies by the
 
end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan in 1986.
 
Subsidization of grain pricing through the Grain Manage­
ment Fund by 1983 cumulatively reached $1.7 billion. In
 
addition, the fertilizer subsidization had accumulated deficits
 
of $700 million.
 
Contrary to some published figures, farm household income
 
had lagged far behind urban household income (the comparison
between farm household income and urban salaried income was not
 
quite valid). Between 1965 and 1970, when the export drive was
 
entering high gear, average income of urban and salary wage

earner households rose in real terms 141 ,J and daily
2 percent

wage earner household income 15.3 percent. In contrast, farm
 
household income only rose by 4.6 percent during 
the same
 
period.
 
In the 1970-1975 period, after grain prices were raised

and the high-yielding varieties of rice began be distri­to 
buted, farm income rose more quickly than urban salary and wage
 
earner, households (6.5 percent compared to 2.3 percent), partly

as a result of the first oil price increase and its effect on
 
the urban economy. From 1975 to 1979, the growth pattern was

again reversed: farmn income rose by 5.7 percent while urban

salary and wage household income increased 12.7 percent. Urban
daily wage earner households, however, essentially equalled

farming household income. Overall, urban households continued
 
to be more affluent than rural ones, for the effective exclu­
sion of most academicians, businessmen, higher civil servants,

and professionals from the statistics markedly skewed the
 
comparison.
 
Since that time, it is likely that disparities between the

urban salaried worker households and farm households have
 
grown. Although a greater proportion of farm households
 
receive income from nonfarming sources (especially from urban

remittances), the disastrous harvest of 1980 and the freeze in
 
rice and barley prices in 1983 mean that farm income will
 
probably continue to decline in constant currency due to infla­
tion and that the elimination of the subsidies of the Grain
 
Management Fund by 1986 will see a further decline 
in rural­
urban equity in the rural sector. A move by Korean farmers out

of rice and into high priced specialty crops would help solve
 
the issue, but it is currently illegal and would likely be
 
politically and emotionally traumatic. Elimination of the land
 
holding ceiling would allow increased farm income, of course
 
for fewer farmers, the remainder driven off the land into the

cities. Urban employment would thus have to continue
 
expanding.
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The Korean government is well aware of the need, under
 
present and likely circumstances, to increase the proportion of

nonagricultural income of rural inhabitants. In 1962, 20.4
 
percent 
of rural income came from nonfarm sources, including

wages (9.4 percent), remittances (7.2 percent), and other
businesses (3.8 percent). By 1981, 32.8 percent of rural
household income was from nonfarm sources, 
 including 19.9
 
percent from remittances 
and savings. The highest off-farm
income is, naturally, iffamilies *with less than 
0.5 hectares
 (64.0 percent in 1981). 
-TJapan,the figure is 80 percent

and in Taiwan 73.6 percent.M The potential for such growth,
however, is limited because of 
a lack of appropriate institu­
tional financing (essentially a monopoly of the National Agri­
cultural Cooperative Federation) for non-farm employment oppor­
tunities at the village level.
 
The failure of the Saemaul industrial program, which
 
subsidized the establishment of 741 factories and was designed

to establish labor-intensive industries 
in rural areas in the

mid-1970s, was due to its quick formation 
as a political
imperative; and its export orientation occurred just when there
 
was a slump of the world market and internal transportation

costs were high. One-third of these small factories, often
branches of larger concerns, closed and most of the remainder
 
operated at low capacity, as they were not competitive with the
 larger concerns. Nothing has yet taken their place.
 
It should also be noted that the decline recently in rural
income is reflected in two other statistics: the rise in rural
indebtedness 
and the increase in tenancy. Rural indebtedness
 before the agrarian policy changes in 1965 stood at 106 percent

of current farm assets (including land values). At the height

of the agricultural success in 1976 when 
rice production (49

percent of gross farm receipts) peaked, it dropped to
 percent but by 1982 it had once again risen to 94 percent.

At the same time, tenancy has been on the increase, so that by
1981, 46 percent of farmers were complete or partial tenants,

and 22 percent of the land area was tenanted.
 
Growing pressures to increase the statutory limit on land

size, which would make mechanization more feasible and thus
 
increase the productivity of rural 
labor, would also probably

result 
in heightened disparities in income distribution within
 
the rural sector.
 
Rural incomes are likely to continue to decline insofar 
as
 
farm income is still 
largely dependent on rice. Significant

off-farm employment is still a distant prospect, and continuing

migration of youth (both male and female) into urban jobs 
seems
likely, with the aging of the Korean farm family. This without
 
compensatory factors would probably lead to 
lower productivity,
but the government will continue to attempt to offset this with
 
mechanization. Although grain and fertilizer subsidies may be
 
lessened or eliminated, there remains considerable
 
subsidization by government in other aspects of the rural
 
sector, including irrigation, roads, mechanization, and credit.
 
The donors' response to the rural inequities that have
 
existed in Korea have been one that essentially followed Korean
 
government's policies. Except for one irrigation loan each,

the multilateral donors did not invest 
in the rural sector

until Korean emphasis was placed on it in 1971. The United
 
States only provided $36 million in grants directly for
 
agriculture and natural resource development between 1954 and
 
1975, although an indeterminate but substantial amount went for

rural activities under loans and under general support to the
 
Korean budget. Because of the PL-480 program, the United

States can justly be charged with exacerbating rural inequi­
ties, but in other fields the donors simply accepted government
 
program direction.
 
D. Regionalism and Equity
 
The patterns of regionalism in South Korea are too
 
persistent to be ignored. Dating back to the period of the
 
Three Kingdoms in Korea (unified in 668 AD), there 
has been
 
some social discrimination between those from the Cholla
provinces in the southwest and the remainder of the country.

These have been marginal differences in comparative perspec­
tive, but they became of greater importance politically because
 
the opposition to Syngman Rhee was centered in that area. From

the Third Republic on, these two provinces were also regarded

as the seat of opposition to the government. This culminated
 
in the Kwang-ju insurrection in May 1980, which was forcibly

put down by the government but in which many lives were lost.

There were charges that the southwest had been discriminated
 
against in the introduction of highways and industrial
 
development.
 
There is some evidence that this was true. Part of it, no
 doubt, came from the better port facilities of the southeast
 (the southwest being largely agricultural with shallow
 harbors), and also because, as in most developing nations,

rapid economic growth usually takes place in the capital and
 its surrounding area. There was perceived economic discrimi­
nation in any case. It may be significant that the rate of
failure of Saemaul rural 
 industry in the Cholla provinces was
 
over double that in the more favored Kyungsang provinces
(Presidents Park and Chun are from this region) of. the south­
east. Income was also skewed. In 1968, for example, per

capita income 
in Seoul and Pusan was over double that of the

Cholla provinces 1 income in Kyungsang provinces was about

one-fifth higher. these
Further, disparities had been
 
growing. Rural industry in 1970 in Chollanam and Chollabuk
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provinces was 17.8 and 11.2 percent respectively of all
 
national rural industry; by 1980, it had dropped to 12.9 and
 
7.5 percent respectively (employment had also fallen to 7.4 and
 
3.1 percent respectively). On the other hand, Kyonggyi

province (around Seoul) had doubled its industry over the same
 
period to 30.6 percent of the nation, and Kyonggyi province in
 
1980 had also expandeh to encompass 27.7 percent of rural
 
industrial employment. J
 
The bulk of industry in Korea is located in the Seoul area
 
and the surrounding province of Kyonggyi, and then in the
 
southeast, especially in or near the cities of Pusan, Taegu,

Masan, Ulsan, and Pohang. It is not surprising that a review
 
of the funds provided by the IBRD and the ADB to various banks
 
for relending to industry indicates that only perhaps 5 percent

went to the Chollas, which have about one-fifth of the national
 
population.
 
In that sense the donors were following the lead of the
 
government and reinforcing these disparities. However, there
 
has been a persistent effort by some donors, especially the
 
IBRD, to engage in regional development, and it is to the
 
credit of the IBRD that its focus on the Kwangju region has
 
been longstanding. Figures on donor support to rural infra­
structure, such as roads and irrigation, show no evidence that
 
the donors intentionally exacerbated the discrepanc!es that
 
already existed. Although donors could in large part influence
 
how their funds were spent, they could not effectively do so
 
for the recipient's own resources, which were by far the
 
overwhelming proportion of monies available. Donor lending was
 
provided to those areas that made sense economically, following

Korean government leads. Such lending was designed neither to
 
throughout Korea and 

alleviate income differences 
and it accomplished neither. 
nor to correct past deficiences, 
E. Aspects of Social Equity 
There has been general improvement in social services 
the introduction of social security. In
 
addition to the spread and accessibility of higher levels of
 
education in an equitable manner, electricity reaches most of
 
the remote rural homes on the peninsula, and only a few
 
isolated islands are without it. Rural electrification has
 
generally been a consumption, rather than an production, good

in the rural setting, as little use is made of it for farm­
level productive enterprises. Its primary functions seem to be
 
lighting, television, and fans. (In the sense that government

controls all the media, from the state's viewpoint it is also a
 
political good.) Water and sanitation have greatly expanded in
 
urban areas and, to a lesser degree, in rural areas as well.
 
The IBRD, ADB, and earlier AID, have all been engaged in major

support to improved sewage and water supplies for the major
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urban areas. There has lately been an increase in donor
 
support to water and waste treatment in the smaller urban
 
communities as well. Safe water 
is now said to be available to
 
85 percent of urban and 55 percent of rural households.
 
There has also been a general improvement in health and
 
nutrition throughout the nation. The average life expectancy

has risen from 54 years in 1960 to 63 years in 1982, infant
 
mortality dropped from 62 to 37 per thousand live births, and
 
although the government spends only a small percentage of its

annual budget on health, the availability of services has
 
certainly increased. In rural areas, this has been not so much
 
a product of better hospitals, preventive or
care, medical
 
services, but rather 
a result of improved rural transportation
(roads, buses, and taxis), together with telephone service, so
 
that in emergencies, transportation to a hospital is possible.

As in most developing countries, doctors are concentrated in
 
major urban areas, but medical personnel now may serve in

provincial areas in lieu of military service, and the popula­
tion doctbr ratio fell from 3,539 1960 to 1,986
in in 1982.
 
The ratio of population to hospital beds has also declined
 
significantly, from 2,482 in 1960 to 643 in 1982. 
 It should be

noted, however, that most health expenses are privately

financed, with only 15 percent of total gross health expendi­
tures borne by government, which also controls only 13.1
 
percent of h-Ith care institutions and 18.7 percent of
hospital beds. 1 Nutrition standards are well over the daily

requirements both for the population as a whole and for groups

within it although traditional child feeding patterns, which
 
are nutritionally poor, are generally retained.
 
Although there is evidence 127 that mobility has been
 
limited at the apex of the economic and social ladder, except

through the military channel, there is considerable mobility in
 
the economy at the lower and middle levels. 
 The expansion of
 
economic activity has, of course, required this, but it has
 
been assisted through the activities of donors that have
 
strengthened the technical educational system, 
thus allowing

mobility through 
an alternative channel to the prestigious

academic system that normally dominates a Confucian-oriented
 
society. in this sense, the donors, especially the World Bank,

have furthered the process by supporting many of the
 
institutions contributing 
to such mobility and the development
 
of such skills.
 
The issue of participation, broadly defined in terms of
 
economic development as the involvement in the economic and

allocational 
 decision process of those whom development

affects--in contrast to the overall political process of the

choosing national or local leadership--is one that has flowered
 
for three short periods in Korean history. These eras followed
 
liberation from Japan in 1945, the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in
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1960, and the assassination of Park Chung Hee, in 1979. Each
 
was an intensely participatory period verging on the chaotic,

and each began to unloosen the encumbering strands of state
 
control, only to be followed by a reaffirmation of the central­
ized power of the political leadership.
 
Korea has had a strong heritage of central control.
 
People generally believe that power is finite, and thus to
 
share or delegate it is to diminish proportionally one's own.
 
It may be argued that the pervasiveness of state control was
 
one factor in retarding the development of major entrepre­
neurial investment or industry in the classical period. This
 
tendency was reinforced by the Japanese colonial period, and
 
inadvertently by the U.S. military government.
 
The extent of central government (and it should be remem­
bered that all local government is appointed and is an arm of
 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, which also controls the police)

intervention into the economic, social, and cultural lives, let
 
alone the. political process, is ubiquitous. The regulatory

functions of the state intrude into the daily lives of every

citizen, controlling much of the mundane aspects of living,

especially in rural communities. The anonimity of urban Korea
 
government in rural development through the 

is in contrast to the rural 
attractions, more because of 
areas, and may 
the removal of 
be one of its 
some Confucian 
strictures rather than political influence. 
Some have argued that in spite of the heavy hand of 
Saemaul Movement,
 
citizens have a greater share in the process than heretofore.
 
This may be true, but it is the concept of a limited role
 
within effectively statist regulations and objectives.
 
As the economy has expanded and become more complex, there
 
have been pressures of sheer efficiency to release some of the
 
bonds of state regulation. This has included some pressures

from abroad, and planned liberalization of imports, the opera­
tion of both foreign and domestic banks, and more generally the
 
functioning of the economy as a whole. These pressures for
 
liberalization are real, and have been generally supported by

both foreign donors and Korea's trading partners, as well as
 
many of Korea's trained economists. Although there are those
 
who favor liberalization, there are vested interests and
 
bureaucratic inertia that are likely to slow such processes.
 
Donors have often suggested policies of macroeconomic
 
liberalization, and the Korean government has slowly moved in
 
this direction, more likely because it perceived in its
 
pragmatic mode that it was in Korea's own interests rather than
 
because it was abstractly desirable. The government has done
 
so when its political and economic power base was either not
 
threatened or could be enhanced by such moves. The Fifth Five­
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Year Plan, in which 
more reliance on market mechanisms is
 
advocated, is such an example.
 
There seems little question that liberalization will
 
continue, but it is likely to 
do so in a slow, episodic

manner. The donors' contribution to the process is evident in
 
some fields, such as helping encourage the government to play
less of a dominant role in pricing, but the historic tendency
in Korea points in the direction of centralization.
 
F. The Status of Women
 
The development process in Korea has provided Korean women
 
with increasing opportunities to work. but discriminated

against them in wages and status. Female participation in the
labor force has grown, but not as rapidly as a percentage of

the labor force as one might expect. This is due to the
 pattern of women entering the urban job market, and staying in
it for a brief period until they are married or until their 
first chiid. 
 There is thus a constant turnover in female labor

supply, with their participation in light industries, such as
textiles and electronic assembly, very important to those
 
fields. They are generally young. In 1973, 82 percent of all
 
women in the modern labor force were between 18 and 29 years,

and over 88 percent of all female clerical workers were under
24 years, as were 64 percent of all women in manufacturing. In
larger firms, the women 
are often housed by their factory.

Income is considered as a supplement to general family income,

and wages are shared with the nuclear family as a whole, or

saved as dowry. In 1978, female wages were only 46 percent of
 
male wages. Although there is no statistical evidence, it
 
seems likely that 
rural women enter the urban labor force not

only for the remuneration but secondarily for the mobility

associated with leaving the rural community, the desire to
 
escape from the rigid confines of the Confucian village

society, and to marry into urban homes. 
Women interviewed said

that they did not want their daughters to marry farmers. There
 
are few women in the higher levels of government; for example,
there is only one in the Economic Planning Board in a
 
supervisory role.
 
Women have fared poorly at the farm level even with rising
incomes, for their work has increased while the family labor
 
associated with the farm has diminished. Women have taken on

nontraditional roles in some occupations, and there has been a
growing number of women in higher education. Avenues for women
 
are still restricted, although Korean women may have progressed
further, from a very low beginning, than the other women of
 
northeast Asia.
 
The donors' role (after early military government assist­
ance in education) has been essentially neutral. Insofar as
 
-56­
development has opened up employment opportunities for women,
 
and donors have contributed to such possibilities, their
 
contribution has been useful but essentially inadvertent. No
 
major donor seems to have consciously designed projects or
 
offered assistance that would have affected in some defined
 
manner the positive enhancement of the status of women,
 
although some small foundations have tried to do so.
 
Women are still disadvantaged in Korea. In spite of past
 
constitutional provisions specifically indicating their equal
 
status with men, this is still ignored both in fact and in
 
law. Positive change, however, is likely over time.
 
G. Equity and Foreign Assistance
 
The contribution of donors, especially the United States,
 
to the relief of Korea following World War II and the relief
 
and rehabilitation after the Korean War was both positive and
 
critical to the survival of the nation. It is important to
 
qualify this, however. Although foreign relief assistance was
 
effective, it was not in the hands of the Korean government,
 
but in large part was administered directly by the donor. That
 
situation is unlikely to offer many lessons germane to other
 
nations, as the Korean experience may have been unique in
 
circumstances and in time.
 
Equity is highly valued in parts of Korean society in
 
spite of its hierarchical structure. This may in part be due to
 
the Confucian concept of literati (i.e., bureaucratic and
 
intellectual) responsibility for ensuring the health of the
 
state, coupled with modern student,(i.e., younger literati)
 
concerns with social affairs. It may also have been affected by
 
the remarkable growth of Christianity over the past two
 
decades.
 
Donors have had an important influence on policy related
 
to equity in Korea, but it occured prior to the formation of
 
the Korean government. The single greatest foreign
 
contribution to equity in the country was the land reform that
 
was carried out under foreiqn military government auspices and
 
based on foreign models. It no doubt was profoundly important
 
to equity in that society, and remains today, in spite of some
 
erosion in its effect, an outstanding acheivement of a
 
particular type of foreign assistance, one that is unlikely to
 
be replicated in many places and certainly not under similar
 
conditions. Land reform in all analyses of Korean income
 
distribution is regarded as elemental to rural equity, and in
 
many other nations may be similarly considered.
 
Equity issues are so largely a matter of policy and relate
 
so directly to the distribution of power tnat, if Korea is any
 
example, both relatively weak, but authoritarian, governments
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and strong nationalist ones will try by varying tactics to
 
control policy and shape the equity issues to their own
 
interests. Syngman Rhee did so by manipulating one
 
bureaucratic element of the donor against another, each having
 
parochial interests that were not in consort. Bilateral donors
 
are more subject to this sort of alternating pressures than
 
multilateral donors. It should be mentioned here that the
 
Japanese aid program has not at any time attempted to influence
 
or shift policies related to equity. They have accepted with
 
apparent equanimity the status quo in Korea in this regard.
 
There is no evidence that the Korean government made any
 
concessions either to donor policies as contained in the
 
donor's own regulations (e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act of
 
1973 in the United States concentrating assistance on the rural
 
poor) or to donor requests for reforms leading to more
 
equitable distribution of the benefits of development until the
 
Korean government perceived it was in its own interests to do
 
SO.
 
There thus is no indication that the donors, either
 
through project or program assistance, and without regard to
 
the magnitude of funds, had any significant impact on improving
 
equity by prompting changes in Korean government policies. One
 
might ironically speculate that this is to be expected when
 
professional economists, Korean and foreign, talk to each
 
other, for they share a common set of academic values. When
 
the Korean government made such changes, however, donors
 
through projects supported those shifts.
 
The reverse seems apparent as well. Policy changes in
 
equity terms as suggested by donors have been ignored on the
 
rare occasions when they have been proferred. In spite of
 
repeated exhortations by the United States to reform its
 
agricultural policy to provide better livings to Korean
 
farmers, the government did not do so until it became evident
 
to elements of that government that to continue to neglect the
 
rural sector would lead to further erosion of the power base of
 
the regime.
 
It is also significant, insofar as equity is related to
 
participation, that the donors have had no effect on improving
 
participation in Korean society, which remains minimal. Local
 
government remains appointed, not elected. The participatory
 
nature of the Saemaul Movement, sometimes cited as democratic
 
in concept, is open to dispute, as there is an indistinct line
 
between mobilization and participation. What is apparent,
 
however, is that whatever the degree of local participaion, it
 
was developed and sanctioned by the government of Korea at its
 
own pace and in its own way.
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There may be an indirect effect on equity policy by

participant training through foreign assistance, but it cannot
 
be demonstrated except in individual circumstances. In any

effort to build up a critical mass of officials or technicians
 
over time, as they rise in the bureaucracy, they may positively

affect policy. Although there may be an indirect relationship

to the donors, it is virtually impossible to quantify and is
 
tenuous at best.
 
The persistent policy discussions that take place between
 
advisors and officials over prolonged periods may eventually

have some effect, but it is impossible to trace with any

certainty such causality. This type of dialogue is desirable,

but is probably impossible of evaluation.
 
Once the government has decided on a course of action,

however, or if the matter under consideration is technical in
 
nature, donors may have a profound influence within these
 
important strictures. Thus bilateral donors can help affect
 
the equitable allocation of credit once it is decided which
 
organization will control it, how to raise incomes and yields

through technological improvements in industry or agriculture,
 
and other project-level activities.
 
The greatest contribution to overall equity in Korea by

donors has probably been the support to the industrial sector,
 
not for any particular group or sex, but simply and directly in
 
the magnitude of the number of jobs created and the likelihood
 
that by its support the donor community provided the tacit
 
assurances that enabled commercial markets to provide the
 
credit that created even more employment, a primary, positive

factor in improved equity in Korea.
 
-59-

IV. Conclusions
 
Korea began the process of economic development with a set
 
of distinct noneconomic advantages (unrecognized, at the time)
 
together with the pall of a devastated physical infrastructure.
 
In retrospect, the obvious massive destruction of the Korean
 
War has proven to be less of a hinderance to economic growth
 
than cutural homogeneity, the Confucian stress on education,
 
the concept (if neglected in the breach) of a meritocratic
 
bureaucratic system, have been advantages.
 
Korea has been able to attain such growth with a degree of
 
relatively equitable income distribution by international
 
comparisons not, however, as a result (until recently) of
 
policy formulation but on the basis of its particular cultural
 
background and a foreign-initiated and influenced land
 
reform. The higher education standard, light industrial base,
 
and the beginnings of modernized agriculture (relative to the
 
systems existing in many post-colonial societies following
 
independence), together with the destruction of assets from the
 
Korean War have proven advantageous to equitable distribution
 
of income. The threat of North Korea has proven to be as much
 
of an economic incentive as it has been a military problem.
 
There have, of course, been errors in priorities, in plan­
ning, and in the equity of implementation, and strong forces
 
for continued centralization exist in spite of public dicta to
 
the contrary; yet the overall record in economic terms has been
 
enviable. A price has been exacted for such growth in politi­
cal and social terms and economically for various elements of
 
the population at different periods. Stress is likely to
 
continue. Participation has been severely restricted; but
 
economic and to a lesser degree, social mobility have been
 
evident. The country has become economically unified but
 
regional income and investment disparities still exist.
 
The unique circumstances of Korean culture and history and
 
the events surrounding its growth preclude the wholesale
 
adoption of the Korean model of development, or indeed any of
 
its components--the parts being relatively dependent on each
 
other and generally not isolatable--to other countries. Yet,
 
certain features stand out from which one may abstract general­
ized conclusions about development and the roles of donor
 
agencies, and from which one might attempt to draw lessons that
 
might improve the management of the development process. These
 
issues are the subjects of the next two sections of this essay.
 
A. Aid Effectiveness
 
The most prosaic "definition" of effectiveness, one that
 
has certain credibility only internal to organizations that
 
view their essential--as opposed to titular--function as
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spending funds efficiently and completely and in a volume
 
prescribed by internal demands, is limited to funding issues.
 
Such a narrow definition implies the following evaluative
 
questions: were the funds allocated for projects or programs

obligated in an expeditious manner for the purposes agreed upon

and were these (narrow) purposes achieved, according to the
 
prescribed rules and, if a loan, were they repaid according to
 
agreement?
 
This definition is by no means adequate, but it is of
 
importance, especially to bilateral donors, when the first (and

most obvious and public) aspect of assistance may be the over­
all volume of aid that is set and promised at high political

levels. Thus, there is a certain relief within a bureaucracy

when the allocated funds are obligated, when the donor performs

well, and when loans are repaid.
 
In this sense Korea has been a model recipient for two
 
decades. The Japanese have commented on the 100 percent

effectiveness of their aid program and regard Korea as the
 
premier aid recipient in the world in these terms. The Asian
 
Development Bank has also noted that the projects have been
 
implemented in an exemplary manner, and in their analyses such
 
terms as "highly satisfactory" performance are quite common.
 
Funds have been utilized at rates almost double the average for
 
other countries. All the evaluations carried out by the World
 
Bank have also expressed these same themes. When there have
 
been delays or cost overruns, and these have often occurred,
 
these have often been a product of the donor's bureaucratic
 
system rather than recipient inefficiency, or of inflation due
 
to external factors, such as the international rises in the
 
price of oil. There have been delays in innovative projects,

but by definition such innovation is likely to lead to slow
 
implementation.
 
Because the United States was the longest and overall the
 
largest donor, and the only one that bridged the gap between
 
the relief, rehabilitation, and import substitution phase of
 
Korean development and the more dynamic and successful export

promotion era, the American experience is mixed. It is overly
 
simplistic to categorize an era in a few words, but it may be
 
said that in the period prior to 1961, assistance was generally
 
not effectively used and Korean performance-was poor overall.
 
It can also be cogently argued that donor performance was
 
limited conceptually to a rather narrow view of Korea's poten­
tial, and one that served the donor's interests perhaps more
 
than the recipient's. Following 1961, except for an initial
 
period of about two years when relations between Korea and the
 
United States were quite strained politically (and indeed
 
economically), that aid relationship was overall very effective
 
until concessional assistance stopped in 1975. Not all
 
projects supported by the United States succeeded; some
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advisory projects failed, and those that were successful had
 
varying degrees of effectiveness. But the argument can be made
 
in the latter period that the primary responsibility for not
 
reaching specified goals may well have vested with the internal
 
donor process in setting unrealistic targets and the
 
articulation of specific and inflated goals and purposes as
 
aspects of a sales document, the credibility of which was
 
limited to the donor's internal review procedures rather than
 
the objective conditions facing the recipient.
 
In summary, Korea has been an exemplary recipient in terms
 
of the narrow definition of "aid effectiveness." Since "aid
 
effectiveness" deals essentially with the expenditure of funds
 
and the physical construction of facilities, the total scope of
 
development aid is ignored in this definition. It is therefore
 
necessary to review the Korean experience in technical assis­
tance, training, and policy dialogue as well as to determine
 
how Korea has fared in these and other categories.
 
B. Technical Assistance and Its Effectiveness
 
Technical assistance in Korea is a broader concept than
 
its literal definition indicates, and it has had several over­
lapping functions that. varied in importance at different
 
periods. It has been used to provide highly specific, techno­
logical assistance either for shorter or longer periods,

suggestions or guidance on policy issues transcending projects
 
or sectors, and moral support for both donor and recipient.
 
From the recipient's perspective, technical assistance has
 
been used internally by one individual, branch, group, or
 
ministry to strengthen its hand internally within the Korean
 
government or institution. It was sometimes viewed as either
 
providing additional internal prestige to an institution or
 
even a point of view as well as assisting at some substantial
 
project level. It was also at various times considered the
 
means through which the donor would make available funds,

training, surplus property or other benefits . in which the 
recipients or their institution were primarily interested. 
Thus the recipient's advocacy of technical assistance was
 
sometimes a lever with which to extract additional resources
 
from the donor. Each of these uses was legitimate at the time.
 
Technical assistance was also useful to the donor, some­
times also as a lever in either the field or headquarters.

When there were considerable doubts about the capacity of an
 
institution to manage a project, when some oversight was
 
thought to be desirable, when real technical advice was
 
required, or when the bilateral donor wished to avoid the
 
bureaucratic onus of monitoring the project with its own staff,
 
technical assistance personnel could be brought in under
 
contract to fill the gap. There was also a certain belief,
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ill-founded in the view of this author but prevalent in
 
Washington, that in the United States contract technical assis­
tance through an American university (especially a state­
supported one) would help establish a political clientele for
 
continued appropriations for the foreign aid bill.
 
Long term resident technical assistance staff at the
 
project level was subject to considerable stress because of
 
factors of language and culture. A review of the "End-of-Tour"
 
reports, which once were required of all U.S. AID technical
 
assistance advisors, reveals patterns that lead to the inescap­
able conclusion that, at the project level, understanding the
 
Korean language and the operation of the Korean bureaucratic
 
culture were essential to effectiveness. These factors were
 
less important, as we will see, at the policy level because
 
counterparts at policy levels usually had international train­
ing, but in projects the counterpart Korean administrators were
 
generally at a lower level and, at least in the earlier period,
 
were less-likely to be educated abroad and thus know English.
 
The capacity of the Koreans to absorb English (or at least
 
to attempt to speak it) even without being trained abroad was
 
remarkably effective compared, for example, to Japan, although

admittedly there is no statistical evidence for this. Yet the
 
methods of language instruction, which need not concern us in
 
this paper, were generally so poor as to prevent any except the
 
most talented from speaking it by the time they assumed
 
positions in the public sector. The evidence for this is clear
 
when a review is made of training programs that were designed
 
to train Koreans in the United States. The delays in such
 
programs were invariably related to the capacity of the
 
trainees to know enough English prior to their departure to
 
pass examinations so that they could function effectively
 
abroad.
 
Foreign advisors were often confused about the operation

of the Korean bureaucracy, and unclear on how to function
 
within it. They soon realized that one element of a successful
 
project was the personal relationships that had to be estab­
lished with the counterpart personnel. Since few technical
 
assistance advisors knew anything about Korea before they 
came
 
and even fewer had a comwmand of Korean, much of the advice was
 
not effective.
 
The United States experience in Korea demonstrates that
 
generally the Koreans regarded foreign technical assistance
 
personnel as reinforcing the developmentally progressive views
 
of Koreans within the bureaucracy. Without the moral encour­
agement and the financial assistance that went in tandem with
 
the technical assistance projects, foreign personnel would have
 
been far less effective. Conversely, on some projects where
 
the sole contribution of foreign assistance was technical, as
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opposed to capital or training, it was likely that the advice
 
would have had less impact.
 
Overall, in the early period before there were many

technically trained Koreans, technical assistance staff
 
provided vital advice on matters that ranged from soils to
 
textiles. Insofar as they acted, rather than solely advised
 
and trained staff on the job, they may have been effective.
 
For example, when AID had advisors attached to the office of
 
every provincial govenor in the early 1960s, many were regarded
 
as eminently successful insofar as they assisted those govenors

(mostly military officers in that period) to attain targets set
 
for their provinces by the central authorities. It is likely

that any lessons that might be learned from this early period

in Korean development would be more germane to some of the
 
African nations that still lack trained manpower.
 
Today, for any country in which development progress is
 
being built on a firm but narrow, technically skilled group, an
 
alternative to long-term resident technical assistance is the
 
development of links with the international centers in fields
 
such as agriculture or other types of foreign institutions that
 
could provide rapid, short-term responses to articulated
 
technical needs in the society. It is likely that the shorter
 
time periods in residence will focus better utilization of
 
these personnel while they are there, and that higher level and
 
more acceptable advisors will be available for shorter, rather
 
than longer, periods. It is important that these links be
 
continued beyond the rather finite and constrained period of a
 
project, and funds might be provided from donors for this 
purpose. 
When technical assistance advice was linked to technical 
issues, as opposed to those of policy, advisors could play an
 
important role. In other words, when the Korean government had
 
decided on a general policy direction, technical assistance
 
could be employed to further Korean goals so that the results
 
were likely to be appropriate. The most influential example

from Korea is that of interest rate reform in 1965, which sub­
stantially raised rates on local savings deposits, thereby

causing a large but hidden supply of savings to come into the
 
instj tional lending mechanisms. It was profoundly success­ful.
 
The record, however, is replete with examples of "failed"
 
attempts by foreign advisors to affect policy when those
 
suggestions were not consonant with Korean government interests
 
as perceived by those wielding power. The Korean government
 
was prepared to make policy shifts when it was deemed to be in
 
its own interests to do so. The magnitude of funds in these
 
cases was immaterial. Greater continuity of host country

personnel is also more likely at the project (technical) level
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than at the policy level. 
 Too often advisory services failed
 
because the higher officials who initiated the request for such
 
services were transferred and new officials were less committed
 
to the concepts. If the Korean experience is consistent with
 
that in other countries, then the general rule would seem to be
 
that technical assistance will likely be successful when such
 
assistance 
is strictly technical and is in accordance with the
 
perceived direction government is already taking. Foreign

advice that is perceived to diminish or to dilute support for
 
the regime will not be implemented until that government

determines it is in its interest to do so. If Korea is an
 
example, then the magnitude of foreign assistance in such
 
efforts is not a relevant factor.
 
Conversely, when foreign technical advice supports the
 
policy decisions underway, this advice will generally be
 
followed, and then funding levels might speed implementation.

The formation of the Office of Rural Development in Korea on
 
the advice of foreign technicians was an important bureaucratic
 
innovation in Korea, for it intimately linked 
agricultural

research and extension. It was also consonant with the Park
 
government's attempt to unify administration for more effective
 
control.
 
On the other hand, for some 15 years advisors suggested to
 
the government that the National Agricultural Cooperative

Federation Le democratized, decentralized, and turned into real
 
cooperatives, but there has been no action along these lines,

for the cooperatives are an integral arm of government power in
 
the rural sector. Although advisors had early suggested that
 
agricultural pricing policy should be revised and 
that farmers
 
should be paid sufficiently for their produce, the changes came
 
only when the government determined it was in its interest to
 
do so.
 
There is a third option between the short-term technical
 
project advisor and the long-term resident expatriate: the
 
operation of a resident technically competent foreign

assistance mission in a country. In Korea, only the 
United
 
States had a significant presence in this regard (UN assistance
 
was tied to individual projects, while U.S. assistance was more
 
general in scope). Although evidence is limited, it may be
 
concluded that in the period before Koreans were well 
trained
 
in technical aspects of development, such a mission (probably

far less large than the one in place at that time) was
justified. When the Koreans became trained, a large mission
 
was not necessary, and it was difficult for an organization

such as AID, because of its own internal bureaucratic problems,

to staff such a mission with individuals who could uniformly

equal the training of their counterparts in the Korean
 
government.
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Missions are expensive to run and difficult to manage
 
effectively. Such bureaucracies tend to create their own
 
internal work load, and thus should be kept as small as poss­
ible with autonomy commensurate with their technical capacity.
 
Too often such missions become captives of their headquarters
 
and thus spend too little time servicing the needs of the local
 
development community, and too much time responding to external
 
dissiderata.
 
C. Training
 
In interviews, Korean administrators of a wide range of
 
bilateral projects stated that the most effective part of the
 
program was the international training, which often comprised
 
only a small percentage of the total funds. Although it is
 
possible that some of these anecdotal remarks may be self­
serving, it is likely that there is considerable validity in
 
them, as similar comments have been made in a wide variety of
 
countries. The singular importance of training was reinforced
 
by the virtually unanimous views of senior Korean policy-level
 
staff, past and present.
 
The training of staff who can operate within the bureau­
cratic milieu of a particular society is one of the major
 
longer term contributions that any aid organization, multi­
lateral or bilateral, can make to a nation at a certain stage
 
of its development.
 
Korea, since liberation, has produced a substantial flow
 
of self-directed and self-supported individuals, largely from
 
the gentry, who received graduate degrees abroad. In addition,
 
however, some 3,000 Koreans were trained abroad for shorter or
 
longer periods by the Unite1 2 tates alone, 86 percent of whom
 
went to the United States. Many of these were for short
 
term, observational courses, although a substantial number were
 
for long-term degree training. Of 2,148 participants trained
 
by AID between fiscal years 1954 and 1962, 15 percent were in
 
agriculture, 18 percent in administration, 8 percent in
 
trunsportation, and 25 percent in industry and mining. Of
 
these, 46 percent were from government, 43 percent from
 
nationalized industries, and only 6 percent from the private

business sector. There were complaints that i few indi­
viduals had been trained from the private sector.
 
The effectiveness of foreign assistance depends on the
 
trained staff of any local institution. It is unfortunate,
 
however, and perhaps unnecessary, that the "training of key
 
individuals to be associated with projects can only begin after
 
project approval, thus creating a hiatus between project start
 
and local effective administration. This made the use of
 
expatriate technical assistance necessary (at an earlier stage
 
of Korea's development). Thought should be given to develop­
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ment of a means by which staff can be trained in priority

fields prior to formal project approval. Although there are
 
obvious problems associated with such an approach, especially

when loans are involved, there may be ways around such an
 
impasse.
 
Senior officials of the Korean government have persua­
sively argued that the early stress on training and human
 
resource development by the donor (the U.S.) was the critical
 
factor in later economic growth in spite of the fact that this
 had been relegated to a rather low priority by Syngman Rhee,

who wanted more physical and tangible signs of foreign

assistance. U.S. assistance for training abroad and human
 
resource development projects internally were, they have
 
argued, a vital element in the future developmental success in
 
Korea.
 
A significant gap in the training program of the United
 
States was the absence in the 1950s of any donor attempt to.
 
train economists who could be associated with economic planning

at a later date, although economists were trained through self­
generated or unofficial programs. Although such planning 
was
 
not taking place within the Korean government at that time, it
 
should have been apparent that the need for such individuals

would eventually arise. It was not until the 1960s, after the
 
military government had started its First Five-Year Plan, that
 
a change in training priorities took place. In this sense, the
 
Koreans were the leaders in this field, while the donor lagged

behind.
 
D. Policy Dialogue
 
FOL a dialogue, as opposed to a monologue, to take place
 
on development policy, a peer relationship between the two
 
nations or individuals is required. What one may lack in
 
training or knowledge of the international economic scene may
be compensated for by other, often national-specific attri­
butes. The dialogue between Korea and the United States, the

oldest and largest donor, was often acrimonious at the
 
beginning and toward the end of the aid relationship, and
 
generally productive over some issues in the middle.
 
The early economic aid relationships of the 1950s were
 
marked by often bitter disputes over exchange rates, money

supply, uses of local currency generated by foreign imports

supplied under aid, corruption, and stabilization programs. It
 
was not fruitful. Just prior to the end of the concessional
 
aid relationship with the United States, there the
were 

beginnings of disputes about trade, quotas, marketing

agreements, and dumping issues. Many of these still continue,

and are likely to increase. In the mid-1960s, the relationship

and dialogue were generally productive.
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One characteristic of this policy dialogue stands out:
 
foreign observers of Korea's economic growth have consistently

underestimated the capacity of that government mobilize
to 

internal support for its program and reach its targets. If one
 
assumes that these advisors were well aware of the interna­
tional economic factors affecting Korea's potential growth,

then their failing must have been in misinterpreting the inter­
nal Korean scene.
 
Policy dialogue is not necessarily advocacy of a view that
 
is solely externally generated and is not held by a significant

number of officials within a host government. It is rather more
 
effective to support those progressive policy views held by a

portion of the recipient bureaucracy, so that foreign

assistance on economic policy is a lever to be used not by 
an
 
outsider, but by an insider in internecine policy debates.
 
The Korean case demonstrates this point. Policy changes
 
were made- when such changes were pushed internally and were
 
perceived to be in the interests of regime in power
the and
 
were not directed toward the dilution of such power. There is

considerable evidence, for example, that the $300 million
 
structural adjustment loan by the IBRD of October 1983 stipu­
lating certain policy shifts such as liberalization of imports

and the elimination of grain subsidies by 1986 stimulated
 
reforms that important elements in the Korean government were
 
already prepared to make, and at best accelerated the process

of inevitable change. This should not be surprising.
 
Conversely, as has previously been noted, policy recommen­
dations from outside, when perceived to be detrimental in some
 
manner to the interests of the government in power, were
 
ignored whenever possible. Overall, the Syngman Rhee era
demonstrates this 
axiom as does lack of reform of the coopera­
tive movement, early efforts to liberalize grain prices, and
 
banking and import reforms in the earlier periods.
 
Conversations with individuals who were knowledgeable

about the period indicate that Korea in the 1960s participated

in standby agreements with the IMF not because the money was
 
really necessary, but because the agreements enabled the Mini­
stry of Finance to get more leverage with the Economic Planning

Board over various issues. One AID study indicated that Korean

"economic ministries used the conditions precedent of the
 
program loans (in the 1960s) to counteract inflationary
 
programs or policies proposed by other ministries. The program

loan provided Finance Ministry economists with an excub 2 for
 
unpopular policies they wanted to carry through anyway."
 
There have been cases, especially in the mid-1960s, when
 
assistance levels in any one year and within limits were tied
 
with modest types of reform, but these reforms, although

important, never questioned the power base of the regime.
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The issue through much of the 1950s and 1960s was
 
stabilization. In the later 1960s the U.S. used the "program

loan," amounting to about 3-4 percent of the total aid package

in any year, as an incentive to the Koreans to meet a number of
 
highly specific targets in relation to stabilization. "The
 
program loan was introduced as a carrot, a marginal element of
 
assistance, but one specifically aimed at stimulating better
 
stabilization performance." 132 The concept seems to have been
 
to delay funding if targets were not achieved (performance in
 
meeting one objective could be substituted for one not met),
 
not to withhold funds indefinitely.
 
The U.S. position, however, was complex. "Moreover, since
 
our (U.S.) political objectives could not permit real damage to
 
the Korean economy, and since funds were never unlimited, we
had to use available funds for dual purposes: to wit~ld for 
punishment and then making again available (sic). The
 
failure to meet targets and thus the temporary denial of
 
support under program loans, amounted to relatively small
 
amounts. For example, in 1967 the $15 million loan was reduced
 
to $12.5 million. The important force may have been the
 
inchoate threat of public disclosure of such failures, which
 
was not made, and not the funds involved, as the regime at that
 
time was unpopular in many circles and had not yet established
 
its economic legitimacy. In addition, the AID study concluded
 
that "...knowledge that the U.S. had withheld aid for poor

performance might weaken Kojs's credit standing and ability to
 
borrow from other lenders."
 
The Korean-American relationship, as characterized in the
 
study quoted, may not have been as confrontational or mono­
lithic as presented. By 1970, in any case, the study noted 
that "... what started as a largely U.S. program, accepted by
the Koreans as necessary to get the required aid, became a joint program, and now is becoming increasingly a Korean 
program. If leverage M its use has diminished, the need for 
it has also decreased. 
The effects of training and of the constant dialogue of
 
expatriate advisors over long periods of time cannot be
 
measured, for the success of the policy dialogue in fact occurs
 
when the changes are internalized within a government and are
 
not perceived to be of external initiation. As such, it is
 
virtually impossible to evaluate such policy changes and pin­
point their origins, although anecdotally it is evident in some
 
cases it was important. The degree to which such policies are
 
internalized is probably directly correlated to the effective­
ness of the changes proposed.
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E. Food Assistance and Korean Development
 
Except for high value, specialty crops and perishable

vegetables, Korea has today little comparative advantage in
 
food production. Rice costs over two times the world market
 
price to produce, livestock about 1.8 times the Australian
 
imports, corn and soybeans three and one-half times more expen­
sive to cultivate, and red peppers and sesame six times more
 
expensive than those grown in India. Yet Korea is now
 
remarkably productive in terms of ilds. but has not been able
 
to feed itself since World War II.
 
There is considerable evidence that food assistance to
 
Korea was essential to the country at an early period, but was
 
later counterproductive. The supply of food, especially during

and following the Korean War, was vital to the continuation of
 
the existence of the Republic of Korea. The disruption of
 
agricultural production and the fact that Korea, during much of
 
that period, was a nation of refugees required a relief opera­
tion.
 
Following this period, however, food aid produced

decidedly mixed results for the Republic, although the program
 
was eminently successful from the vantage point of the donor.
 
Food assistance from the United States is designed to serve
 
general, often contradictory, purposes: rid the United States
 
of agricultural surpluses, create markets for U.S. supplies,

support foreign policy objectives, and assist the development
 
process in the country concerned. The program accomplished all
 
of these goals, but to the detriment of elements of the Korean
 
population for significant periods of time.
 
The food assistance program was designed not only to feed
 
a people who could not be self-sufficient at that time, but to
 
generate local currency that was used to support the overall
 
budget of the Korean government. The program at various
 
periods in the 1950s accounted for up to 85 percent of all
 
imports, and thus was critical to the continuation of that
 
government. Through much of this period the Korean currency
 
was overvaluedi and thus it was in the interests of the Korean
 
government to keep the level of food aid as high as possible.

(It should be remembered that PL 480, although normally

composed of food, did also include significant portions of
 
nonfood stocks, such as cotton and tobacco.)
 
Food aid enabled the governments of both Syngman Rhee and
 
Park Chung Hee to ignore the inequities in the pricing of rice
 
and barley, placing the economic burden on farmers, while using
 
the funds generated for other purposes. There is some evidence
 
that food aid was diverted for military purposes. 137 There
 
seems little doubt that food aid retarded agricultural pricing

reform for perhaps a decade and a half. By using "development
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loans" for importing rice, as was done in the late 1960s and
 
early 1970s, the United States in effect increased the PL 480
 
program. "This use of AID funds in conjunction with increased
 
PL 480 imports appears to serve as a disincentive for the ROKG
 
[Korean qovernment] to see 8 an early solution to problems in
 
its aqricultural sector." It is significant that only when
 
internal political factors intervened, and when PL 480 was
 
transformed from grant to loan, did the Korean government move
 
to change its agricultural pricing policies.
 
As the types of U.S. surpluses changed, the donor supplied
 
more wheat than rice to Korea. With a growing urban popula­
tion, this dietary shift may have been inevitable, but it was
 
probably speeded up by the food program. In the sense that it
 
was approximately equally nutritious but was less costly, the
 
argument may be made that it was desirable. The effect on
 
Korean production was apparent. As rice prices were raised and
 
as the urban population increased, the acreage in wheat and
 
aggregate- production fell. Where Korea once had been 36
 
percent self-sufficient in wheat, it is now 2 percent. Food
 
imports, including grains for human and animal consumption, in
 
1983 totajjed some $2.2 billion, or about 10 percent of total
 
imports.
 
Although the political goal of food self-sufficiency in
 
general and in rice in particular is often articulated by the
 
government and reflected in the press, the former will not be
 
achieved, but the latter is possible assuming that consumption
 
of wheat will grow. The goal of a state need not be food self­
sufficiency but rather self-reliance, the latter meaning that
 
the state is able to generate sufficient foreign exchange to
 
pay for any food it must import to meet its requirements.
 
Korea can, of course, be self-reliant in food, but her compara­
tive advantage lies in specialized crops rather than in food
 
grains. At this stage, however, it is politically impossible
 
for any regime in Korea to ignore rice production, and
 
pressures from such sources as the United States to rely on
 
U.S. food imports are even more unpalatable in Korea than they
 
are in Japan. Food aid or trade, of course, inherently has
 
internal political ramifications for the supplier, and Korea or
 
other nations in their own self-interest must weigh carefully

such external dependencies. Such dependencies have created
 
additional problems for Korea, as witnessed by the rice
 
purchase scandals, pressures on Korea to buy one type of rice
 
(from specific U.S. states) as opposed to a different variety

(from another state, as Koreans have distinct tastes in rice.
 
There have also been problems with Australian meat imports.
 
F. The Private Sector and the Marketplace
 
The government has dominated the private sector in Korea.
 
Historical reasons for this stem in part from the distribution
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of Japanese assets following liberation, a large portion of
 
which went to government, but more importantly, there has been
 
a long and essentially unbroken tradition of centralization and
 
government control. In general, the degree of government

involvement in the economy in statistical terms has been under­
represented, as the government tobacco ginseng, and energy
 
monopolies are sometimes included as private sector in
 
national-accounts figures on Korea.
 
Government involvement in regulating and influencing the
 
business community occurs through both formal and informal
 
mechanisms and is profound.
 
The [Economic Planning] Board and the ministries
 
have the power to change, without approval of the
 
National Assembly, taxes, tarrifs, subsidies,
 
public utility rates, interest rates, controlled
 
prices of selected goods, and licenses for
 
imports, investment, use of foreign exchange, new
 
business, and so on. And they have wielded this
 
power, frequently 1 4 producing an impression of
 
chaotic controls.
 
Yet the private sector is dynamic in Korea, in spite of
 
this centralized and pervasive public influence. Testament to
 
this comes from the figures on business formation and failure
 
and the rapid growth of the chaebol, as well as manufacturing

and exports. Yet this dynamism is one that has been kept

within bounds by a government anxious to achieve its economic
 
(and political) goals, in which the private sector plays an
 
important part.
 
The government intervenes in the private sector in a
 
variety of ways, including through control over the allocation
 
of credit, the determination (or, more usually, veto power)
 
over senior business staff, and the composition of the corpora­
tions, as well as through pricing policies, planning and
 
industrial strategy, and tax policies. The government has a
 
clear perception of what it wants the private sector to
 
accomplish. Significantly, the business community has not yet
 
competed for political power. The private sector also offers
 
important avenues for social and economic mobility to elements
 
of the population, although the traditional elites maintain
 
control at the top (along with the military).
 
The government has maintained steadfast control over the 
composition of exports, and the nature of heavy and defense 
industries ( import substitution efforts) through the 
allocation of credit, since most Korean private firms are
 
heavily in debt. This pervasive government control is
 
somewhat relaxed after export goals are articulated. If an
 
enterprises engages in exports,."most government restrictions
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are substantially relaxed or become irrelevent. Put another
 
way, under this system an exporter operates in a nearly free
 
market and enjoys access to the world market prices of imputs

and output...In cfarast, the incentive system has penalized

domestic sales." Export activities remove the strictures
 
on the relatively small internal Korean market and thus "The
 
export incentive system directs entrepreneurial energies to the
 
wide-open world market, where one firm's gain does not reduce
 
the sales opportunities of oteA firms--the zero-sum nature of
 
'
the domestic firm is avoided.""
 
The monopoly on institutional credit has raised curb
 
market lending rates, and the gap between curb market and
 
institutionalized rates is so great that in fact official
 
credit has taken on the character of subsidized credit
 
internally, and in exports it more nearly approximates world
 
credit rates.
 
The government has also regulated prices in a bewildering
 
array of materials, goods, and services. These include the
 
producer and consumer prices of grains, of which rice is the
 
most important, fertilizers, and other consumption goods

extending to, for example, the cost of accounting services. It
 
has controlled wages in many fields and in general controls
 
have been singularly pervasive, although allowing the private
 
sector to flourish within limits imposed by the government.
 
As the economy has become more complex, efforts have
 
increased within the Korean government to loosen the tight

reins with which the private sector has been held in check.
 
Especially important have been liberalization of the banking
 
system and imports. These attempts have been strengthened by

donors, as well as trading partners, and there seems little
 
doubt that official government strictures over the private

sector will relax in time, but strong vested interests will try
 
to continue control. It is also likely that informal means
 
will be found by the executive branch to control any

developments within the private sector that it feels are
 
detrimental either to the growth of the economy as a whole or
 
its political power in particular. Overall, however, the
 
efficiency of the private sector has been the result of
 
entrepreneurial activities. "Government functions as a market­
augmenting instrument and, fortunately, was uak in producing a
 
"
market-repressing or rent-creating effect. lj
 
There were complaints that the United States, as primary

dohor in the 1950s, did not do enough tpassist the development
 
of the private sector at that time. Even later, similar
 
sources noted that U.S. funds contributed to government­
controlled industries, thus perpetuating state involvement in
 
industry, and that AID funds, designed to help small- and
 
medium-size firms, in fact went to assist large, well­
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established enterprises. 1 45  In retrospect, it is likely that
 
any further efforts that might have been made to help the
 
private sector in the 1950s would have produced little in terms
 
of tangible results. As Korea entered the Park Chung Hee era,
 
there was considerable excess capacity in a wide variety of
 
manufacturing fields, but the overvalued exchange rate dis­
couraged exports. The argument that more representatives of
 
the private sector might have been trained is, however, a valid
 
one.
 
Donors have materially assisted the development of the
 
private sector, but none has seemed determined or able to
 
liberalize the policies of the government toward the private
 
sector overall beyond new banking and import policies, and then
 
only after many years of quiet negotiations. Foreign conces­
sional assistance, therefore, has made a positive contribution
 
to the growth of the private sector, but has had only a
 
marginal influence on policy toward it. The private sector, in
 
turn, has responded efficiently and well toward foreign 
assistance credits that were made available by the donors. 
Relending by banking institutions has been efficient, with 
admirable repayment rates and only a very small percentage of 
overdue loans (in contrast to the 1950s).
 
Donors, especially through the structural adjustment loan
 
of 1983, will have an effect on grain prices, which will over
 
time bring rice costs into line with international prices,
 
although this may significantly lower rural incomes, and may
 
(for internal political reasons) take longer than anticipated.
 
G. Aid Levels and Aid Effectiveness
 
What is the relationship, if any, between the levels of
 
concessional foreign assistance and the effectiveness, if any,
 
of such support? The question is simplistically phrased, but
 
the issue is complex and, of course, varies with both time and
 
circumstances.
 
The level of concessional assistance can be critical to
 
the continued existence of the state, as it was in Korea in the
 
1950s. It can be vital in countries in danger of default. In
 
between these extremes, however, the levels or foreign assis­
tance, if Korea is a typical example, have far less correlation
 
with the effective use of foreign aid than do a number of other
 
factors.
 
Concessional foreign assistance has been of most modest
 
proportions compared to commerical flows since the early 1970s.
 
The complete stoppage of concessional aid (including all assis­
tance from the World and Asian Development Banks and Japan)
 
would probably have had only the most marginal statistical
 
effect on the economy, although if caused by dissatisfaction
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with Korean performance would no doubt affect' commercial
 
lending. On the other hand, increases in such assistance
 
within reasonable limits would probably also have had little
 
statistical influence on Korea. The effectiveness of foreign
 
aid thus is not necessarily measured by its amount, although

under certain (relatively extreme) circumstances this becomes
 
important.
 
Numerous Korean officials have commented that the value of
 
foreign assistance, especially that of the World Bank in the
 
later period and the United States earlier, was the influence
 
that the donor brought in support of certain institutions or
 
concepts within the Korean government. The interest and views
 
expressed by the donors, both in policies and projects, enabled
 
some Korean technocrats to convince the top executive and
 
legislative branch leadership that certain policies and
 
approaches were important. This seems to have been a highly

significant factor, at least to the recipients.
 
External analysis of the world economy and the manner in
 
which Korea fits into this picture, together with a view of the
 
Korean performance and goals seen in comparative perspective,
 
were other important aspects of donor involvement transcending
 
support levels, as explained by Korean officials.
 
Donor support can help build institutions, such as those
 
in the financial sector, and to train individuals at costs that
 
are exceedingly small (even if rising) in comparison to their
 
impact. Thus, the level of support is less important than the
 
types of assistance, the acumen of the advisory services (when

they are perceived to further Korean goals), and the prestige
that is attached to donor activity. Insofar as donor assis­
tance introduced new technological processes, in the Korean
 
context these were important beyond the level of support

provided. There is an additional factor: continued donor
 
support generates confidence in the economy in international
 
(and local) commercial circles, and probably in some unquanti­
fiable way contributes to a major degree to generation of non­
concessional lending. Such donor assistance may be perceived

by commercial lenders or investors as lowering their rists.
 
This attribute of donor assistance should not be overlooked,
 
for it does not appear on the balance sheets of economic
 
growth.
 
Overall, the level of support from foreign donors to
 
Korea, except for the initial period following the Korean War,
 
was less important than its indirect effects, which continued,
 
and st2.ll continue, to be substantial. Thus the rationale for
 
bilateral donor phasing out of concessional assistance to
 
countries solely on the basis of such ephemeral or questionable
 
statistics as per capita income is highly suspect, for the
 
importance of such efforts transcends the volume of aid and the
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immediate economic impact of such support. Such phase outs, as
 
in the U.S. withdrawal of concessional assistance to Korea or
 
Taiwan, are likely to be motivated more by the internal
 
political requirements of the donor (at least in the United
 
States) than they are by the objective conditions in the
 
recipient nation.
 
Donor coordination in the Korean context has not appeared
 
to be a problem, most importantly because the depth of Korean
 
planning and implementation competence is so great that donor
 
projects can readily be accommodated in the bureaucratic
 
process, in contrast to the situation in many countries. The
 
small number of significant donors has no doubt made the task
 
easier. Central planning conceptually has allowed donors to
 
meld their and the Korean overall priorities, which is in
 
distinct contrast to the situation in many countries where
 
planning consists of a catalogue of a number of disparate,

discrete projects without adequate priorities attached or
 
inter-relationships considered.
 
A.I.D. comments on the first aid group meetings on Korea
 
in 1966 and 1968 indicate that these meetings were formalistic,
 
and important issues either not raised, or if raised, not
 
resolved. Although donor coordination through such annual or
 
biannual meetings is useful, they evidently are not sufficient
 
for either policy or project level coordination.
 
The issue of the tying of foreign aid to the purchases of
 
goods and services of the donor has been important in the past

in Korea. There have been accusations that early U.S. assis­
tance levels to Korea were not truly reflective of the support
 
provided, because U.S. goods and services were overpriced. At
 
the same time, some of these goods were of third country

(especially Japanese) origins.
 
The issue is today focused on Japan. Japan has untied
 
most of its aid, but the economies of scale, location, and the
 
effect of linguistic experience (since Koreans over 45 can
 
speak Japanese, and Japanese is easier for a Korean to learn
 
because of structural similarities--the reverse is obviously
 
also true) all have meant that Japanese goods, services, and
 
training naturally predominate in the Korean foreign assistance
 
marketplace. It is unlikely that this will soon change, and
 
although the Japanese role in Korea must be delicately managed

(an issue recognized by both governments), the Korean trade
 
deficits with Japan are likely to continue and Japan will also
 
dominate the Korean aid picture.
 
H. Technological and Institutional Factors
 
Foreign assistance in the early period of Korean growth,
 
prior to the expansion of the export drive, was the principal
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means through which technological improvements were intro­
duced. This occurred through the provision of goods, technical
 
advisory services, and perhaps most importantly for the longer
 
term, through training of Koreans overseas.
 
As exports expanded, and the volume of concessional assis­
tance diminished relative to commercial flows, the means to
 
acquire technology shifted. Advisory services continued, but
 
at a reduced rate, and institutionally generated (as opposed to
 
privately sponsored) overseas training diminished, although the
 
number of Korean students presently (1984) studying in the
 
United States is at a high water mark. Technological change

has come about less through investing than it has through

trade. As the Korean produce for export on specifications
 
stipulated by foreign buyers, the technology improvements have
 
quickly been absorbed into the Korean industrial economy.
 
Although foreign assistance can be credited for assisting
 
Institute, and the Korean Educational Development Institute, to
 
the establishment of some institutions critical to the devel­
opment process (such as the Office of Rural Development, 
combining agricultural research and extension, the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology, the Korean Development 
mention a few), the impetus for the majority of institutional
 
innovations came from within the Korean government. The
 
continuing foreign role through such donors as the NDP, is to
 
strengthen such organizations. The wedding of technology and
 
institutional growth is apparent in the increase in the
 
percentage of GNP directed to research and development, now
 
less than 1 percent but scheduled to rise to over 2 percent.

The institutional focus for quch research, however, will not be
 
government-sponsored ultitude
in the -. of parastatal research
 
institutes but in private industrial organizations directly

focused on furthering manufacturing and export goals.
 
The donor role in both technology and institutional
 
development has been important and generally effective in the
 
past, but has been superceded by the growth of private sector
 
and trade functions. When Korea began its export drive, its
 
institutional structure was essentially in place, in contrast
 
to the situation in many nations.
 
Donors have asked the question whether project, sector, or
 
program lending or assistance was the most effective or
 
efficient method of assistance. The issue cannot be resolve
 
simply, for at various levels of development, and in varying

circumstances, as well as under certain types of donor
 
constraints, each, or a combination of all, may be appropriate.
 
Project assistance, when it was effective and accomplished

its discrete ends, was focused on specific, limited objeq­
tives. It thus proved useful when there was overall agreement
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on sectoral goals or purposes. Sector or program lending,

usually larger, was at a broader 
level of goal or purpose

abstraction, and could be more important in furthering mutually

agreed upon objectives. Program lending or (in the earlier
 
period) grants would, one would assume, have greater policy

impact, and indeed this may have been true when such support

furthered government directions already established. It was
 
less effective when there were policy disputes.
 
Thus there are few generalizations that can be drawn from
 
the Korean experience on the most appropriate mix of project,

sector, or program lending or grants. 
 What seems evident,
however, is that mutually agreeable sector lending or program

goals can be reinforced through discrete projects, but that
good projects may not necessarily lead to sectoral policy

reform. Thus the most appropriate mix of these three elements
 is bound by the objective conditions of the recipient, the
donor, and the overall interaction between the two, and remains
 
an enigma-without universal application.
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V. Coda: Lessons from the Korean Experience
 
The successes of Korean growth and even perhaps more
importantly, its sustainability in spite of a variety of
 
adverse economic and political factors, has prompted donors and
the Korean government, to espouse Korea as a development model,

the former to demonstrate their own efficacy, and the latter
 
for its own internal and foreign policy reasons.
 
This simplistic approach is, however, unlikely to be
 
attractive to development specialists--in contrast to those in
the popular press--who rightly see it as a complex process
highly dependent on singularly Korean factors and the world
 
economy at a particular point in time.
 
This does not mean, however, that lessons cannot be drawn
from the Korean experience respecting factors influencing or

affecting recipients and donor capacity. It should be

remembered that all foreign donors, except the United States,
began their operations in Korea after that country had set its
 
economic house in some sort of rational order. These donors
have thus been spared the earlier, less efficacious, period of
 
Korean history when economic assistance and its use could under
 
no circumstances be conceived of as a positive model.
 
A. The Developing Nations
 
From the viewpoint of the recipient of foreign aid, Korea
demonstrates the need for strong political will with economic
 
development as an articulated, critical priority for the poli­
tical elite. It also validates the concept that the delivery
institutions to spread these ideas must be in place or first
 
must be built. Implementation of programs and projects then
becomes exceedingly important and is a factor on which many

countries flounder. Without sound implementation, the most
 
sophisticated and elaborate planning will fail.
 
To be successful in influencing policy, Korea's experience

points out the importance of working with the host government
bureaucratic structure to elicit change that 
is perceived by
 
"'-at government as in its own interests, preferably originating
internally. Korea demonstrates that policy dialogue is useful

and important over time, even if its influence cannot normally

be quantified, but that it will not produce positive results

unless it somehow furthers the overall direction that the state
 
is taking, and is regarded as being in the interests of those
 
in power.
 
The process of change can be speeded up, but is unlikely

to be altered radically until the government is prepared to
 
make such a move. It is also unlikely that significant altera­tion in the amounts of assistance will affect the paths of such
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change, although it might well affect the technical aspects of
 
some predetermined decision that already has been made.
 
Although funds may not be completely fungible, there is
 
enough flexibility in the foreign aid process that assistance
 
will not necessarily deter a country from following its own
 
developmental goals even though foreign assistance specialists
 
may recommend against such moves. It is only when a country

reaches a serious economic strait bordering on default that
 
major pressures can be brought to bear on those societies.
 
Foreign aid organizations prefer to consider themselves
 
pristine, and divorced from domestic politics. Although there
 
is more justification for such an attitude on the part of
 
multilateral agencies, there seems to be confusion between
 
providing assistance for political purposes (often the
 
rationale of bilateral donors) and the intimate association of
 
the internal economic and political processes in any state.
 
This association must be understood for aid to succeed.
 
Korea demonstrates that land reform is likely to be the
 
single most important criterion for overall equitable distri­
bution of income in a heavily populated, land-poor developing

society, and yet it is unlikely that many nations today are
 
prepared to undertake such a broad redistributive approach to
 
income and power. Under such circumstances, the Korean
 
experience points to a likely widening of income disparities

that may only be offset by vast employment opportunities, and
 
with major concentration on improved productivity, which seems
 
essential to increasing wages in this highly competitive world
 
situation.
 
Korea offers some disquieting lessons from the agricul­
tural sector. Ignored for so long, agriculture in Korea began
 
to be extremely productive when high levels of diverse types of
 
subsidization were introduced. At one point Korea recognized

that this level of support could no longer be maintained. What
 
is the lesson for other nations, for can they (or the donors)

supply such subsidization if that in fact is what is needed to
 
get agriculture moving? If agriculture is to lead development,
 
a path advocated by some donors but which Korea did not follow,

this raises serious developmental issues. Yet the export

model, Korea's path, may have occurred at a unique time in
 
history, and may not again be so easily replicable.
 
Pricing policies, as Korea illustrates, can be an impor­
tant means by which to provide incentives for growth. As Burma
 
illustrates, however, positive pricing incentives can be
 
replaced by implicit or explicit threats of coercion. In
 
Korea, with administrative delivery systems in place, pricing

policies worked. Korea also demonstrates that these incen­
tives, if involving extensive subsidies, are unlikely to be
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maintained indefinitely.
 
If pricing policies have been effective, the pricing of
 
foreign exchange has been a critical factor in growth. Thus,

the maintenance of a realistic foreign exchange rate has proven
 
to be of the utmost importance in exports, an obvious fact but
 
one that seems to be ignored in many societies.
 
The growth of trade, however, and of per capita income
 
should not necessarily result in the complete stoppage of
 
concessional assistance, which performs other functions. Such
 
aid attracts commercial investment and lending, provides

comparative analysis of the recipient nation's economy by out­
side observers, is in a sense a window on the world economy,

strengthens elements within the host government bent on reform
 
or progress, and thus has greater utility than the simple
 
measure of funds provided. Foreign assistance can be a risk­
taking endeavor that prompts increased national investment in
 
enterprises, the economic rate of return of which may be
 
delayed and yet the effort may be quite innovative. To tie
 
concessional assistance to per capita GNP is rigid and
 
unimaginative. Why, then, does the Ford Foundation operate in
 
the United States?
 
Korea also illustrates that the private sector can be
 
effective in many ways, even if subservient to overall
 
government, and that a public sector is not necessarily

inefficient. The experience of the earlier Rhee period also
 
supports the view that if the foreign assistance focus is
 
solely directed to the private sector when other factors are
 
not in place, such assistance may be ineffective or be
 
extremely slow in producing economic results. Private sector
 
support requires careful assessment of capacity, both political

and economic, not simply the application of fashionable
 
programmatic formulae.
 
Korea also shows that education has been a powerful force
 
in supporting economic growth, and that this may be one of the
 
most effective means by which donors can provide assistance to
 
a developing nation.
 
Food aid may prove vital to the effective functioning of a
 
government and the feeding of its people, but Korea provides

evidence that it can also be instrumental in slowing the
 
process of agrI' ,iltural reform. There may be tension between
 
the shorte donor objectives in providing food aid and the
 
longer tern g(, Is Gf both the donor and the recipient.
 
Korea also illustrates that technology is not simply

something that can be transferred, except perhaps in export

processing enclaves, but must, with policies, be internalized
 
and adapted to local circumstances.
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B. The Role of Donors
 
The role of donors, both bilateral and multilateral,

although there are significant differences in issues of effect­
iveness, is not only reflective of conditions in any particular

recipient nation, but is also based on developmental or organi­
zational hypotheses, articulated and inchoate, that shape their
 
operations.
 
There is, for example, a general tendency to regard the
 
answers to developmental problems as universally applicable.

Although there are, of course, general propositions that may

apply to certain conditions or actions at various stages of
development, however defined, these general laws 
 are
 
circumscribed by the local milieu, which may radically alter
 
the applicability or suitability of generally prescribed

developmental solutions. Koreans have accused some donors of a
 
formula-type approach to analysis of Korean problems where
 
these were not applicable. This attitude results in donors
 
regarding their staff as equally competent to work on sectoral
 
development problems in any society and it presents the danger

of donors neglecting the vital noneconomic factors that have
 
been demonstrated to have been so important in, for example,

Korean developmental success. Donors then should re-examine
 
their administrative patterns to ensure that both disciplinary

and geographic area competence are represented in any country

analysis.The implications for internal bureaucratic changes, if
 
this issue is recognized, are important, and may indeed be
 
traumatic. This is likely the reason why such issues have
 
rarely been addressed by some donors.
 
It is evident that there is some confusion in Korea among

senior Korean officials about the rationale of various types of
donor support and the purposes of each. Korea moved from U.S.
 
nonproject assistance, including food aid, to project grants

and loans. The IBRD has provided first project support, and
 
then two structural adjustment loans. There is some feeling in
Seoul that sector lending may be the next mode, and there is
 
some legitimate confusion in some Korean circles.
 
Project lending implies discrete activities, manageable

within specific bureaucratic and specialized agencies.

Structural adjustment loans, larger by far, are managed by the

central planning agency of the government. Sector lending is
 
in some sense a median position. Although it is generally true
 
that sector or structural adjustment lending allows easier
 
coordination of broader policy issues than projects, the
 
general position seems to be that neither sector nor program

lending, nor structural adjustment loans (except for emergency

considerations) will force a nation to agree to policy changes

that are perceived to be detrimental to their conception of the
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distribution of power. At the level of Korea's development,
 
however, major sector or structural adjustment lending may be
 
more appropriate not because of the policy changes that may be
 
required by a donor, but because it is administratively more
 
efficient for both donors and such recipients.
 
Donors seem bound by the mystique of aggregate data and
 
the issue of the concessionality of assistance. Although
 
analysts recognize that such issues are often of limited
 
meaning, interest rates and resident aid programs are often
 
determined on the basis of such factors. Yet few countries
 
have such balanced development that foreign assistance on
 
concessional terms might not be desirable for specialized,
 
relatively high risk undertakings.
 
Finally, what has been the relative experience in Korea
 
between bilateral and multilateral donors? Korea in this
 
instance may not be typical, because of the two bilateral
 
donors, Japan has intentionally avoided a high profile, policy­
oriented role, and the United States was important because it
 
was esentially the only donor in the early period, and because
 
in U.S. and Korean eyes, economic assistance and military
 
security were intimately intertwined.
 
Bilateral donors are often bound by their own foreign
 
policy considerations (which were important in determining the
 
level of U.S. assistance) and even internal donor political
 
factors (PL 480, and the phase out of the AID program), and
 
thus are especially vulnerable. Multilateral organizations,
 
however, can be bound by bureaucratic or operating procedures
 
that effectively restrict the breadth of their developmental
 
approaches. In other words, all developmental agency bureau­
cracies suffer from defects. It is likely, however, that
 
multilateral organizations can more easily shake off their
 
defects than can bilateral donors, at least those with perva­
sive non- developmental interests.
 
There is, however, a role for bilateral donors, especially
 
at earlier stages of development when administrative competen­
cies in host government institutions are limited, for they can
 
perhaps more easily supply resident staff with greater stakes
 
in project success than have contractors without longer range
 
commitments to developmental growth.
 
If, however, multilateral donors are to maintain the
 
prestige they have attained, the quality and candor of their
 
economic, social, and political analysis need to be strength­
ened. Bilateral donors can no longer afford on a general basis
 
to do the economic analyses that the multilateral donors do.
 
It is therefore essential that such analyses be as open and
 
encompassing as possible.
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The success of Korea is undoubted. Its accomplishments

offer hope for other nations, but its lessons must be carefully

extracted from those considerable, and not yet fully explored,

factors that have made Korea unique.
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THIRD DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORP LO 0735-0 
IISEP70 31DEC76 40.00 
.35 39.65 .00 .00 .00 g­
.00
HIG14WAY 7.2500 29JUL71 31AUG75 30.00 39.65 27.22 9.25 36.47 W
LO 0769-0 7.25o .87 29.13 .00
YOUNG SAN GANG IRRIGATION 7DEC71 31DEC77 54.50 .08 29.13 1.24 .18 1.43
LO 0795-0 7.2500 53.42 .00 53.42 39.30
FOURTH RAILROAD 15SEP72 31DEC78 33.00 5.44 44.74
LO 0863-0 7.2500 .00 33.00 .00 33.00
4TH DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORP. 26FEB73 31MAR79 40.00 29.12 1.19 30.31
LO 0905-0 7.2500 .00 40.00 .00 40.00 >
1OSEP73 31DEC77 32.54
40.00 
.39 39.61 .63 33.17 En

.00 39.61
SECOND EDUCATION 5.21 .89- *4.32 In
LO 0906-0 
 7.2500 
10SEP73 31DEC79
PORTS 23.00 

.00 23.00
SEFDS LO 0917-0 7.2500 .00 23.00
KYONqJU TOURIS, 18SEP73 30JUNBO 22.46 4.43-
0942-0 18.03
LOLO 0953-0 7.2500 80.00 .00 En7.2=', 24APR74 31DEC79 80.00
SECOND HIGWAY 6MAY74 31DEC80 7.00 .00 .00 80.00 66.49
25.00 7.00 .00 3.42-
.12 24.88 7.00 63.07
Lo 0956-0 7.2500 .00 6.25 .65-
INTEGRATED AGRI. PRODUCTS PROC LO 0994-0 
4APR74 31DEC78 24.88 22.61 2.13- 5.59
47.00 20.48
.00 47.00 .00
7.2500 47.00 41.90
SECONDARYCITI-ES-J2EGIOML 19MAR75 30JUN80 13.00 2.10 44.00 m
-- .04'- LO1070-0 12.96
8.0000 .00 12.96
PROGRAM LOAN 18AUG75 30SEP80 15.00 10.06 1.55- 8.51
LO .00 15.00
KID IO94-O 8.5000 21APR75 1MAY76 100.00 .00 15.00 14.18 1.13-
.00 100.00 -13.05
LO 1095-0 8.5000 .OO 100.00, 84.11
THIRD EDUCATION 17JUN75 30JUN79 60.00 2.53 86.63 010 1096-0 .00 60.00
8.5000 .00 60.00
FIFTH RAILROAD 6JUN75 30JUN81 22.50 29.55 .15 29.70
.00 22.50
LO 1101-0 8.5000 .00 22.50
FIFTH kC EA DFC 15JUL75 30JUN80 100.00 21.64 3.38- 18.26 0
LO 1145-0 8.5000 .00 100.00 .00
' 100.005SEP75 30JUN80 90.78 2.51-
MEDIU4 INDUSTRY BANK 55.Oo 89.27
.12 54.88
LO 1175-0 .00
8.5000 54.88 17.29
SECOND ,tJrEGRATED DAIRY DEV. 28JAN76 31MAROO 30.00 .78- 16.51 >LO 1193-O 9.5000 .14 29.86 .00 29.86
THIRD HIGHWAYuC llJOV76 31DEC82 15.00 7.20 .19- 702
LO 1203-0 8.5000 .00 15.00 .00 15.00
RURAL INFRASIRUCTURE 17MAY76 30SEP02 90.00 14.63 2.61- 12.02
LO 1216-0 8.5000 .00 90.00 .00 90.00
UrE 4JUN76 30JUNO 20.00 81.70 14.45- 67.25
-URAJIlA 
 LO 1218-0 4.5000 .00 20.00 .00 20.00
PROGRAM LOAN II 4dUN76 30JUN80 40.00 19.50 .22- 19.28
.00
LO 1219-0 40.00
8.5000 9JIJN76 .00 40.00 37.84
MIHO WATERSHED AREA DEVELOPM. IMAY77 75.00 .00 "37.84
LO 1319-0 F.9000 .00 75.00 .00 .75.00
21OCT76 31DEC84 68.02 1.81
SECOND AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 29.00 69.83
LO 1328-0 8.9000 .00 29.00 1.08 27.92
SECON'D KD3 1OMAR77 30JUN1 20.00 
.00 24.36 2.49- 21.87
LO 1338-1 8.7000 20.00 .00 20.00
SECOND 1.DB 21MAR77 31DEC80 14.08
7.56 3.15- 10.93
LO 1338-0 .04 7.46
8.7000 21MAR77 30APR81 .00 7.46 1.03
YON1G SAN GANG IRRIGATION II LO 75.00 .00 75.00 .11- .92
1364-0 8.5,000 .00 75.00 47.91
SECOND PORT 22APR77 31DEC84 95.00 6.48- 41.43
LO 1401-0 8.5000 27dUL77 31DEC82 
.00 95.00 9.41 85.59 60.95 6.00-
SIXTH KOREA DEVELOPM. FIN.CORP.LO G7.00 .00 67.00 54.96
1461-0 8.2000 1.12 65.88
HEAVY MACHINERY 15SEP77 31DEC81 70.00 51.00 4.70- 46.30
LO 1466-0 .00 70.00
8.2000 .00 70.00

-VCATIONAL TRAINIrG_ IDEC77 31DEC80 80.00 46.67 7.47- 39.20
.. LO 1474-0 8.2000 .00 80.00 .00 80.00
25OCT77 30JUN83 60.00
OGGEO AREA DEVELOPM. 23.00 12.98- 47.02

- STAGE I LO 1503-0 7.9000 29MAR78 30JUN84 
.00 23.00 
.22 22.78 17.68
SECOND MEDIUM INDUSTRY BANK 36.00 .00 2.72- 14.96
LO 1507-0 7.9000 36.00 11.41- 24.59
IOMAR78 31DEC82 19.05 .80-
SECOND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE 55.00 18.24
.01 54.99
LO 1530-0 7.4500 .00 54.99 
 19.08
SIXTH RAILWAY 8JUN78 30JUN84 95.00 3.20- 15.88
LO 1542-0 7.4500 .00 95.00 4.42 90.58
THIRD KOS * 3AUG78 31DEC82 120.00 75.96 12.38- 63.53LO 1574-0 .00 120.00
7.5000 .00
7TH KOREA DEVELOPMENT FIN CORP L0 14SEP78 31DEC82 110.00 120.00 106.16 23.72-
1635-0 7.3500 .00 110.00 .00 110.00 82.43
6FEB79 30JUN83 100.00 
.00 77.97 5.63- 72.35
1O0.00 

.00 100.00 
 78.38 .8.41- 69.97
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PROJECT 
 LOAN / INTEREST EFFECT CLOSING
DESCRIPTION CREDIT RATE 
------ PRINCIPAL------ UNDISB CUMUL DISBUR EXCH BORR
DATE DATE ORIGINAL CANCEL CUPRENT 
BALANCE DISBUR & OUT 
 ADJUST OBLIG

FOURTH HIGHWAY 
 LO 1640-0 7.3500 
 14MAR79 30dUN84 143.00 .00 143.00 2.64
CHUNGJU MULTIPURPOSE LO 140.36 129.36 11.29- l8.07
1666-0 7.0000 
 11JUL79 30JUN85 125.00 .00
ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY 125.00 24.26 100.74 95.94
LO 1676-0 7.0000 28JUN79 31DEC83 5.87- 90.07
29.00 .00
3RD SMALL & MEDIUM INO. BANK 29.00 8.52 20.48 19.16
LO 1749-0 7.9000 2.43- 16.73
26SEP79 31DFC83 60.00 .03 59.97
SECOND GWANGJU REGIONAL LO 1758-0 7.9000 .00 59.97 39.72 2.40- 37.33
POPULATION 15FEB80 30JUN84 65.00 .00 65.00 21.93 43.07 43.07
LO 1774-0 7.9500 21MARD 9OCT81 1.11- 41.96
.00
POPULATION .00 .00 .00 .00
LO 1774-5 7.9500 .00 .00 .00
9OCT81 30JUN84 30.00 .00
GOJEONG POWER 30.00 24.85 5.15 5.15
LO 1788-0 7.9500 .07- 5.08
21MAR80 31DEC84 115.00
EDUCArION SECTOR LOAN LO 1800-0 8.2500 
.00 115.00 16.68 98.32 98.32 2.08- 96.24
7APR80 30%lUN84 100.00. .00
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK 100.00 20.06 79.94 79.94
LO 1829-5 8.2500 25NOV81 31DEC84 1.30- .78.63
17.96 
 .00 17.96
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK LO 1829-0 8.2500 .53 17.44 16.75 .48- 16.28
SEVENTH RAILWAY 5AUGOO 31DEC84 12.04 .00 12.04 .00 
 12.04 9.27
LO 1836-0 8.2500 29AUG80 31DEC83 .33- 8.94
94.00
2ND AGRICUL. PROD. PROCESSING LO 1851-0 8.2500 .00 94.00 5.87 88.13 88.13 7.47- 80.66
3SEP80 30SEP84 50.00 .00 
 50.00 8.63 
 41.37 39.45 
 1.44- 38.01
KLTC8
FOURTH KOB LO 1932-0 9.2500 19MAR81 30JUNR5 90.00 .00 90.00
LO 1933-0 9.2500 12.43 77.57 75.38
19MAR81 30JUN85 100.00 3.67- 71.71
THIRD AGRICULTURAL CREDIT .00 100.00 2.60 97.40
LO 1974-0 9.dOOO 89.16 3.82- 85.34
1iAUG81 31DEC85 50.00 .O 50.OO
NTL URBAN LAND DEV & HOUSING 2.85 47.15 47.15
LO 1980-0 9.6000 11AUGB 31DEC84 90.00 1.11- 46.04
.00 90.00
4T1l SMALL & MED INDUSTRY BANK LO 2004-0 9.6000 56.88 33.12 33.12 .34- 32.78
ISEP81 31DEC85 60.00 .00
STPUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN 60.00 21.66 38.14 37.39
LO 2071-0 11.6000 .12- 37.27
4MAR92 31DEC82 250.00
WATER SUPPLY .00 250.00 .00 250.00 250.00
LO 2072-0 11:6000 5.59- 244.41
1APR82 30JUN86 90.00 .00
AGRICUL W14OLESALE MARKETING 90.00 53.46 36.54 36.54
LO 2111-0 11.6000 6AUG82 30JUNR5 50.00 .09- 36.45
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT .00 50.00 35.54 14.46
LO 2112-0 11.6000 14.46 .21- 14.25
IOJUN82 31DEC86 50.00 .O 50.00
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK II 32.65 17.35 17.35
LO 2144-0 11.6000 24AUG82 31DEC86 .09- 17.26
30.00
SM & MED MACHINERY INDUSTRY .00 30.00 20.96 9.04
LO 2215-0 10.4700 26MAY83 31DEC86 9.01 .07 9.08
11.00 .00 11.00 8.60
SM & MED MACIiINERY INDUSTRY 2.40 2.40
LO 2215-1 10.4700 .02 2.42
26MAY83 31DEC86 29.00
SM & MED MACIHINERY INDUSTRY .00 29.00 29.00
LO 2215-3 10.4700 .00 .00 .00 .0026MAY83 31DEC86 10.00 .00
SM & MED MACHINERY INDUSTRY 10.00 10.00 .00 .00
LO 2215-2 10.4700 .00 .00
26MAY83 31DEC86 20.00 .00 20.00
2140 NAT'L URBAN LAND DEV 19.32 .68 .68
LO 2216-0 10.0800 31MA,83 30SEP86 .02 .69
 PROVINCIAL & COUNTY ROADS 00.00 .00 100.00 94.78 5.22
LO 2228-0 10.4700 30MAR83 31DEC87 5.22 .02' 5.20
125.00 .00 125.00 106.23
COAL & CEMENT DISTRIBUTION 18.77 18.77 .41 19.19
LO 2267-0 10.4700 30SEP83 31DEC87 
 122.00
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE .00 122.00 121.70 .30
LO 2309-2 10.0800 .30 .00 .30
14SEP83 31DEC88 120.00
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE .00 120.00 114.25 5.75 
 5.75
LO 2309-0 10.0800 14SEP83 31DEC88" 5.00 .13 5.88
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE. .00 5.00 4.00 1.00
LO 2309-1 10.0800 1.00 .01 1.01
14SEP83 31DEC88 130.00 .00 130.00
SECOND WATER SUPPLY 130.00 .00 .00
LO 2350-0 10.4700 IIJAN84 30JUN89 .00 .00
78.50
2ND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN LO 2354-0 .00 78.50 72.50 6.00 6.00 .15
10.4700 29NOV83 31DEC84 6.16
300.00 .00 300.00 100.00 
 200.00 200.00 
 1.97 201.97
 
T 0 T A L 4859.00 3.52 4855.48 1211.05 
3644.43 3041.41 160.01-281.40
TECHN. ASSISTANCE 
- TRANSPORT CR 5004-0 0.7500 8OCT68 30SEP72 3.50 3.50
RAILROAD .00 .00 .00 .00
CR 0025-0 0.7500 .00 .00
6NOV62 31MAR65 14.00
SECOND RAILROAD .01 16.87 .00 16.87 14.44
CR 0110-0 0.7500 .00 14.44
 EDUCATION 13MAR68 30JUN70 11.00 .35 12.84 .00 12.84 
 12.01
CR 0151-0 0.7500 25MAY79 30SEP76 .00 12.01
14.80 
 .13 15.00 .00 15.00 14.25 
 .00 14.25
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STATUS OF LOANS AND CREDITS
 
REGION: EAST ASIA 3 PACIFIC IN MILLIONS OF US S CTRORI2I
 
AS AT FEBRUARY 29 1984
COUNTRY: KOREA. REPUBLIC OF 

DISBUR EXCH BORR
PRINCIPAL------ UNDISS CUMUL
INTEREST EFFECT CLOSING ------
PROJECT 	 LOAN / 
 6 OUT ADJUST OBLIG
CREDIT RATE DATE DATE ORIGINAL CANCEL CURRENT BALANCE DISBUR 
DESCRIPTION 

.00 18.09 .00 18.09 	 17.36 .00 17.36
 CR 0183-0 0.7500 11SEP70 31DEC72 15.00
THIRD RAILROAD 

.00 7.02
24AUG71 31MAR77 7.00 .00 7.24 .00 7.24 7.02
CR 0234-0 0.7500
INTEGRATED DAIRY BEEF DEV. 

.00 15.04 .00 15.04 	 14.74 .00 14.74
 YONG SAN GANG IRRIGATION 	 CR 0283-0 0.7500 15SEP72 30SEP77 15.00 

CR 0335-0 0.7500 24MAY73 ISEP76 10.50 .00 10.50 .00 10.50 10.34 .00 
10.34
 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 

.00 20.00 .00 20.00 	 19.80 .00 19.80
0.7500 1OSEP73 31DEC78 20.00
SECOND EDUCATION 	 CR 0394-0 

109.96 .00 109.96
T 0 T A L.: 110.80 3.99 115.58 .00 115.58 

160.01-
C 0 U N T R V T 0 T A L : 4969.80 4971.06 3760.01 

7.51 1211.05 3151.38 2991.37
 
JEONJU REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT LO-2388 Not Eff. loan amount $60 -m
 
HIGHWAY SECTOR 	 LO-2392 Not.Eff. i " $230 m 
COUNTRY TOTAL AS OF APRIL 6, 1984 $5,259.80 million
 
4i
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ANNUAL LONING LEVELS 
($ Million) 
'TO KRA 
Year No. 
ADF 
Amount No. 
OCR' 
AmU'nt 
Toita 
o. Amount 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
-
-
-
-
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3.70 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
8 
4 
6 
6.80 
24.50 
45.00 
56.40 
64.60 
46.30 
89.45 
101.50 
114.00 
135.15 
150.00 
160.10 
174.53 
205.20 
-
1 
3 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
8 
4 
6 
6.80 
24.50 
45.00 
56.40 
68.30 
46.30 
89.45 
101.50 
114.00 
135.15 
150.00 
160.10 
174.53 
205.20 
1968-81 (1) $3.70 (59) $1373.50 (60) $1377.23 
/
 
LIST *OF 'ADS'LOANS" 'TO KO9A 
Lo~ni Aiondft
 ( $ million) 
1968
 
6.80
1. Seoul-Incheon Expressway 

1969
 
7.00
2. Cold Storage 

3. Transportation and Stevedoring 7.50
 
10.00
4. Medium Industry Bank (I) 

1970
 
5. Andong Dam Multi-Purpose Development 0.50
 
9.50
6. Power Transmission and Distribution 

10.007. Korea Development Bank .(I) 
25.00
8. Caprolactam Plant 

1971
 
8.80
9. Seoul Water Supply 

15.00
10. Medium Industry Bank (II) 

10.60
11. Power Transmission and Distribution (I) 

22.00
12. Andong Dam Multi-Purpose Development 

13-3 
1.972 
13. Vocational Training Institute (ADF) 

14. Busan and Daegu Water Supply 
15. Fisheries Development 

16. 
 Korea Development Bank (II) 

17. Metropolitan Water Intake 

1973
 
18. Incheon Port Development 

19. 
Medium Indubtry Bank (II1) 

1974
 
20. Road Improvement 

21. Korea Development Bank 

22. Highway (I) 

23. 
 Korea Development Finance Corporation (1)

24. Imjin Area Development 

1975 
25. Samrangjin Pumped Storage 

26. Machinery Manufacturing 

27. Road Improvement 

28. 
Korea Development Bank (IV) 

L6an Azibtiht 
( i mrIIon 
3.70
 
5.70
 
13.30
 
20.00
 
25.60
 
16.30
 
30.00
 
0.45
 
30.00
 
10.00
 
30.00
 
19.00
 
1.00
 
17.50
 
43.00
 
40.00
 
Lban Ainount
 
"($.million )
 
1976
 
29. Coal Development 12.00
 
30. Korea Development Finance Corporation (1I) 40.00
 
31. Namgang Area Development 32.00
 
32. Medium Industry Bank (IV) 30.00
 
1977
 
33. Nakdong River Basin Development 45.00
 
34. Industrial Products Inspection Centers 17.00
 
35. Road Improvement (II) 41.50
 
36. Asan Bay Power 1.65
 
37. Regional Water Supply 30.00
 
1978
 
38. Korea Development Bank (V) 50.00
 
39. Applied Research Institutes 33.00
 
40. Small and Medium Industry Bank (V) 40.00
 
41. Mineral Resources Development 8.00
 
42. Fisheries Development (II) 19.00
 
1979 
15.00 
1980 
Loan Amount
 
( million)
 
43. Busan Water Supply (II) 

44. Citizens National Bank 
 10.00
 
45. Livestock Feedmills 
 13.00
 
46. Sewage Treatment 

2.10
 
47. Coal Development (II) 
 25.00
 
48. Korea Development Finance Corp. (I11) 
 50.00
 
49. Low Cost Urban Housing!. 
 30.00
 
50. Korea Institute of Science and Technology 
 15.00
 
51. Incheon Port Development (II) 
 54.00
 
52. Samrangjin Pumped Storage Power 
 52.63
 
53. Small and Medium Industry Bank (IV) 
 40.00
 
54. Sewage Treatment 

27.90
 
198.
 
55. Small and Medium Industries Management
 
and Technology Institute 
 13.00
 
56. Korea Long Term Credit Bank (IV) 
 60.00
 
57. Citizens National Bank (II) 
 30.00
 
58. Han River Basin Environmental Master Plan 
 4.10
 
59. Second Low Income Urban Housing 
 60.00
 
60. Provincial Cities Water Supply 
 38.10
 
TOTAL 

1377.23
 
Table''A-7 
TECHNICAL XSSIS9TANCt' TO" MRA 
Grants '(Wo0S) Type 
1968 
1. Agriculture and Fishery Dev. Corp. 0.0665 A & 0 
1970
 
2. Andong Dam 
 0.150 PP
 
1972
 
3. Seoul-Incheon-Suweon Highway 
 0.0478 PP
 
1973
 
4. Namgang-Imjin Area Development 
 0.230 PP
 
1974
 
5. Road Improvtment 0.100 PP 
1975
 
6. Samrangjin Pumped Storage 
 0.100 PP
 
7. Nakdong River Basin Developmen- / 0.300 pp 
1976
 
8. Integrated Water Supply 
 0.050 PP
 
(S
 
° 
Table A-7: Technical ASSis'tAnce to'K0"rea (continued)
 
0SDGo)oype
 
1977
 
9. Asan Bay Power 0.150 PP
 
10. Sewage Treatment 0.089 PP
 
11. Mineral Resources Development 0.162 PP
 
1978
 
12. Incheon Port (II) 0.150 PP
 
13. Study on Small-Scale Industries 0.097 A a 0
 
14. Applied Research Institutes 0.8604 / A & 0
 
1979
 
15. Sewage Treatment 0.150 PP
 
1980
 
16. Han River Basin Environmental Master 0.125 PP
 
1981
 
17. Small Towns Water Supply Sector 0.150 PP
 
18. Second PrOvincial Cities Water Supply 0.050 PP
 
a/ Financed entirely by UNDP.
 
Table A-7: Technical Assistance tO Korea (continued)
 
s0,00s) Tp
 
Loans
 
1970
 
1. Andong Dam Multi-Purpose 0.500
 
1974
 
2. Road Improvement 0.450
 
1975
 
3. Samrangjin Pumped Storage 1.000
 
1977
 
4. Asan Bay Power 1.650
 
1979
 
5. Sewage Treatment 2.100
 
1981
 
6. 	Han River Basin Environmental Master
 
Plan 4.100
 
JAPANESE ASSISTANCE 10 KOREA
 
($000) 

'-.
 
Capital 
Grants 
Technical 
Assistance 
Grants a 
Technical 
Assistance Loans 
Official 
Devel. 
Assistance Investment 
Export 
Credit 
Other, 
Official 6 
Private Total 
Year 
A B C 
(AVB) 
D E 
(C+D) 
FH 
(F+G) 
I 
(EVH) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
/// 
E 
1962 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A [/3 
1963 
N/A 
N/A 
5396* 
34* 
N/A 
N/A 
79 
34* 
N/A 
N/A 
5,475* 
-
N/A 
N/A 
-5,475* 
545*. 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
-
N/A 
N/A 
2,238* 
N/A 
N/A 
2,238* 
71 
N/A 
N/A 
7,713* 
E23,3En 
H 
In 
-
1964 
1965 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
4,573* 
N/A 
N/A 
190* 
N/A 
N/A 
ISO* 
N/A 
N/A 
Igo* 
N/A 
N/A 
4,723* 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
41,156* 
N/A 
N/A 
I&19* 
N/A 
N/A 
45,79* 
N/A 
N/A 
-
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1,646* 
N/A 
4/A 
4,792* 
N/A 
N/A 
1,646* 
N/A 
N/A 
4,792* 
N/A O 
N/A 
1,8361-3 
N/A 
N/A : 
50,671* 0 
1966 
N/A 
N/A 
21,655* 
N/A 
N/A 
273* 
N/A 
N/A 
21,92* 
N/A 
N/A 
9,248* 
N/A 
N/A 
31,176* 
N/A 
N/A 
2,500* 
N/A 
N/A 
92,518 
N/A 
N/A 
95,018* 
N/A 
N/A 
126,194* 
-1967 
N/A 
N/A
33,865* 
N/A 
N/A
380L 
N/A 
N/A
34,245* 
N/A 
N/A
19,397* 
N/A 
N/A
53.642* 
N/A 
N/A
306* 
N/A 
N/A
61,592* 
N/A 
N/A
61.88* 
N/A 
N/A
115,530* 
1968 
N/A 
N/A
31,269* 
N/A 
N/A
676* 
N/A 
N/A
31,945* 
N/A 
N/A
12,021* 
N/A 
N/A
43,966* 
N/A 
N/A 
802* 
N/A 
N/A 
95,186* 
N/A 
N/A 
95,988* 
N/A 
N/A 
139,954* 
1969 
31,10C 
131,3901 
31,390* 
-
17901 
790* 
31,100 
132,1801 
32,180& 
66,290 
175,8701 
71,300h 
97,390 
1108,0501 
103,480* 
-
-
4,190" 
48,700 
(53,0101 
111,290* 
48,700 
153,0101 
115,480* 
146,090 
(161,0601 
218,960* 
1970 
25,430 
129,1901 
29,190* 
-
19101 
910* 
25,430 
130,1001 
30,100* 
73,140 
161,2301 
56,660* 
98,570 
191,3301 
86,760* 
-
-
16,700' 
50,630 
1108,5101 
62,070* 
50,630 
1108,5101 
78,770* 
149,200 
1199,8401 
165,530' 
1971 
30,480 
122.1301 
22,130& 
1,140 
19601 
960* 
31,620 
(23,0901 
23,090* 
114,760 
1105,8401 
101,150* 
146,380 
1128,9301 
124,240* 
8,280 
15,7801 
87,340* 
75,410 
(85,1401 
39,420* 
83,690 
193,9201 
126,760h 
230,070 
1222,8501 
251,000* 
" |
 
JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO KOREA (cont.)
 
($000) 
Capital 
Grants 
Technical 
Assistance 
Grants £ 
Technical 
Assistance Loans 
Official 
Devel. 
Assistance Investment 
Export 
Credit 
Other, 
Official & 
Private Total 
Year 
A B *C 
(AB) 
D E 
(C+D) 
F G H 
(F+G) 
I 
(E+H) 
31,300 2.160 33,460 173.340 206,800 25.560 25,560 232.360 
1972 (45,0001 (1.6001 (46,6001 (70,6601 (117,2601 
- 171,2001 171,2001 1188,4601 
45,000* 1,600" 46,600* 66.090* 112.690*" 72,600* 18,920' 91,520& 204,210­
1973 
35,920 
126,9701 
26,970-
2,210 
11,7401 
1,740* 
38,130 
128,7101 
28,710& 
56,440 
(134,2601 
127,930' 
94.570 
1162,9701 
156,640' 
6,600 
-
251,760' 
13,050 
1101,7801 
44,620* 
19,650 
(101,7801 
296,380* 
114,220 
(264,7501 
453,020* 
1974 
28,590 
135,5001 
35,500* 
3,980 
13,1401 
3,140' 
32,570 
138,6401 
38,640* 
225.430 
1140,3701 
129,200' 
258,000 
1179,0101 
167,840* 
-
12,9401 
65,200* 
-
130,1601 
-33,290' 
-
133,1001 
31,910' 
258,000 
1212,1101 
199,750' 
1975 
20v470 
133,8301 
33,830& 
3,900 
[3,4401 
3,440* 
24,370 
137,2701 
37,270* 
37,790 
160,1201 
50,1706 
62,160 
197.3901 
87,440* 
-
12,4801 
39,7106 
-
198,4901 
33,600* 
-
(100,9701 
73,310' 
62,160 
1198,3601 
160,750' 
1976 -
-
60 10,300 
15,7201 
5.720* 
10,360 
15,7201 
5,720* 
70,640 
135,6301 
18,490' 
89,000 
141,3501 
24,210* 
-
-
84,260* 
-
174,1701 
5,940' 
-
174,1701 
90,200* 
89,000 
1115,5201 
114,410* 
1977 
2,290 
13,7801 
J,780* 
5,750 
15,0401 
5,040* 
8,040 
18,8201 
8,820' 
61,820 
197.7401 
75,510' 
69,860 
1106,5601 
84,330* 
-
-
18,320' 
-
1102,1601 
41,630' 
-
1102,1601 
59,950' 
69,860 
1208,7201 
144,280' 
1978 
1,970 
13,3901 
3,390* 
9,310 
18,1001 
8,100' 
11,280 
111,4901 
11,490* 
195,080 
190,7601 
54,640' 
206,360 
1102,2501 
66,130' 
-
-
242,820* 
-
1396,9201 
325,290* 
-
1396,9201 
568,110' 
206,360 
1499,1701 
634,240h 
1979 
30 
(1,9301 
1,930" 
8.510 
17,2001 
7.200* 
8,540 
19,1301 
9,130* 
-
191,3801 
45,050' 
8,540 
1100,5101 
54,180' 
7 
-
205,7806 
-
1356,9301 
245,890* 
-
1356.9301 
451,670' 
8,540 
(457,4401 
505,850* 
1980 
-
-
-
7,090 
16,2001 
6,200* 
7,090 
16,2001 
6,200* 
210,100 
1119,4001 
70,100' 
217.190 
1125,6001 
76,300* 
-
-
45,080* 
-
1349,3001 
200,590* 
-
1349,3001 
245,670* 
217,190 
1474,9001 
"321,970* 
1981 
30 
1301 
30* 
7,870 
17.0401 
7,040& 
7,900 
17,0701 
7,070' 
326,730 
1366,3801 
288.480* 
334,630 
1373,4501 
295,550* 
-
-
120.820* 
-
1318,4001 
121,800' 
-
1318,4001 
242,620* 
334,630 
1691,8501 
538,170' 
'­
I 
JAPANESE ASSISTANCE Io KOREA (cont.)
 
($000;
 
Capital 
Grants 
Technical 
Assistance 
Grants I 
Technical 
Assistance Loans 
Official 
Devel. 
Assistance Investment 
Export 
Credit 
Year 
A a C 
(A+B) 
D E 
(C+D) 
F G 
- 8,810 8,810 140 8.950 
1982 - 18,250] (8,2501 173,6401 [81,8901 - (45,120) 
- 8,250* 8.250*' 
-4,440' 3,810'" 359,570* -299,850' 
TOTAL 
207,670 
(233,1401 
329,898* 
71,030 
(60,1301 
61,912* 
278,700 
1293,2701 
391,810* 
1,619,700 
11,523,2801 
1,232,152' 
1,898,400 
(1,816,5501 
1,623,962-
14,880 
111,2001 
1,617,758* 
213,350 
(2,194,2901 
1,175,882' 
Notes: 	 Figures in brackets represent gross disbursement. N/A indicates information not available.
 
Figures with asterisks represent net flow. 
 Net Flows - Total Disbursement - Repayments.
Figures not otherwise noted are commitments. 
Source: 
 Japanese 	Ministry of For.eign Affairs, Economic Cooperation Bureau. 
Other.
 
Official I
 
Private 

H 

(F+G) 

-
145,1201 

59,720* 

228,230 

12,205,4901 

2,793,640* 

Total
 
(E4H)
 
8,950
 
1127,0101
 
63,530*
 
2,126,630
 
14,022,0401
 
4,417,602*
 
APPENDIX C JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO KOREA
 
1. Outline
 
o Major Economic Indicator for Korea
 
1980 

Population (Thousands) 38,198 

GNP (US$ Millions) 56,930 

Per Capita Income (US$) 1,490 

Exports (US$ Millions) 17,505 
Exports to Japan ( " ) 3,039 
Imports ( " ) 22,289 
Imports from Japan( " ) 5,858 
Foreign Exchange 2,925 
Reserves 
Official External 15,808 
Debt 
DSR % ) 12.0 
1981 1982
 
38,880 ­
66,090
 
1,700 ­
21,271 22,251
 
3,503 3,368
 
26,155 25,466
 
6,374 5,389
 
2,682 2,807
 
18,279 20,061
 
12.4 13.1
 
FROM: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, ]983
 
Source : IMF, World Bank
 
2. Economic Cooperation with Japan 
(1) Financial Cooperation 
- Governmental Cooperation 
(MillionV) 
79 80 81 82 83 Total 
- Grant-type Aid 106,708 106,70 
In accordance with 102,093 102,09­
recompensation 
General Grants 4,187 411F 
Cultural Grants 32 32 
KR food Aid 396 39d 
- Credit Assistance 420,002 47,570 52889E 45,10(565,57C 
In accordance with 67,728 
-
- 67,72E 
recompensation 
Project loans 175,680 19,000 
- 45,10C239,78C 
Commodity loans 55,000 
-
-
- 5,50 
Rice Exports on 121,594 28,570 52,89d - 203,062 
deferred payment termS 
Total 526,710 47,570 52,898 - 45,100672,278 
0 Grant Cooperation
 
(Unit : V Millions)
 
Contract date Contract Name Amount Remarks
 
(In accordance with Recompensation)
 
" Machinery for Irrigation and 5,933
 
Prevention of Drought
 
Machinery for Increasing 6,215
 
Production of Agricultural
 
Products
 
Machinery for Fisheries and 11,649
 
Fishing boat Construction
 
Machinery for Science and 4,584
 
Technology Research
 
Machinery for Construction 10,287
 
of Pohang Iron Foundry
 
Raw Materials 36,051
 
(Manure, Chemicals, etc.)
 
Textile Machinery and 8,785
 
Automible Parts
 
Clearing Account 15,749
 
Others (Bank Fee) 2,840
 
(General Grant 	Cooperation)
 
71. 	8.28 Keum-Ho Technical High School 

(Heating & Electrical Equipment)
 
72. 	7. 1 Keum-Ho Technical High School 

(Basic Laboratory Equipment)
 
74. 	2. 6 Keum-Ho Technical High School 

(Advanced Laboratory Equipment)
 
74. 	12.27 Seoul Engineering College 

Laboratory Equipment
 
75.*.8.29 

76. 9. 1 

76. 	8.31 Equipment for Barley Reserch 

Institute
 
77. 	9. 29 Medical Equipment for Local 

Medical Center
 
78. 8. 18 

77. 	9.29 Korea Foreign Language College 

Japanese Language Laboratory Systx
 
79. 	1.13 Chung-ju University Japanese 

Language Laboratory System
 
(KR Food Aid)
 
70. 3.31 	 Japanese Rice 

130
 
394
 
563
 
500
 
500
 
1,000
 
100
 
600
 
400
 
17
 
15
 
396
 
According to the agreement for property claims and economic
 
cooperation of June 1965, these sums were paid from December
 
1965 to December 1975 \:
 
_____________ 
Credit Assistance 
A. (Exchange of official letter basis) 
Contract date Contract rame Amount 
*Interest 
Rate Period Remarks 
(Inaccordance with 
Rccompensation) 
65. 6.22 Claim Right 
Economic Cooperation 
Agreement 
67,728 3.50 20(7) 
(V Loan) 
(First Loan) 
71. 2. 18 Modernization.of Agricul 
and fishery sector 
. 7,200 6.25 13(3) 
71. 6.29. Promotion of exports 
for Small and Medium­
size industries 
10,800 6.25 13(3) 
(The Second Loan) 
71. 12.30 Railway and Subway 
Projects 
27,240 4.125 20(5) 
(The Third Loan) 
72. 7.1 Commodity Loan 
Commodity Loan 
7,700 
7,700 
5.00 
3.50 
15(5) 
20(7) 1 
73. 1.24 
(The Fourth Loan) 
Correspondence Facilities 6,200 4.25 20(5) 
73, 12.4 CommodityLoan 7,700 5.00 15(5) 
7,700 3.50 20(7) 
Promotion of Export Industry 6,200 5.25 20(7) 
(The Fifth Loan) 
74. 10.25 
P 
Agricultural Development 
Project 
Dai-Chung Dam 
19,440 
11,880 
3.25 
3.50 
25(7) 
20(7) 
(The Sixth Loan) 
75. 8.29 Buk-Pyung Port Development 
Project 
12,420 3.50 20(7) 
Agricultural Development 
Project 
11,000 5.75 15(5) 
(The Seventh Loan) 
76. 11.13 
77. 2.10 
Correspondence Facilities 
Chung-Buk Railroad 
Agricultural Development 
6,600 
4,300 
12,600 
4.25 
3.50 
5.75 
20(5) 
20(7) 
15(5) 
(The Eighth Loan) 
77. 8.31 High-power Electricity 
Transmission Facilities 
4,000 4.25 20(5) 
77. 8.31 Chung-ju Dam 
Agricultural Development 
Project 
14,000 
6,000 
3.50 
5.75 
20(7) 
15(5) 
(The Ninth.Loan)
 
78. 	12.20 Agricultural Development 14,000 

Project
 
78. 	12.20 Project for expansion of 7,000 

medical facilities
 
(The Tenth Loan)
 
80. 1. 18 Project for expansion df 10,000 
educational institutions 
80. 	1.18 Project for modernization 4,000 

of medical institutions
 
Construction of urban sewage 
 5,000 

disposal facilities
 
(The llth Loan)
 
81. 	1.13 Equipment for Rural Hospital. 13,,000 

Project
 
81. 	1.13 Project for expansion of 6,000 

educational institutes
 
83. 	10.7 Hap-Chun Dam Project 20,400 

" 
 Seoul University Children's 5,400 

hospital program
 
Tan-Chun Sewage disposal 11,500 

plant project
 
Equipment for rural water- 7,800 

works project
 
5.25 20(7)
 
3.50 20(7)
 
4.00. 25(7)
 
4.00 25(7)
 
4.00 25(7)
 
4.00 25(7)
 
4.00 25(7)
 
4.50 25(7)
 
4.50 25(7)
 
4.50 25(7)
 
4.50 25(7)
 
(Food Aid) 
69. 3.11 Rice Exports deferred 
payment terms 
@ 47,700 30(10) 
70. 2.24 
70. 12.17 
. 37,957 
7,090 
30(10) 
30(10) 
71. 4.5 
71. 7.30 
73. 6.26 
80. 7.18 
8o. 8.22 
81. 1.17 
81. 4.16 
"11,868 
" 
9,329 
7,650 
6,286 
8,184 
14,100 
52,898 
30(10) 
30(10) 
30(10) 
15(5) 
15(5) 
30(10) 
30(10) 
C- J.
 
B. (Loan Agreement Base)
 
Contract date Contract Name 	 Amount Remarles
 
In Accordance With Recompensaticn)
 
(2utual Agreement for first year)
 
66. 	6. 8 Railroad Facilities Improvement 3,958
 
Project
 
66. 	6. 17 The Han-RiVer Bride Recon- 321
 
struction Project
 
66. 7. 20 	 Irrigation, R clamation, and 1,188
 
Construction Machinery 2,340
 
Improvement Project
 
66. 7. 27 	 Sea Transportation Improvement' 2,942
 
Project
 
66. 	7. 27 Small and Medium-size Machinery 5,335
 
Producers development Project
 
(Mutual Agreement for Secand year)
 
67. 	3. 23 Railroad Facilities Improvement 3,340
 
Project
 
67.6. 	27 Transportation Improvement 934
 
Project
 
Contract date 	 Contract Name 

67. 7. 11 Kwang-Ju City Waterworks Project 

Dae-Jun City Waterworks Project 

Long-distance Phone System 

Expansion Project
 
67. 	7. 31 Machinery IndUstry Expansion 

Project
 
67. 	8. 7 The So-yang Dam Construction 

Project
 
67. 	8. 7 5v1l and Medium-size Business 

Imporvement Project
 
(Mutual Agreements for third year)
 
68. 6. 26 	 Expressway Construction Project 

68.10. 	30 Railroad Facilities Imporvement 

Long Distance Phone System
 
Expansion Project
 
(Mutual Agreements for Fourth Year)
 
63.12. 28 So-yang Dam Comstruction Project 

69. 4. 14 Expressway Construction Project 

69. 6. 19 Agriculture and Fishery Promotion 

69. 9. 1 Yung-Dong Thermal Power Station 

Construction Projecti
 
Amount Remarles
 
605
 
545
 
360
 
1,013
 
395
 
2,669
 
1,079
 
(275)
 
4,686
 
1,402
 
831
 
641
 
Contract date 
S 
69.12. 4 
Contract Name 
Chung-ju Waterworks Project 
Nam-Hai Bridge Construction 
Project 
Amount 
324 
787 
Remarles 
(Mutual Agreements for the Fiftt 
year) 
70. 2. 4 
70.6. 25 
So-yang Dam Construction Project 2,699 
Long Distance Phone System 502 
Expansion Project 
(Mutual Agreements for the Sixt­
year) 
71. 7. 16 Pohang Iron Foundry Constructicn 2,880 
Project 
(Mutual Agreements for the 
Seventh year) 
72. 5. 1 Pohang Iron Foundry Constructioi10,749 
(Mutual Agreements for the 
Eighth year) 
73. 1. 16 
73. 7. 20 
Pohang Iron Foundry Construction 1,086 
Project 
The Han River Flood Warning 455 
System Project 
V 
C -/>O 
Contract date Contract Name Amount Remarles 
(Mutual Agreements for the Ninth 
year) 
74..5. 22 Pohang Iron Foundry Expansion 
Project 
12,788 
(Mutual Agreements for the tenth 
year) 
75. 7. 30 Pohang Iron Foundry Expanson 
Project 
225 
(V Loan) 
(The First X Loan) 
71. 2. 18 
73. 4. 3 
71. 6. 29 
Agriculture and Fishery Industry 
Modernization Project 
" 
Exports Industry Promotion 
Project 
5,400 
1,800 
5,400 
" 
(Korea Foreign Exchange Bank) 
Small 0 Medium Size Business 
Promotion Project 
5,400 
(Small I Medium Industry Bank) 
Contract date 	 Contract Name 

(The Second X Loan)
 
72. 4. 10 	 Railroad and Subway Project 

(The Third V Loan)
 
72. 7. 17 	 Commodity Loan 

72. 9. 13 	 Commodity Loan 

(The Fourth M Loan)
 
73. 4. 23 	 Correspondence Facilities Expansion 

74. 5. 10 	 Commodity Loan 

74. 5. 13 	 " 

74. 5. 10 	 Export Industry Improvement Project 

(Korea Foreign Excha e Bank)
 
(The Fifth V Loan)
 
74.12. 	26 Agricultural Development Priject 

Dae-Chung Dam 

(The Sixth V Loan) 
76. 3. 31 	 Buk-pung Harbour Development 

75.12. 24 	 Agriculture Promotion Project 

Amount Remarles
 
27,240
 
7,700
 
7,700
 
6,200
 
7,700
 
7,700
 
6,200
 
19,40
 
11,880
 
12,420
 
i,000
 
'K
 
Contract date Contract Name Amount Remarles 
(The Seventh V Loan) 
76. 11. 26 
" 
77. 6. 10 
Correspondence Facilities Expansion 
Chung-buk Railroad Project 
Agriculture Promotion Project 
6,600 
4,300 
12,600 
(The Eighth V Loan) 
77.11. 28 
73. 1. 20 
78. 1. 31 
High-power Electric Transmission 
Facilities 
Chung-ju Dam 
Agriculture Promotion Project 
4,000 
14,000 
6,000 
(The Ninth V Loan) 
78.12. 25 Agricultural Imporvement Project 
Medical Instruments Improvement 
Project 
14,000 
7,000 
(The Ten Y Loan) 
80. 1. 18 Education Institute Expansion Project l0,000 
Medical Institution Modernization 4,000 
Project 
Urban Sewage disposal Facilities 5,000 
Otruction Project 
1f 
Contract date-	 Contract Name 

(The Eleven V Loan)
 
81. 	2. 27 Rural Hospital Facilities Equipment 

Progra.-A
 
" Educational Institute Expansion 

Progran
 
(The 	Twelfth V Loan)
 
83.10. 	11 Hab-chun Dam Construction 

to Rural Waterworks Expansion 

Medical Equipment Expansion Project 

(Seoul University Children's
 
Hospital)
 
2 	 Sewage Disposal Plant Constriction 
Amount Remarlts
 
13,000
 
6,000
 
20,400
 
7,800
 
5,400
 
11,500
 
21 
 Financial Cooperation on Private Base
 
1 	 EXIM Bank Direct Loan
 
V millions at the end of Dec. 1983)
 
Contract Date 
 Item 
 Amount Remarks
 
58. 	10. 6 Small and Medium Size Bank Loan 10,000
 
2 	 Export on a Deferred Payment Basis and Overseas
 
Investment
 
( In V millions ) 
80 	 81 
 82 	 Total
 
Number Number Number
 
Amount Amount 
 Anount Amount
of Cases of Case. of Cases of Cases 
Export on deferred 513 3,948,64 6 	 86,253 a 146,151 528 1,181,044 
Dayient basis
 
Overseas Investment 1,046 1,136,70 33 
 72,601 26 103,165 1,105 1,312,467
 
(2) Technical operation
 
A) Trainee discipline 
'82 

Agency 

esults 
Trainee JICA 104 
dfW Ic, 
APO 35 
UNIDO 1 
AOTS 167 
OISCA 
-
I La 
ACCU 1 
Dispatch of JICA* 71 
Specialist APO 7 
JODC 8 
& Dispatch of 
At the Fnd c 
982 cumulati'v
total 
2,982 
3Sl 
12 
2,691 
16 

170 
18 
1,112 
57 
88 
Specialist (number of people) 
Sector
 
Agriculture, Ad-inistrations, Sanitatio 
and jedicine, Transportation, Technica. 
industry 
Business administration Technical, 
administration
 
Technical Industry 
Machinery Industry, Steel.Heav,% 
-Electric Equipmnt, Agriculture,
Fishery Autanotile 
Culture 
Electrical .Machinery, Steel,
 
Transportation Textiles
 
Publishing 
Agriculture, Social Huan-resources
 
Agriculture 
Technical Industry Service 
Textiles, Business Administration, 
Ceramics 
* inclnding investigating party 
B. Technical Cooperation Project 
Category 
Agriculture, Fishery 
Industry Cooperation 
Project 
Agriculture Climate Disaster 
Research 
During 
82 - 87 
Sanitation and 
Medicial Cooperation 
Circulation Appliances Center 79 - 84 
. Appliances radiotherapeutics research 
appliances 
82 
3. Gorernment Development Aid Received of Korea 
year_.
 
Ite'm .
 
- TOfAV 

e. OPEC Countries 
*.Int'L Agencies 
o.DAC member countries 
Japan 

U.S.A 

West Germany 

(million, US $) 
'80 '91 '82 
139.0 330.6 34.0 
10.9 A 0.2 = 4.8 
10.8 4.9 23.4 
117.3 325.9 15.4 
76.3 295.6 3.8 
21.0 12.0 A12.0 
14.3 13.2 18.7 
Source 
 = DAC 
-- 
o z 
C: : 
Seumeary Of AID Cranto Provided to totes for lciemical send capital Projects
by Field of Activity for Fillcal year* 1954-1975a an of lhqcpnter )it 1974 a 
nc 
it" U.S. doilars) 
Field of Activity P11954 T11955 rvl9s6 I'l57 ri1958 r11959 r11960 rP1961 rPr192 rP1193 '11964 r1r9f65 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
Ajgricuture end Natural 
Industry and Mling 
Tranaportatou 
Labor 
WIaltk and Sanitation 
Ldqactio 
Public Adminitration, 
peaourcen 1.209.075 
51.940.420 
22.420.402 
0 
2.271,213 
746.404 
06.643 
6.460.526 
23."61.594 
61.117.700 
0 
2.349.047 
S26.4:S 
0 
6.317.771 
20.313.556 
37.33O.566 
16s500 
2.894.931 
S. 392. "S 
226S255 
6.430-.320 
29,237.760 
39.36.38,3 
0 
4.7761.589 
4.905. 302 
1.510.05s 
2,459.521 
10.007,303 
7.2i67.169 
0 
3,433,729 
3.133.432 
1.925.791 
2.936.025 
13.003,613 
10,107,207 
0 
1.309.604 
1.834.756 
1.549.96S 
2.525.591 
7.215.769 
3.031.928 
0 
471.015 
1.451.886 
1.413.201 
804.JY7 
2.399,126 
2.599.664 
0 
156,339 
410.561 
710,813 
249,263 
5.16.149 
1,244,403 
0 
0 
97.0S2 
434,147 
316.580 
t,"SS.636 
111.217 
0 
0 
630.744 
1.364.995 
346*382 
946.297 
9 .026 
0 
0 
143.3f5 
4612.191 
396, 20f; 
993.092 
121.570 
0 
0 
786 9F 
349,671 
60 
90 
Commnity D mvelopopnt. Socialelfare. and Iloaling 
General and NIucellaneoo 
Technical Support 
0 
--
--
3.532.903 
0 
223.476 
3.067.591 
94,360 
2.205,561 
4.367.822 
412.736 
3.479.263 
1.664.991 
2.036.781 
3.245,349 
1,430.310 
958.936 
2.922.122 
1.6010.675 
766.764 
3,910,622 
366.430 
135,766 
1,834,692 
03.415 
0 
1,671,122 
1.015 
0 
640.336 
0 
346.019 
J,21I 
0 
0 
151.326 
Total 79.462.156 97.091,741 77.860,005 94.960.IS 35,974.093 36.652.540 22.s4.671 9.497.769 9.9SSS 5.220,531 S.20 .479 3.092.463 
I9S4-197S
 
Field of Acttvity 
 1,1966 r1967 rTI968 
 F11969 1,11970 11971 rl1972 r11973 r 1q74 rr1975 
 Total
 
10 Agriculture and Natural e nourceo 66,50S 735.440 ,1i.:a* 721.004 OS4.218 747&324 733,251 2436.914 9.632 1.#00 36.013.77520 Indukntry and IqMnlng 2.01.974 S,060,931 3.178,397 
 609.231 581,612 
 550.466 195,444 345,500 147.010 15.050 1J1.115.05230 Tcansportatlon 
 166.423 
 163.439 
 ",7@1 60,605 0 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
-- 1S.777.63640 labmr 0 45.390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.890
50 
 Ikalth and Sanitation 0 64.550 1.107,242 990.7 765.666 836 ,78 299.772 
 92.314 
 33.001 
 v.735 21.864.632 
60 ruAca t I on 70.62 202. 340 185.102 255.762 323,474 368,074 
 41f6.492 7S,443 73,61R 
-- 21.322.34370 Pudblic A6mlnltration 
 615.630 
 763.361 
 5.627.923 
 1.025.929 965.058 1,06S. 03 
 3I4.066 
 285.577 
 107,150 

-- 21.025.227 
61) Comnity ivelirmmtWelfare. and lontming Social 0- 2.520 26.020 0 0 0 0 0 01 16.42-.780
90 
 .enoral and Minc.ilan-oua 
 0 
 37.819 
 25.670 
 70.467 
 37.918 
 76,062 154.683 
 119.3S4 
 9.9"4 

-- 5.2n4.147 
Technical Support 1,220,327 1.283,267 1.362.289 1,146,442 1.00f;.605 
 "6. qq I nor, x74 nn r.'t 
Summary of AID Counterpart Funds Provided to Korc4 
by rld of Activity for Fincal Years 1954-1974 
(in tholvl4nds of wn ant doillr .tl.livaienta) 
Field rroJ-ct Nmber a Title 
Ff1954 
(I8:$411 
FY1955 
(WSO:$1) 
Fy1956 
(SOI$I I 
r1957 
(NSOiI) 
ry1958 
(50$1 
rY1959 
("SO.-1 
FY1960 
(65S$1 
rI'f961 
(W I30$I) 
FY1962 
(WI30:$13 
FYI961 
(w130:S1) 
00 Direct hilitary Support 1,034,476 
(57.471) 
285,000 
(5,700) 
1,631,800 
(32.636) 
0 
0 
200.000 
(4,000) 
1,092,752 
(21,855) 
3,376,948 
151,953) 
3,193,977 
(101,492) 
7,116.000 
(54,73q) 
7,006,243 
(53,R94) 
10 Agricaltur-
Memrces 
and Natural 45.785 
(2.544) 
965,301 
(19,306) 
1,413,300 
(28,266) 
1.672,330 
(33,447) 
2,064.262 
(41,285) 
3,819,379. 
(76,388) 
266,864 
(4,106) 
0 
0 
a5,606 
(659) 
0 
0 
20 Industry and Mining 2.809.596 
(156,0891 
1.292,471 
(25,849) 
1,165.331 
(23,307) 
1,346,259 
(26,925) 
1,066,474 
(21,329) 
1,017.958 
(20.359) 
311.359 
(4,790) 
759,680 
(5,844) 
"637.0fl06 
(4,907) 
0 
30 Transportation 1.511,219 
(83.957) 
1,763,015 
(35,260) 
959,114 
(19,182) 
917,733 
(18,355) 
1,057,251 
(21,145) 
1.085.961 
(21,719) 
534.566 
(8,224) 
72.000 
(54) 
1.376.520 
(10,589) 
0 
0 
SO Health and Sanitation 230.366 
112.798) 
412,513 
(8,250) 
214,353 
(4,2M7) 
519,700 
(10.394) 
466.492 
(9,330) 
122,187 
(2,444) 
22,172 
(341) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
128,549 
(989) 
60 Mucation 0 
0 
56,011 
(1.120) 
121.340 
(2.4271 
118,809 
(2.376) 
319.197 
(6,384) 
221.852 
(4.437) 
137.315 
(2.113) 
6,475 
(50) 
1,736,772 
(13.360) 
0 
0 
70 Public Mministration 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,590 
(32) 
118.070 
(2.3611 
24,242 
(485) 
123,349 
(1,890) 
55.577 
(427) 
8,611.246 
(66.240) 
10.419.893 
(80.153) 
80 Community Developent, 
Social Welfare. and Housing 
10.028 
(557) 
85,986 
(I.720) 
71.193 
(1,428) 
505,245 
(10,105) 
830,152 
(16,603) 
453.035 
(9.0611 
75.381 
(I,160) 
109,008 
(839) 
92.016 
(708) 
0 
0 
90 Geymral and NHicottlaneous 49.155 
(2,7311 
700 
(141 
0 
0 
31,357 
(627) 
53,691 
(1,074) 
40,085 
(802) 
25,314 
(389) 
3.008.437 
(23,142) 
1,822.523 
(14,019) 
0 
0 
Total 5,690.625 
(316,147) 
4,860,997 
(97,219) 
5,576,631 
(1I1.S31) 
5,113,023 
(102,261) 
6,175,589 
(123,511) 
7.877,451 
t(1S7,550) 
4,873,268 
(74,974) 
17,205,154 
(132.348) 
21.478,569 
(165,221) 
17,554,685 
(135,036) 
uble N-'. Status Of Rocean 
 Man beposits and Transfers tnder Pl 4g0
title I Sales Agreements for Fiscal Teasc 1955-1911
 
Agreement 
Date 
Deposits to amse 
bolter Valve won Deposited Transfers 
alance in 
20F?081 
Country Use 
l04c-72F1745 1040-72FT760 
U.S. ie 
20FT400 Total 
65/31/55 
63/13/50 
01/30/57 
02/05/50 
06/30/59 
12/24/60 
03/02/02 
11/07/62 
81/20/64 
12/31/64 
43/01/66 
63/25/67 
05/10/61 
02/26/69 
03/26/70 
04/12/71 
Total 
8 14,139.300 
41.141.100 
11.12.900 
48.113.000 
32.615.260 
49.397,900 
61.317.400 
91.364.200 
71.314,400 
43.218,950 
43.46,.027 
53.476.304 
71,170.221 
46.372.130 
53,163.10 
24.531.432 
$7771011s.9 
w 7iI.911.615.IO 
2.342705,209.000 
934.4179,61S.50 
2.473.514.S4.05 
1.977,319.330.30 
6.413.55A2,37.90 
8456,134.625.10 
12,0531S5,L1.70 
1?725v312e667.02 
11.724.190.795.67 
11627,309.743.11 
14.636.659.914.64 
20.115.375,024.03 
13.960.602,002.,1 
16.765.937*001.25 
9.136.111.16.27 
MI151.605.719.54 4. 3 
V 766.919.91S.89 
2#342.70S.269.00 
934,479,675.50 
2.47,.157.8h.93 
1.991.62,189.17 
0.416,4016037.50 
0.921.595.129.24 
12.430o544,702.51 
1,44Th91,4h0.66 
110.12,10800.09 
11,19.331,1bb.714 
14.63.4673.116.30 
19.997t393,465.60 
13.972*380,594.67 
16.712.319,837.69 
9*137*178929.27 
ISI614.519.S44.13 
0 
0 
a 
(5.441.279.301 
121.662.657.171 
12.15S.999.0 
4(S.45.oG4.06) 
(425.229.690.811 
279,394,199.16 
111.309,995.51 
S031.142.37 
1,96.1796.26 
17,91,551.37 
0*301.407.34 
16.301*951.441 
;44.617.66 
1.269,000.09 
V 300.000,000.00 
2.1001.27,143.00 
799.479.675.SO 
2.022.716,507.12 
1,603,292,301.96 
"5.406.24.031.50 
7,933.160962.97 
10.914.018,248.81 
14,754.064,078.86 
9.290.311.040.07 
9,262,273,708.59 
10.791.345.529.80 
13,356111o740.14 
9.664.046.462.15 
9.901.]350113.02 
7v691.123.462.21 
"114.138,070.410.30 
V 0 
0 
0 
89,307.278.00 
0 
39,900,000.00 
23,470,000.00 
42.750,000.00 
0 
111.121,807.75 
111,193.310.00 
*50.164,010.39 
073,557°224.01 
$38,30.2010.54 
910.710,698.22 
0 
W3,767.606,282.96 
U 4,911.GIS15.10 
241,871,126.00 
135.000.000.00 
307134.029.u3 
314.709.486.2t 
770.20.000.00 
1.04.904,666.37 
1,473.776,403.70 
2,691.923.1g9.b0 
2.211.440.172.21 
2.431.164.57.1s 
.9881,63.S26.19 
5.965.124.494.74 
4.009,991,313.96 
5.130.183,026.40 
2,045.147,46710 
W33,071,841,q43.SS 
V 78,9110.615.0 
2#342,70.,269.00 
934,479.615.s0 
2.419.157.813.90 
1.991.062,IP.20 
6.410.406,831.So 
0.921.595.629.20 
12,430.544.702.5g 
17.445.98h.468.60 
11,012.88,800.00 
11.819.331,600.70 
14.34,671.10.30 
19.997.393,465.90 
13.972.300.594.60 
16.772,319.037.b0 
9,137670.929.20 
W1SI.614.519.5 44 .0 
Lean Tund Used 1114,638,670,419.30 31749,094401.89 
falance O 19,505,831.09 
Adem. Expenme Used by Treasury 71271.00 
Current Balance In Account 19,491.5S3t.1 
Soucces Kocea Desk. Agency fot International Development. 
Date Agreement 

Signed 

10/23/68 

02/26/69 

04/08/69 

f20/70 & 01/28/71 

01/29/71 

04/12/71 

F14/72 & 10/20/72 

04/12/73 

-otal 

s. 
Sumary of AID Expenditures for Korea Under Public Law 480 Title I
for Fiscal Years 1955-1973 an of December 31, 1974 
(cont.)
 
(in U.S. dollars)
 
Convertible local Currency Credit
 
Dollar Expenditure 

CUP (U.S. use) ComoditV reakdovnI)KG Use 
 Total 
 Cotton 
 Wheat 
 Alce Corn 
- 40,548,675 40,548,675 

_ 
 40.5480675
9,043,653. 
21,101,858 
 30,145,511 

- 15,475g340 

- 14,670,171
 
- 18,578,040 18.578,040 

18,578,040
2,330,309 44,832,025 
­
47,162,334 

- 78767,695 39,394,639
 
- 5d,382,563 
 58,362,563 

_ 
 56,362,563
9,833,783 
 18,262,740 
 28,096,523 
 9,050,158 
 14,847,128 

- 4,199,23740,150,072 
148,602,011 
188,752,083 
 22,149,684 
 76,766.600 
 68,988,524 
 20,647,275
6,116,255 
 19,348,764 
 24,465,019 
 3,650,637 
 16,299,425 

- 4,514r957
67,474,072 
368,656.676 
436,130,748 
 34,850,479 
131,156,18 
 225,892,441 
44,231,640
 
ces 
 Korea Desk, Agency for International Development.
 
ISam.,y of AID M ,wesfor 3arem thh "Lic Lw 490 Title I 
Ax fiscal W e 1955-1973 asof D 31. 1974 
fin M.. llaru) 
GYM t to cbrment bles 
ae Aggemm 
Signed .,ai vut O~ttm MmC maeq Um ted 
GO. 
PO itMk ae bugar 
ellm 
(brn 
Gain 
gkxuju 
Ckttcm 
Seed 
OV31/55 14.33 - 9W90 - - -.. 4.041,410 ...... 
*O.l'56S 46.60U.106 7.,90.M 440.606 14^2.10W t2.792.56 - 564.600 2.12AoO 0.249hA0O 99700 278000 - -
- -
VW57 18.612.M16 2,350.10 - 11977,100 4.276.0M - -
OZAP'S 
0'.l3r 
NAM=.00 
32.6S1.206 
30,433.M0 
:9.530,400 1,744,6W---
14.796.309 --
-
-
-
165.906 
-
1.245.200 
5461'00 
2,230.000 
-
-
193 
12//IV0 
OyV2162 
49.3971900 
6".311.400 
15.457.006 
22.615.108 
31.090.606 
33.6676 
-
-
2.073.700 
71923.306 
.....-
2023%1 M..... 
-
-
76t400 
1,119.100 
-
470100 -
1W1/7/2 91.364.200 50.056.100 33,6 ,706 - 2,594.,06 -......- 1.057,000 410.000 3,297 
61SI164 71.374.406 36.459.206 .662166 - 4.24.506 .... - - 1.613 
1I/31^4 43.211.90I 14.734.@9 28.464.069 ----------­
6l/ AG 43.466.027 12.426.613 31.646.I14 -........... 
/1 7 53.416.394 10."1.340 36.6.5?2 - - 4,338,34 ........ 
AQ68 11N.226 31.o .@ 37.434,12 - - 2,5 42 ......... 
07/2V%9 ".72l.L 21.422.464 19.592.605 - - 4154.367 1.2.614 ....... 
"16 53.163.616 34.91.4W 16,193.142 ............ 
64I6'2/71 24.531.432 14.596.52 9.934.*0 .......... 
1bal 7".50.l6 33.40.645 33,17,S" 26.839. 0 41.M.700 13.101,276 1o767,274 6.974.00 6.24,6 "970 2M.66 105.90 4.744.4W 3.110.100 
5.103 
I1.) 
.&Le .. AID Financial Expendituree for Korea Program for Fiscal Years 1954-1975. 
as of Decoaber 31. 1974 
(in .S. dollars) 
Te~ch. coop..Defense Supp., Public Law 
t Project 
Fupportinq Asaitance 
W-Project Total 
6 De. Grant 
Project 
Public Law 460 Title 1 
Sales Loan Ttots 
460 Titles 
II II 
DeveIopM-.1t 
Loan Tota I 
19S4 79.462.156 96.681.961 176.I1.019 0 0 0 0 0 176.151.019 
I95 97.668.265 129.162.327 225.630,S92 223.476 14.39.300 0 14,839.300 
- 0 240.893,368 
1956 5.381.190 222.289.960 227,671,150 72.478.815 46.648,100 0 46,846.100 
- 0 346.998.065 
1957 0.990,173 209.933.183 218,923.356 65.969.963 16.612.000 0 18.612.000 
- 0 323.SOS.339 
1956 3.626.106 171.423.909 175.050,01S 32.347.987 4.8I3.o000 0 4.8!3,000 
- 65,630.880 261,841.882 
1959 1.094."9 176.999.137 176.093.826 3S.757.F6s5 32.615.200 0 32,61S,200 
- 11.292.507 257.759.364 
1940 0 178.734.186 178.734.106 22.674,671 49,397,900 0 49.397,900 1086079,000I 0 356.865.757 
1961 0 158.144.214 156.144.214 9,407,789 0 0 0 27,650,000 3.130.465 198.532.468 
1962 0 92.454,460 92.454.490 9.595.5si 60.317.400 0 68.317.400 10.187,000 23.009.183 203.563.614 
1963 0 91.207,137 91,207.137 S.220.531 91.364.200 0 91.364.200 11,374,000 28,215.627 227.481,495 
1964 0 74.997.363 74.997.383 3.206.479 114.593.350 0 114.S93.356 32,357,000 27.645.204 252.001.424 
196S 0 70.689,*le 70,689.198 3.092.463 0 0 0 26,12,500 468.00,000 150.706,661 
1966 0 59.245.832 59,245.632 S.075.58 43,466,027 0 43.466027 66.664 000 7SS01.247 249.9S2.694 
1967 0 44.767.319 44.767.319 8.379.077 53,476,304 0 S3.476.304 13,379,000 50.719.233 170.720,933 
1966 0 29.812,696 29.612.696 12.375,673 71,170,22i 40,$48.675 111.718.903 34.317.000 2S.676.696 213.900.966 
1969 0 16,673.024 18,673.024 4.890,547 46,372,130 4.723,551 95,095.681 48.023.000 19.463.410 186.145 662 
1970 0 9.969. 51 9.969,561 4.SSS.551 53.163.610 47.162.334 100. 325.944 20.724.000 8.672,799 144.247.87S 
1971 0 0 0 4.4R2.468 24.S31.432 86.479.086 II1.010516 20.690.000 47.649,116 163.R32.102 
1972 0 0 0 3.104,3@4 0 18.7S2.083 188.752.083 11.178,000 22,704,243 22S.730,710 
1973 0 0 0 1.8,j795 0 24.465.019 24.46S.019 835,000 24.149.656 51,263,670 
1974 
1975 _ 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
469.39S 
14.9.05 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
469,405
16 385 
Total 196.222.5,81 1.634.272.427 2.030.495.006 32S.142.459 777,5l00.169 436,130.748 !.213.710,937 433,782.000 422. 2. 476 4,425.4108f0 
1 RepresentqcumOlRAtiv. total from T 194 throuh FT 1960. Sreakdmwn by flecl year is not available. 
Appendix E
 
The Growth of Commercial Credit and Investment
 
Year PublicLoans 
1960 2.2 
1961 1.2 
1962 1.8 
1963 40.3 
1964 14.8 
1965 5.0 
1966 73.1 
1967 105.6 
1968 70.2 
1969 213.8 
1970 209.9 
1971 303.4 
1972 324.5 
1973 368.5 
1974 316.7 
1975 482.1 
1976 710.7 
1977 608.5 
1978 817.7 
1979 1,085.6 
1980 1,518.3 
1981 NA 
1983 NA 
(Million U.S. $) 
Commercial Direct
 
Loans Investment
 
2.6 0.6
 
20.5 4.8
 
13.2 0.7
 
41.5 5.6
 
118.7 13.4
 
124.0 7.6
 
268.4 19.2
 
410.6 15.9
 
366.7 66.1
 
345.2 42.9
 
326.4 78.8
 
344.4 143.3
 
616.0 124.1
 
804.5 61.6
 
*842.5 85.5
 
1,260.3 104.4
 
1,929.8 100.5
 
1,624.8 126.0
 
1,415.8 96.2
 
918.4 100.6
 
927.7 101.4
 
Note: Public loans include both concessional and nonconces. onal
 
assistance (e.g. U.S. or Japan Export-Import Bank).
 
Source: Bank of Korea Research Department
 
APPENDIX E GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT
 
Foreign Equity Investment Arrivals By Industry, 1982-83 
(S Thousands) 
Cum 1962 
1982 1983 Thru 1983 FM 
Agriculture & Fisheries ig005 318 16,125 1.1. 
Agriculture 
Fishery 
& Forestry 2 
1,053 
218 
100 
7,948 
8,177 
0.5 
0.6 
Mining & Manufacturing 91,346 68,637 1,075,743 76.4 
a. Mining 365 212 3,010 0.2 
b. Manufacturing 90,981. 68,425 1,072,733 76.2 
Food processing 3,581 7,396 29,791 2.1 
Textiles 3,133 20 136,305 9.7 
WOcd products - - 1,793 0.1 
Fertilizers - - 43,325 .3.1 
Pharmaceuticals 7,911 12,258 27,565 2.0 
Chemicals 31,855 4,819 271,967 19.3 
Petroleum 718 95 63,278 4.5 
Ceramics 114 122 20,090 1.4 
Steel & metals 783 1,720 66,836 4.8 
Machinery & parts 10,916 14,619 107,299 7.6 
Elec/electronics 22,501 24,368 207,715 14.7 
Transport equipment 5,138 2,372 55,642 4.0 
Others 4,331 636 41,127 2.9 
Social Overhead' Capital 
and Other Services 8,197 32,479 316,624 22.5 
Banking 2,034 2,097 49,010 3.5 
Construction & Services 
Electricity 
462 
-
12,882. 
-
79,867 
111 
5.6 
-
Transport & Storage 1,000 669 26,218 1.9 
Hotel & Tourism 4,701 16,831 161,418 11.5 
TOTAL 100,598 101,434 1,408,492 100 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
APPENDIX F
 
(inmillIon U.S. dollars) 
-. rflinl .... 	 I-mot 
Yer 7ld 	 w,.lh To the %of Total Grownh From the %of Cvwoh 
Rime U.. Total Rme U.S. Total&IGNP (%)1fl 	 le) 

152 27.7 214.2
 
1953 J9.6 43.10 345.4 61.3
 
19"4 24.2 33.9 
 243.3 - 29.4 $.1 
I9M. 1.0 34.4 7.4 41.1 341.6 40.4 37.9 11.1 4.3 
195 24A6 .16 7 10.9 44.3 36.1 13.1 37.0 22.5 -1.4 
442.2 14.5 110.0 24.9 7.61957 1.1.2 4.8 4.1 18.5 
16.$ 2.7 2.9 17.6 378.2 - 14.5 209.0 55.3 5.5,"A3 
19'1 19.1 A) 2.1 10.6 303.3 19.7 147.6 48.6 3.3 
190 32.3 65.7 3.6 11.0 343.5 13.1 133.7 38.9 1.1 
1961 40.9 24.7 6.3 16.6 316.1 -3.0 143.4 45.4 5.6 
421.8 33.4 220.3 52.1 2.119629 54.8 	 34.0 12.0 21.9 
6.3 53.4 24.3 21.0 540.3 32.8 214.1 50.7 9.1196)

I9M 119.1 37.2 35.6 29.9 404.4 -27. 302.1 0.0 9.4
 
16.s 17.1 47.0 61.7 35.2 463.4 14.6 . 102.1 9.3 5.3 
iM, 2".3 42.9 9".8 33.3 716.4 54.6 253.7 35.4 12.7 
l967" 320.2 27.9 137.4 42.9 996.2 39.1 305. 0.6 6.6 
194 45.4 42.2 237.0 52.0 1.462.9 46.8 449.0 0.7 11.3 
199 62.5 6.7 315.7 50.7 1.123.6 24.7 530.1 29.1 13.8 
970 33.2 14.2 393.2 47.3 1.964.0 8.8 54.8 29.5 7.6 
1971 I.067.6 17.1 531.1 49.8 2394.3 20.7 673.3 23.3 9.4 
I9r 1.624.1 	 12.1 753.9 46.7 2.S22.0 5.3 647.2 25.7 5.3 
1973 3.225.e' 16.6 1,021.2 31.7 4,240.3 GSA 1.201.9 21.3 14.9 
1974 4,460.4 I3.3 1.492.2 33.5 6851.1 61.6 1.700.8 24.8 3.0 
1975 50O1.U 13.9 1,536.3 30.2 7.274.4 6.2 1811.1 25.9 7.1 
19A 7.715.1 '1. 2.492.5 32.3 .773.6 0.6 t .9 22.4 13.1 
23.2 2,447.4 22.6 10.3 
191 12,710.6 6.5 4.051.3 31.9 14,971.9 38.5 3,042.9 30.3 11.6 
19"9 15,0.5. 11.4 4.373.9 29.1 20,333.6 35.3 4.12.6 22.6 6.4 
190 17.50.9 16.3 4,606.6 26.3 "2,291.7 9.6 4.0.2 .21.9 -6.1 
191" 21.180.9 !1.0 5.560.9 26.2 26.344.6 18.2 6,050.2 23.0 7.1 
Plan peia0. 
I977d 10.046.5 	 10.2 3.111.6 31.0 10,310.5 
A". b.c,.md :The I ,r. Secoed. Tird. and Fovmh Five-.Ye 
" Prtimsisal daa. I itpors re valud amf.o.b., Implrs imelf. iot
 
S Ecww.* Simon Yarbro. vorio edhkis.
ovoie: The Rank ,-' Kore, 

MAnlmik Eevotimr Simitmi. vrse edItIoMs.
 
Kwa*s NMefon Iaorn. IFJi.IPi. 
f JO.YVar Hm of Ow Bookf Ne. 19M0. 
pp. 430.431; The Jil Aim&f Rfpov. 1980, p. 2, 
The Koy Emoewk Ine.v, Februry. I1M3(New York). 
i Koren Trader A ¢ocisbon. New York OWfe. 1annul reports. 
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Appendix G
 
Total Investment, Per Capita GNP & per Capita NI
 
Year 
Total Investment 
at current price
(Million U.S. $) 
per Capita GNP 
at current price 
(U.S. $) 
per Capita NI 
at current price 
(U.S. $) 
1953 208.5 67 61 
1954 
1955 
173.2 
172.0 
70 
65 
63 
59 
1956 
1957 
129.5 
255.4 
66 
74 
60 
67 
1958 
1959 
241.7 
217.5 
80 
81 
72 
71 
1560 
1961 
215.8 
276.6 
80 
82 
70 
73 
1962 
1963 
296.3 
492.4 
87 
100 
76 
89 
1964 
1965 
403.8 
451.0 
103 
105 
93 
93 
1966 
1967 
792.7 
936.4 
125 
142 
109 
122 
1968 
1969 
1,352.1 
1,910.0 
169 
210 
143 
177 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
2,023.4 
2,354.4 
2,349.1 
3,647.7 
248 
285 
316 
396 
210 
242 
269 
333 
1974 
1975 
5,871.1 
6,260.5 
535 
591 
453 
492 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
7,349.0 
10,385.3 
16,204.2 
22,234.8 
19,132.0 
19,585.4 
19,111.7 
20,752.7 
800 
1,028 
1,406 
1,662 
1,605 
1,735 
1,800 
1,885 
659 
843 
1,156 
1,349 
1,292 
1,385 
1,409 
Source: Bank of Korea, Statistics Dept. 
Foreign Equity Investment Approvals By Industry
and Country, As of the End of 1983 (S Millions) . 
tal U.S.A. a/ Others 
Agriculture & Fisheries 15.0(42) 3.6(10) 1.1(8) 2.2(7)
 
Agriculture & Forestry 6.7 (23) 3.4 (9) 1.1 (8) 2.2 (6)

Fishery 
 8.3 (19) 0.2 (1) 8.1 (17) 
- (1)
 
Mining & Manufacturing 1,287.7(807) 395.2(135) 481.2(587) 252.3(85)
 
a. Mining 3.1 (13) 0.3 (1) 2.7 (11) 
 (1)
 
b. Manufacturing 1,125.6(794) 
394.9(134) 478.4(576) 252.3(84)
 
Food processing 48.7 (27) 13.3 (14)
22.6 (12) 12.8 (1)

Textiles 69.8 (67) 
 0.5 (2) 63.4 (63) 5.9 (2)
Wood products 1.1 (3) ­ 1.1 (3) -
Fertilizers 42.0 (4) 0.8 (1)
23.5 (2) 17.7 (1)

Pharmaceuticals 
 59.4 (32) 36.3 (13) 10.4 (5) 12.7 (14)

Chemicals 
 326.9 (113) 101.0 (22) 113.9 (80) 112.0 (11)

Petroleum 31.5 (4) 0.7 (1) ­ 30.8 (3)

Ceramics 15.0 (25) 1.0 (2) 12.B (23) 
 1.2 (-)
Steel & metals 
 65.0 (72) 4.6 (6) 47.6 (56) 12.8 (10)

Machinery & parts 95.3 (130) 
10.6 (13) 73.6 (100) 11.1 (17)

Elec/electronics 262.9 (191) 129.7 (39) 112.5 (144) 
20.7 (8)
 
Transport equipment 66.6 (9) 49.6 (3) 9.1 (5) 7.9 (1)

Others 41.3 (117) 14.8 (19) 19.9 (82) 
 6.6 (16)
 
Social Overhead Capital

and Other Services 560.5(107) 72.5(27) 353.1(51) 134.9(29)
 
Banking 90.7 (11) 24.5 (2) 1.3 (-) 64.9 (9)

Construction & Services 72.6 (41) 41.2 (15)
26.4 (17) 5.0 (9)

Electricity 
 3.4 (2) 3.2 (1) 0.2 (1) -

Transport & Storage 31.4 (15) 14.3 (6) 
 7.5 (6) 9.6 (3)

Hotel & Tourism 362.4 (38) 4.1 (1) 302.9 (29) 55.4 (8)
 
TarAL 1,704.2(956) 471:'4'l172) 843.4(663) 389.4(121)
 
l/ Figures in parenthesis indicate number of new projects.
_/ Excludes foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals. 
3/ Includes above foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
 
Source: Ministry of Finance
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Appendix Q
 
Changing Composition of Exports
 
(percentages)
 
1960 1965 1970 1975
 
Food and Animal 29.6 16.1 7.8 11.9
 
Beverages and 1.4 .5 1.7 1.3
 
Tobacco
 
Crude Material 48.2 21.2 12.0 3.0
 
Mineral Fuels 3.5 1.1 1.0 2.1
 
Oils and Fats .6 .0 .0 .0
 
Chemicals 1.2 .2 1.4 1.5
 
Manufactures 12.0 37.9 26.4 29.2
 
Machines and .3 3.1 7.4 13.8
 
Tractors
 
Miscellaneous .3 19.7 42.2 37.1
 
Manufactures
 
Unclassified 3.0 .1 .0 .2
 
Source: Toungil Lim. Government Policy and Private Enterprise: Korean
 
Experience in Industralization, pp 84-85.
 
ANNEX A
 
Task Force on Concessional Flows
 
Terms of Reference
 
Aid Effectiveness Study
 
Rationale and Objectives
 
At various meetings of the Task Force the issue of aid
 
effectiveness has been emphasized as crucial both in its own right and
 
because of its importance.in influencing the mandate for aid and,
 
consequently, prospects for increasing aid volume. Recognizing that
 
considerable effort has been expended in evaluating, at various
 
levels, the effectiveness of aid the Task Force agreed that a study
 
was needed, based mainly on available material, in a form that would:
 
(a) be focused and digestible and (b) draw out the key issues on the
 
effectiveness of aid, for further discussion by Task Force members.
 
It vas appreciated that no such effort would be finally conclusive in
 
attributing to every aspect of aid specific results achieved in terms
 
of development. But representatives felt that an attempt should be
 
made to carry out a study which would enable the Task Force to:
 
assess the extent to which conclusions can be reached on the impact of
 
aid on development; express valid and useful o-ioons on the
 
condi.tions uner which a5,l is 2articularly effective; and recommend
 
ways in which the effectivenes
 
It vas agreed, after considerable discussion of alternative
 
approaches, that experienced consultants should be comissioned by the
 
Task Force to perform this. task. They would: (a) undertake an
 
analysis of country experience and of available evaluation/
 
effectivencss materials at various levels, and (b) synthesi:e for the
 
Task Force valid conclusions and observations on the factors that
 
influence aid effectiveness and suggest approaches and policies for
 
action, on the part of both donors and recipients, which would result
 
s- 4 0prav ng oe erlectiveness of 57 The consultants during their 
work would seek the views of donors and recipients on the aid process 
znd on means to enhance aid effectiveness. 
WORK PROGRAM
 
The consultants will produce both survey papers on'a number of
 
topics, based on documentation which already exists or will be
 
submitted to them, and country studies. This will result in a number
 
of background documents, which will be synthesized in the consultants'
 
main report to the Task Force.
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1. 	Backsround Documents
 
(A) Survey Papers 
The consultants will review aid-effectiveness in various
 
aspects, iacluding:
 
1. 	The experience of aid in countries other than those
 
selected for the "cintry studies" outlined below, to
 
extend the generalizability of the findings of those
 
studies.
 
2. Project evaluation (relying on the work of the DAC
 
evaluation experts' group and other materials).
 
3. 	Food aid.
 
4. 	Comparisons of bilateral and multilateral aid progrms and
 
agencies, covering: the respective contributions of aid
 
from each type of agency based on historical experience;.
 
contrasting experiences with policy dialogue; roles in aid
 
coordination, and so forth.
 
5. 	Technical cooperation.
 
6. 	Submissions by Task Force members and multilateral
 
development banks on their experience of aid, their views
 
on the effectivenese of their aid piograns, and
 
documentation they can make available on their aid
 
projects and programs which would be of general interest.
 
This survey work will result in a set of Survey Papers; their
 
number, the exhaustiveness af their coverage and the number of
 
consultants required to produce them will be determined by timing and
 
budgetary considerations.
 
(B) Conery Studies
 
For the purposes of the proposed investigation, the country is
 
an important unit of analysis. It is only in the context of specific

countries that the workings of aid and the policy environment can be
 
fully.considered. Further, while evaluations of projects or
 
are
programs of individual donors have been carried out, there 

extremely few studies of the composite or "systemic" effects of the
 
operations of a multiplicity of donors in a given country.
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The countries proposed for study are some or all of the
 
following: Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Malavi, South Korea, a
 
francophone least-developed country (Upper Volta or Mali) and a Latin
 
American country (possibly Colombia). The final choice of countries
 
will be made in relation to timing and budgetary considerations, and
 
subject to there being no objections on the part of the countries
 
concerned. (If there are objections such that the representativeness
 
of the list of countries becomes unbalanced, alternatives might have
 
to be identified.)
 
The content of the country studies is annexed below.
 
1I. Synthesis Document
 
The main presentation to the Task Force will be in the form of
 
a synthesis document which will draw together the strands of analysis
 
provided by I (A) and (B) above.
 
The main paper will be substantial and will attempt to reach
 
generalizations based on the other studies. The country studies will
 
give material for such generalizations. The main paper will summarize
 
what they have found, as supplemented by relevant parts of the survey
 
york;
 
The synthesis document will present what can be said about
 
effectiveness on the basis of existing knowledge: how effective aid
 
has been, and how it can be improved in future. These findings will
 
be sumnarized in a shorter "sumnary and conclusions" Of some 30
 
pages. The Secretariat will then prepare an issues paper which might
 
form the principal basis of the Task Force's discussions.
 
\g
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ATTACH M.
 
COTENT OF COUNTRY STUDIES 
The effectiveness of aid can be considered in relation to a
 
variety of objectives; the Task Force study is confined to its
 
developmental objectives. The criteria by which aid is to be jud!g4
 
are its contribution to improving the productive capacity of a
 
r Wcient economy (growth) and to the relief of poverty (distrIZ
 
buont The concentration ot 
 ne studies will be on measures to 
improve the effectiveness of aid; assessment of the past effectiveness 
of aid will be attempted only in the ways and to the extent required
 
for reaching conclusions on such measures. These measures are
 
understood as potential action on the part of both donors and
 
recipients. Lessons of successes and failures, of a kind which can be
 
drawn upon in a published report, will be of particular value. The
 
Task Force will make available to the consultants a list of particular
 
areas of concern, to which the consultants will pay attention to the
 
fullest extent possible.
 
The country studies will be conducted under the following main
 
headings:
 
1. The Macro-Economic Contribution of Aid Resources, Past and Future
 
- Hov significant is the volume of aid as a contribution to 
supplementing a country's foreign exchange availability or
 
resources for domestic investment?
 
- How far has this contribution assisted recipients'
 
development-growth and distribution?
 
- Bow important are aid flows relative to other potential
 
sources of exterial finance, private and official?
 
To the extent that countries have opportunities to borrow
 
non-concessional funds, what is the 'trade-off' between the
 
two? (i.e. what volume of non-concessional finance would
 
balance, in its value to a particular economy, a given volume
 
of concessional finance?)
 
2. Aid and Poverty
 
How far has aid assisted the reduction of poverty, by direct
 
contribution to enhancing the livelihoods of the poor, or
 
through promoting development which enhances their
 
livelihoods?
 
-5-

To what extent have the benefits of aid been confined to
 
particular groups or classes? Have any groups been made worse
 
off as a result of aid?
 
3. 	The Policy Dialogue at Various Levels in Project and Program Aid
 
The policy environment in which aid functions; how effective
 
is the policy dialogue between donors and the recipient at
 
national and sectoral levels?
 
Insofar as aid project3 incorporate technical assistance and
 
advice, how effective is the project as a vehicle for
 
assisting policy formation?
 
4. 	The Systemic Effects of Aid
 
What problems arise from the operation of a multiplicity of
 
aid programs of various donors in a recipient country? What
 
are the effects on the recipient's budgetary process, on the
 
demand for scarce resources - administrative, managerial,
 
skilled manpower, local or recurrent cost finance?
 
5. 	Project Performance
 
How 	successful have aid projects been in achieving their
 
objectives and contributing to development?
 
What lessons can be learned from successful and unsuccessful
 
projects?
 
Have projects had unanticipated side-effects, beneficial or
 
othervise?
 
6. 	Donor Policies and Procedures
 
To what extent do donor preferences for various forms of aid
 
correspond to recipient needs - especially the preference of
 
donors for projects as opposed to programs or local/recurrent
 
cost assistance?
 
What is the impact of aid tying?
 
7. 	institution-building, Technical Assistance, and Resource
 
Management
 
What has been the contribution of aid and technical assistance
 
to institution-building and the effective management of
 
resources in public or private sectors at various levels?
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Insolar as administrative and manpower deficiencies set limits
 
to the absorptive capacity for aid, can aid do more to assist
 
the removal of these limitacions?
 
8. Aid and Market Forces
 
What is the distribution of aid, in its final use, as between
 
privat6 and public sectors? Insofar as the final use is in the
 
public sector, what share goes directly to productive
 
enterprises or to infrastructural or other uses beneficial to
 
the private sector?
 
To what extent can aid be said to have supported. the
 
allocative role of price signals in production in recipient
 
countries?
 
How can aid assist the improved functioning of price signals
 
(to move from 'getting prices right' to 'making prices work')?
 
9. Conclusions: Improving Aid Effectiveness
 
What can be said aout measures to improve aid effectiveness;
 
measures to be undertaken by donors and recipients? Can
 
conclusions be reached about desirable and feasible new
 
directions for aid coordination?
 
